

**THE FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENT
POLICIES AND CHANGING PRIORITIES:
*AFRICA***

Edited by:
Dr. Ervin GÖMBÖS

**United Nations Association of Hungary
HUNIDA Kht
2006**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary and UNDP have supported the conference and contributed to the publication of its proceedings, i.e. of this book.

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ISBN 963 86322 3 2**

***Front cover: VIRTUART Kreatív Stúdió Kft.
Cover photo: Zoltán VENCZEL***

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAP	Africa Action Plan
ACP	Africa, Caribbean, Pacific
ADF	Asian Development Fund
ADI	African Development Indicators
ADLI	Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization strategy
AFLEG	Africa Forest Law Enforcement and Governance
AGOA	US's Africa Growth and Opportunity Act
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
AMCOW	African Ministerial Council on Water
AMESD	African Monitoring of the Environment for Sustainable Development
APF	Africa Peace Facility
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union (formerly Organization of African Unity – OAU)
BWIs	Bretton Woods Institutions
CAR	Central African Republic
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity (UN)
CfA	(UK Prime Minister's) Commission for Africa
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora
CLS	Core Labour Standards
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CSSDCA	Conference on Security Stability and Development and Cooperation in Africa
CTO	(compensatory time-off) policy
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DDA	Doha Development Agenda
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Reinsertion
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Community or European Commission
ECOFAC	Programme for Conservation and Rational Utilization of Forest Ecosystems in Central Africa
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDCTP	European and Developing countries Clinical Trials Partnerships
EDF	European Development Fund
EIB	European Investment Bank

EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FEMA	Forum of Energy Ministers in Africa
FEMIP	Facility for Euro Mediterranean Investment Partnership
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
FPA	Fishery Partnership Agreements
FPOL	Front POLISARIO (Frente Popular Para la Liberacion de la Seguia al Hamra y el Rio de Oro) (Western Sahara)
G8	Group of Eight (richest countries)
GAERC	European Council for General Affairs and External Relations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GÉANT	a multi-gigabit pan-European data communications network, reserved specifically for research and education use.
GMES	Global Monitoring for Environment and Security
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HQ	Headquarters
HUF	Hungarian forints
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICJ	International Court of Justice (of the UN)
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDA	International Development Association
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFF	International Finance Facility
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMS	Integrated Manufacturing Strategy
JFA	Joint Format for Financial Agreements
JFP	Joint Framework for multi-annual Programming
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LICs	Low Income Countries
LICUS	Low Income Countries Under Stress
LICUS	Low Income Countries Under Stress
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

MAP	Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEDA progr.	principal financial instrument of the EU for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
NAP	National Action Plan
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIP	National Indicative Programme
OAU	Organization for African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Co-operation; the forerunner to the OECD
OHA	Official Humanitarian Aid
OIC	Officer in Charge
PFM	Public Financial Management
POLISARIO	Front (Frente Popular Para la Liberacion de la Seguia al Hamra y el Rio de Oro (Western Sahara)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Process
RECs	Africa's Regional Economic Communities
RIP	Regional Indicative Programme
RMA	Royal Moroccan Army
RTD	Framework Programme for Research, Technology Development and Demonstration
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADR	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SDPRP	Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program
SLM	Sustainable Land Management
SMEs	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
SR	Security Sector Reform
SRH	Sexual Reproductive Health
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General (Head of Mission)
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSATP	Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Programme
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWEEP	Sector-Wide Enterprise, Employment and Equity Programme
TB	tuberculosis
TDCA	Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
TEMPUS	Trans-European mobility scheme for university study

TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TRIP	Trade-Related Intellectual Property
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNA	United Nations Association
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCCC	United Nations Climate Change Convention
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMOs	United Nations Military Observers
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar
UXOs	unexploded munitions
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WSIS	World Summit on the Information Society
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organization
YEN	Youth Employment Network

PREFACE

by the Editor

In recent years the importance of international cooperation in the economic and social life of Hungary has grown considerably. As a result of Hungary's membership of the UN, the European Union and OECD as well, it has become a major responsibility for the country to participate in international development cooperation, that is, to assist and speed up development in the developing countries. The European Union and the OECD have committed themselves to the implementation of the decisions made by the large international conferences - like sustainable development and financing development - organized by the UN in the last fifteen years and to the realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

By becoming a donor country, Hungary has started to formulate its development cooperation policy in harmony with that of the above mentioned international organizations. In addition to the development of the adequate institutional framework, it is important to disseminate information about the goals and activities of international development cooperation in order to make it more acceptable in society. Professional training programmes are also necessary.

In the framework of policy formulation and capacity building, on the occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the UN and the 50th Anniversary of Hungary's membership of the UN, the United Nations Association of Hungary and HUN-IDA (an organization responsible for the implementation of Hungary's International Development Cooperation programmes) have organized a UN ACADEMY in cooperation with UNDP and the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004/2005 in Budapest. The theme of the UN Academy was "International Development Cooperation in the 21st Century". The aim of the UN Academy was to provide for national capacity building, to transfer the necessary knowledge for human resource development and to influence public opinion.

The Academy, which started with a full day conference on 19 November 2004, proved to be a great success. More than 350 persons (mostly students, but also representatives of NGOs, government and private sector) registered for the Academy. The Conference was followed by a series of 10 lectures and consultations (once in a week) and a closing conference on 21 March 2005. The lecturers were well known Hungarian and foreign experts and researchers. Some 100 participants received a certificate of attendance as a result of having attended the majority of lectures. The proceedings of the Academy have been published in a 400-page book titled: "International Development Cooperation in the 21st Century"

The success of the Academy was one of the inspiring factors for continuation. The organizers decided that a conference should be held on Africa. The special needs of Africa were clearly recognized by world leaders in the Millennium Declaration, and the United Nations system as a whole is firmly committed to supporting African efforts. The Millennium Summit six years ago, and in particular the eight MDGs, all of which are aimed at dramatically reducing

the amount of extreme poverty and human misery on our planet during the first 15 years of this century. These are goals set by the world for the world, although it is in Africa that they present the toughest challenge, and in Africa that their achievement will depend most crucially on international solidarity.

Our prospect of achieving MDGs depends first and foremost on the peoples of the developing countries, and above all on their leaders. Those peoples clearly recognize that, unless they themselves have the will to resolve their conflicts, eliminate corruption, uphold the rule of law, give priority to the needs of the poor, create an investment-friendly climate, and use their natural resources in a sustainable manner, no one else will be able to do these things for them.

But even the best efforts of these countries to break out of the cycle of poverty, ignorance, disease, conflict and environmental degradation are likely to be insufficient unless they can count on the support of the international community.

The United Nations is committed to supporting the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as the framework for addressing poverty and underdevelopment throughout the African continent. The UN system's diverse funds, programmes, agencies and departments are actively supporting NEPAD priorities and MDGs in line with their particular areas of expertise. The New Partnership for Africa's Development is an African Union-led, -owned and -managed initiative, and it is a serious commitment to addressing the aspirations of the continent, as decided by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in 2001.

A full-day conference on Africa („The Future of Development Policies and Changing Priorities: Africa”) was held on 28 October 2005 in the Headquarters of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences with more than 200 participants (mostly students). The Morning Session was chaired by Prof. *Mihály SIMAI*, President of the UNA of Hungary while the Afternoon Session by Mr. *László VIZI*, Head of the Department of International Development Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The two chairpersons had been deeply involved in the preparation and organization of the Conference as well. We have to highly appreciate their commitment to and support for the conference. We have to be profoundly grateful to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UNDP for their generosity in financing this project, the Conference and the follow-up publication, i.e. this book.

Finally we have to mention Ms. *Ibolya BÁRÁNY*, Director of HUNIDA and her staff members. Ms. Bárány encouragement, her extraordinary and apparently effortless efficiency has greatly contributed to the success of the Conference. Many thanks should go to her, her staff and the staff of the UNA of Hungary as well.

The proceedings of the conference can be found in this book. The order of the articles corresponds to the delivery order of lectures. Dr. *Erika FODOR* was expected to give a lecture but because of her other engagement she couldn't. In spite of this, she has submitted the text of her lecture. In the Annexes we included some important documents, like the EU Strategy for Africa and the MDGs.

WELCOMING ADDRESS

Attila MESKÓ, Secretary-General, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Excellencies, State Secretary, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have the honour to say welcome to all participants of today's meeting as a representative of the host organization, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. I greet our distinguished guests. All of us are looking forward very much to their contributions.

The Hungarian Academy of Sciences always paid attention to the development of African affairs. Hungary also tried to help and wishes to take part in the European Union efforts in the future.

In recent years the international awareness of the situation in Africa has significantly improved. I quote from the latest report of the Commission of the European Communities (dated 12th of October 2005, titled: "*EU Strategy for Africa: towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa's Development*" – the complete Communication can be found in the Annexes of this book – ed.).

"Africa is on the move. The birth of the African Union, the reinforced role of Africa's Regional Economic Communities and the emergence of a new generation of leaders at national level has changed Africa. It is also changing the relationship between Africa and Europe."

Europe and Africa are connected by strong trade links, making the EU the biggest export market for African products. Approximately 85 percent of Africa's export in cotton, fruits and vegetables are imported by the EU. In 2003 the EU'S development aid to Africa totaled 15 billion euros compared to 5 billion in 1985.

"But for too long the EU's relation with Africa has been too fragmented, both in policy formulation and implementation. The purpose of the new strategy for Africa is, therefore, to give the EU a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relation with the African continent."

In this EU strategy for Africa the principal objective is to promote the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa.

The Millennium Development Goals are:

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a global partnership for development

The report concludes that "Europe and Africa are bound together by common history, interlocking cultures and shared objectives. Sustainable social, economic and political development in Africa is our common concern. Together Africa and Europe should reinforce their efforts".

The EU strategy is expected to be adopted by the European Council in December 2005. It is a challenge to get Africa back on the track of sustainable development and to meet the Millennium Development Goals by the target year 2015.

Hungary became a member state of the EU in the last year. Therefore, this is also our mission our common duty.

I consider the present meeting as a contribution to increase awareness of the significance of the Euro-African pact and the role of Hungary in its realization.

I wish all participants a successful meeting and fruitful discussions at the end of both parts.

Thank you!

OPENING ADDRESS

Ferenc GÉMESI, Deputy State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1. Introduction

- This conference is an evident consequence of a so called „filling the gaps” series commenced in 2004. These events create platforms for collective thinking and provide a high-quality professional forum for those who wish to take active part in developing relationships with African countries.
- The rising of Africa is our common interest and it is an especially urgent matter as changes that would soften the serious problems of the continent are awaiting.
- The importance of Africa as a focal point for international development cooperation is unquestionable. It is enough to look at the disappointing figures of statistics. Most of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) and the Low Income Countries (LIC) are to be situated on the African continent. The majority of the population lives below the poverty line. Other problems such as civil wars, corrupt systems and dictators make people’s everyday lives even harder and harder.
- Statistics are horrifying: 20 countries have shown regression in their economies since 1990 which can mainly be explained by the spread of AIDS. According to the Administrator of UNDP there is a great risk that these above mentioned countries will not be able to step on the path of development at all.

2. International tendencies – EU relevance

- The political strength and importance of the African continent is increasingly relevant in the fields of international relations. Parallel to the more and more intensive commercial relations the European re-orientation of African export to Europe and the strengthening interests towards the exploitation of energy and raw materials in the area, there are value-driven foreign policy efforts by the international community. These efforts are focusing on classic development cooperation issues such as the problems of poverty reduction, underdevelopment and urging economic, social, food and health care matters.
- It is a primary intention of the EU to promote development policies that are focusing on Africa. These policies intend to cover the following areas: the realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), making efforts in reducing areas of conflict and fighting against international terrorism and organized crime.
- Out of all the donors it is the EU that provides the highest volume of support for Africa. According to statistical reports the EU represents 60% of all Official Development Assistance granted for the continent. The EU intends to further

increase its ODA resources and as a mid-term plan the Union would like to allocate more than half of its growth of support to Africa.

- The member states of the EU and the African countries have a several centuries-old complex and diversified relationship and a common history as well to connect one another. The reasons of the EU for taking part in development co-operation are special and unique (several member states such as United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Portugal and Italy have colonial pasts).
- Colonial past has its negative aspects as well. It is a constantly remaining tendency that donor EU member states support their African partners through bilateral relations based on their own national interests. The level of co-ordination is relatively poor due to the permanent competition between leading donor nations. This situation may create programme duplications while still keeping efficiency at low levels leading to further spread of corruption.
- As a result of the above mentioned aspects the question of donor co-ordination, harmonization and aid effectiveness became central and vital points of the Development Policy Statement which is currently being discussed on the future of EU development policy. Hungary as well is an active participant in this debate.
- On one hand the need for a solution of problems is clearly reflected in the following acts: the Paris Declaration, the revision of the Cotonou Agreement, the Monterrey Agreement, the creation of development means related to Economic Partnership Agreements, the new commercial goals of the WTO and the reaffirmation MDGs at the UN Summit of September 2005. On the other hand it is the new initiatives of African organizations that represent this clear reflection of intentions towards problem solutions.
- Europe possesses comparative advantages within the international community in the field of problem solutions on the African continent which is principally due to certain historical reasons and Europe's geographical closeness to Africa. This explains why it is especially timely and structure an EU action plan which harmonizes the Africa policy of the EU, of its member states and its institutions.
- This matter is both targeted by the Commission's Communication („*EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa's Development*” – the complete Communication can be found in the Annexes of this book – ed.) which describes the directions of the EU's Africa Strategy, and by the prepared decision related to the financing of the African Peace Facility.

3. New aspects of development co-operation

- A new approach in development co-operation is that the problems of the African continent can best be handled and solved by the African Union and the concerned African states themselves. This theory is called the principle of „ownership” and in order to realize its elements the EU must aim to increase and develop the capacities of African institutions.

- For the „ownership” approach to be realized we have to provide a platform for intensifying communication and the acquaintance of African needs.
- The communication between Europe and Africa concentrates on four main areas: (1) peace and security, (2) good governance, (3) regional integration and trade, (4) development. Hungary’s Africa policy can also be defined by these four main development areas.
- It has been recognized that development co-operation on its own, without the coherency of other branches of politics, cannot succeed in reaching its goals. The politics of trade and environment cannot be inconsistent with development goals as, this way, they would only weaken the efficiency of each other.
- It is important though that the future Africa strategy must be structured in a way that peace and security, governance, trade and the coherent fields of development are represented in a balanced way taking into consideration their interconnectivity
- *An example to demonstrate the interconnectivity between development and security:* Today a part of the activities financed in Africa belongs to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Some of these are military expenses while other financed activities qualify for development support. The Council agreed on a budget of 250 million euros debited from the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) for the establishment of the African Peace Facility (APF) in 2003. Approximately half of this financial support was spent on the Darfur operation (future support and development co-operation in the long run on the basis of peacemaking and peacekeeping actions). There has been an international understanding about a specific concern that the humanitarian aids sent to Darfur, without the normalization of the situation in the area, will never get to their targets.

4. Relevance to Hungary – Hungary’s integration into the EU’s Africa policy

- For decades Hungary and Africa have been keeping intensive relations with each other but mainly on an ideological basis.
- It now seems almost evident that by the end of the 1980s these relations have started to become weaker parallel to the loosening of the bipolar world order and the systematic change in Hungary. As a consequence of the systematic change Hungary’s old ideological link with Africa has disappeared.
- Besides the political reasons it is important to mention the consequences of Hungary’s domestic economic transformation. Almost overnight those large state-owned companies which had the possibility to enter foreign markets have disappeared. The radius of Hungary’s foreign trade has decreased.
- There have been other events as well such as civil wars and domestic conflicts in several African countries that did not help the already weakened Hungarian-African relations. On top of all this the most serious effects of these conflicts targeted Hungary’s key partners in the area: Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique.

- Under these changed conditions Hungary had to radically decrease its presence in Africa. We closed eight out of our ten embassies on the continent and opened only one in the Republic of South Africa after the apartheid era ended.
- Today we have three embassies functioning in the Sub-Saharan Africa: one in Nigeria, one in the Republic of South Africa and one in Kenya, representing three regional centres for West, South and East Africa. It is important to note that we accredit our Ambassadors to several other states within a given sub-region of course. Three African countries have opened their embassies in Budapest: Angola, the Republic of South Africa and Nigeria.
- A new chapter has been opened with the realization of our EU integrational objectives.
- As now a member state, Hungary (in harmony with its interests) also has the opportunity to take an active part in the process of the EU's Africa policy being developed. It is high time that we redefined our goals and interests concerning the African continent and created a new framework for our intentions. Within our foreign relation aspirations we must define Africa's position in a rational and future-oriented manner. We cannot ignore the effects of Hungary's EU membership on our foreign policy either. Everything that is important and relevant for the European Union has to be included in one way or another in Hungary's foreign policy as well.
- Hungary is also part of the specific conclusions (General Affairs and External Relations Council; European Council) which are designed to promote the EU's development policy for Africa. Although the Hungarian ODA priorities are targeted mainly to countries situated outside the African continent we cannot back out of the ongoing international tendency. We must take an active part in supporting Africa:
 - Dr. Ferenc Somogyi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote a supporting letter where he proposed to revive the „Cairo Process” and advised to organize the EU-Africa Summit as soon as possible
 - it is a fact that the EU's financial perspectives for 2007-2013 now include Hungary as a financing state of the ACP-EU co-operation (10th EDF).
- As a participant of the Cotonou Agreement, Hungary among other states as well takes part in the political communication with African states and the African Union. We have become a member of a permanent, structured cooperation mechanism through which we have the opportunity to mutually get better acquainted with one another.
- Hungary cannot separate itself from the problems of Africa. Our country used to be a transit-country for economic and political refugees from this area but today it is slowly becoming a target-country. The Sub-Saharan region constantly in the position of crisis becomes the hotbed for problems with international relevance. Organized crime, international terrorism and AIDS reaches and concerns Hungary as well. It is our rational and moral interest to decrease poverty and create political stability.

- Although Hungary's main international frame of promoting its interests in the world is now the European Union it is definitely not an exclusive frame. A significant part of Hungary's assertion of interests, mainly economic ones, will still be communicated and negotiated within bilateral frameworks. That is why Hungary's Africa policy has to pay special attention to the bilateral development of relations with those African partner countries that have special relevance and importance to us. We aspire to maintain our present relations and those that we have been building through the past decades.
- Hungary, though possessing rather modest means, also contributes to the African peacemaking efforts of the EU. At this very moment as well, we have a military observer in Darfur. From May 2005 Hungary, as the only new EU member state, delegates one expert to the EUSEC civic crisis management mission which serves the transformation of the Congo security sector. As a result of Hungarian social donations UNICEF has collected 10 million HUF to help the children of Sudan.
- Ethiopia is one of our ODA policy partner countries.
- The Hungarian government decided to forgive Ethiopia's debt towards Hungary in the spirit of the commonly represented development policy by the UN, the EU and the G8. According to the agreement signed in Addis Abeba on 28th June 2005 regarding the 7.4 million dollar debt relief, Hungary is canceling 90% of Ethiopia's debt. The remaining 10% will be spent on poverty reduction programs.
- There is an important Hungarian private initiation going on related to Ethiopia. Recently, Hungarian manufacturers sent 600.000 USD worth of aid supply to Ethiopia, including various medical devices and took responsibility for training the corresponding Ethiopian experts as well. These above mentioned companies are preparing similar aid supplies to be sent to Sudan and Somalia.
- As an EU member state Hungary has adopted a new system of values which takes into consideration not only our national interests but solidarity and human rights, too
- We progressively have to harmonize our ongoing bilateral development programmes and aid policies with the expectations of the European Union. In the future we wish to contribute to the realization of common ideas through programmes of smaller volume that adapt better to our possibilities.

5. Summary and conclusion

- Europe believes that with time Africa will recover from its „child illness” and the Pan African organization can successfully face its challenges.
- I am convinced indeed that the possibilities arising from being an EU member state and our steps taken can only give hope and optimism.
- Although diplomacy in general and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs play a very important part in the making of Hungary's Africa policies, we are not the only actor here. The business world, the civil sphere or other state institutions for

instance are also important in forming Hungary's relations with the African continent.

- Globalization transformed the African challenge into a complex problem. In order to reach optimistic results it is not enough to promote development policies. Besides the obvious political and economic aspects our efforts have to be extended to and focused on cultural values as well. We can only succeed in Africa and show true results if the community of nations takes into consideration not only the development of supporting systems but the ethnic, language and tribal, in one word: cultural differences and variety. The development of Africa requires and assumes a two-way process: both the supporter and the supported must take mutual responsibility for the success of development efforts.

DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD 100 YEARS – A POSITIVE VISION FOR INCREASED INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

Bengt LUNDBORG, Ambassador of Sweden to Hungary

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is a pleasure and a privilege to be invited to speak about Dag Hammarskjöld in connection with today's conference which puts the spotlight on Africa's development. To do so in this setting and in the beautiful building of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is an honor.

During the period Dag Hammarskjöld was at the helm of the United Nations more than 25 countries achieved their independence and became members of the United Nations. He did his utmost to welcome the new African members and to make them feel at home in the international community and he also put the spotlight on Africa's problems and potential.

His accomplishments have contributed to shaping Sweden's role as a very strong supporter of the United Nations. His legacy continues to inspire Swedish policies. The United Nations remains a corner stone of Swedish foreign and security policy and of our development co-operation policy.

In connection with the celebration this week of the UN-Day we might reflect for a moment on the life and achievements of Dag Hammarskjöld. We remember him today for his truly remarkable job at the United Nations during a formative and decisive but challenging period of the young world organization.

As he arrived in New York, his predecessor Tryggve Lie welcomed him with these words: "You are taking over the world's most impossible job".

At that time, in April 1953, the hopeful spirit of the San Francisco conference was gone. The United Nations was in deep crisis. Its staff dispirited. The Security Council deadlocked.

The appointment of Hammarskjöld signalled a turning point in UN affairs. Despite the straitjacket of the Cold War, Hammarskjöld gave the organization eight years of dynamic leadership.

As Secretary-General, he was instrumental in developing conflict prevention and peace-keeping. He strengthened the independence and impartiality of the United Nations. He re-organized and re-energized the secretariat. He created a more political and public role for the Secretary-General, giving a new meaning to international leadership and co-operation.

To this day, his contribution to the United Nations continues to influence its work.

Who was Dag Hammarskjöld?

He was born in 1905 and spent his childhood in the Swedish university town of Uppsala, where his father became county governor. His father was a professor of law and was active in international legal circles as well as in political life in Sweden. For a while during the 1st world war his father was Prime Minister of Sweden but had to resign. As a young boy, Dag Hammarskjöld thus had the opportunity to study political life and its challenges. He developed a sense of duty and self-sacrifice combined in what Dag Hammarskjöld often referred to as "integrity" or to be faithful to one self.

"Markings", a book of Hammarskjöld's personal reflections over many years, that was published after his death in a plane crash in 1961, may be regarded as his way of examining his own role, personality and destiny.

Hammarskjöld graduated as an economist, received a doctorate in economy and soon became the State Secretary of the Ministry of Finance. He also served as chairman of the Bank of Sweden. International affairs came more into focus when in 1947 he moved to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and became the State Secretary between 1949 and 1951. But his Swedish career was not to end there. Although he was not active in party politics he was elevated to the rank of Cabinet Minister without portfolio in 1951.

By the time he unexpectedly was appointed UN Secretary General he had extensive political experience, despite his pronounced civil service orientation. He had also participated in international negotiations to establish the OEEC, the forerunner to the OECD. It was probably there that his talent and capacity was noticed by the representatives of countries such as the UK and France.

His obvious skills were high proficiency, mental and physical endurance, the ability to analyze a situation quickly, keep the facts in order and to propose courses of action. He had an air of self-assurance and won peoples confidence. Hammarskjöld also impressed through his broad cultural and scholarly interests. Nevertheless it came as a great surprise when, after months of discussions, the five permanent members of the Security Council reached an agreement to propose the unknown Dag Hammarskjöld as new Secretary General.

Sweden had not campaigned to have Hammarskjöld elected and he was not even asked if he was available for the job. I think such a procedure would be impossible today.

The best way to honour Dag Hammarskjöld's memory is to ask what we can learn today from his work in the service of the United Nations.

Let me highlight three themes:

First: Hammarskjöld was committed to a *dynamic* United Nations. The United Nations Charter is strictly binding, but the working methods and means can be changed or supplemented to meet new challenges. And they should be.

“We are working on the edge of human society”, he used to say. Continuous adjustment was, and remains, essential for the United Nations to evolve and meet changing demands.

Second: Hammarskjöld had a *creative* approach to international crisis management. He successfully established the first UN peacekeeping force in 1956, after the Suez crisis, a crisis that tragically came to overshadow the simultaneous uprising in Budapest. Four years later, in Congo, he initiated the United Nations first multifunctional peacekeeping operation – an involvement that eventually cost him his life. And he created a new role for the Secretary-General in several missions of silent diplomacy.

Third: Hammarskjöld had the *courage* to stand up for his principles. He knew that independence requires courage. He stood up against the great powers when they criticized him, defending the unique role of the United Nations as the guardian of all states. He defined the concept of the independent international civil servant as a corner stone of an effective international order.

Dag Hammarskjöld was an intellectual and visionary, but also a man of action.

Today, much like when Dag Hammarskjöld was elected, the United Nations has come to a decisive moment.

The nature of the challenges and threats we face today makes the United Nations more indispensable than ever. At the same time, some question the organisation’s performance.

This autumn Member States gathered at the highest political level to discuss how to reform the United Nations and strengthen the multilateral system, and how to ensure that the Millennium Development Goals are fulfilled.

We must seize this special opportunity in the very spirit that Dag Hammarskjöld captured in 1957, when he just had been re-elected as Secretary-General.

Then he said:

“The many who together form this Organization – peoples, governments, and individuals – share one great responsibility. Future generations may come to say of us that we never achieved what we set out to do. May they never be entitled to say that we failed because we lacked faith or permitted narrow self-interests to distort our efforts.”

As Foreign Minister Somogyi said last week during his speech on the United Nations in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (UN Day event organized by the United Nations Association of Hungary – editor), we must do our best to give the United Nations the tools and the political support that is necessary for it to

be the strong, modern and effective organization that the world needs. The need for multilateral cooperation is evident when we look at the plights of many around the world that are struck by political conflicts, by poverty and famine or by natural disasters.

The United Nations must get better at strengthening the security and the human rights of all individuals. Only the United Nations offers a structure for comprehensive action. Only the United Nations should provide legitimacy for enforcement measures. We all share the responsibility to make the United Nations the organization that we want it to be – dynamic, creative and courageous.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dag Hammarskjöld's outlook on life and his achievements are an inspiration to us all. He truly made a difference.

Let us be guided by his dynamic and constructive views and by his belief in humanity and in the great potential of the United Nations.

Let us follow his example of taking action in order to give ideals a practical meaning for the benefit of all mankind.

AFRICA: ACHIEVEMENTS, FAILURES, CHALLENGES – THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

**Ambassador Myles WICKSTEAD, Head of Secretariat, Commission
for Africa, United Kingdom**

1. Introduction

In 2005 the world will review progress on a remarkable commitment it made in 2000. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set out to halve world poverty by 2015. But we are now a third of the way to that date and the rich world is falling behind on its pledges to the poor. Nowhere is that more clear than in Africa, where the world is furthest behind in progress to fulfill those solemn promises. If that is to change we must act now.

But all is not gloom. For 2005 is also the year in which it is becoming clear to the outside world that things are changing on the continent – with African governments showing a new vision, both individually and working together through the African Union and its New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) programme. Africa, at last, looks set to deliver.

In 2004, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, brought together 17 people to form a Commission for Africa (CfA)ⁱ. They were invited in their individual and personal capacities rather than as representatives of governments or institutions. A majority of them come from Africa and they have varied experience as political leaders, public servants and in the private sector. The task they were set was this: to define the challenges facing Africa, and to provide clear recommendations on how to support the changes needed to reduce poverty. The Commission has submitted its Report in March 2005: “Our Common Interest”ⁱⁱⁱ.

The objectives of the Commission are:

- To generate new ideas and action for a strong and prosperous Africa, using the 2005 British Presidencies of the G8 and the European Union as a platform;
- To support the best of existing work on Africa, in particular the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union, and help ensure this work achieves its goals;
- To help deliver implementation of existing international commitment towards Africa;
- To offer a fresh and positive perspective for Africa and its diverse culture in the 21st century, which challenges unfair perceptions and helps deliver changes; and
- To understand and help fulfill African aspirations for the future by listening to Africans.

The starting point of the Commission was the recognition that Africa must drive its own development. Rich nations should support that, because it is in our common interest to make the world a more prosperous and secure place – though the international community will contribute to the achievement of these objectives in different ways. But what is clear is that if Africa does not create the right conditions for development, then any amount of outside support will fail.

The Commission's recommendations are based on two things. Its members carefully studied all the evidence available to find out what is working and what is not. And they consulted extensively, inside and outside Africa, with governments, civil society, the academic world and with those in the public and private sector.

They have met individuals and groups from each region and 49 individual countries in Africa, and from every G8 country, China, India and across Europe. They have received nearly 500 formal submissions and have made a particular effort to engage with the African diaspora.

The Report is in two parts. The first, The Argument, addresses itself to that wider audience and succinctly sets out their call to action. The second part, The Analysis and Evidence, lays out the substance and basis of the recommendations so these can be held up to public scrutiny. The Recommendations are set out between these two sections.

The Report is written for many audiences: for decision-makers in Africa who must now drive forward the programme of change they have set out; for the rich and powerful nations of the world, whose leaders meet as the G8 in Gleneagles in Scotland in July 2005 where they must take a strong lead for action of a different order; for the international community, which must commit to greater and faster action on the Millennium Development Goals at the United Nations in September – and must also act boldly at the World Trade Organization talks in Hong Kong in December.

The Report is also written for the people of Africa and the world as a whole. For it is they who must demand action. It is only their insistence which will determine whether their political leaders take strong and sustained action.

The measures proposed constitute a coherent package for Africa. They must be delivered together. 2005 is the year to take the decisions that will show we are serious about turning the vision of a strong and prosperous Africa into a reality.

The main argument and recommendations of the Commission for Africa Report, noting in particular that it had to be seen as a total package. Africa had to be viewed in its historical and cultural context. Reasonable levels of governance, peace and security were a pre-requisite for development. When these were in place, it was possible to address the institutional and resource issues required to build the education and health systems necessary to move towards delivering the Millennium Development Goals. This could not happen in a sustainable way without strong economic growth, which depended in turn on developing physical infrastructure within and between the regions of Africa, and developing Africa's capacity to trade. The CfA recommendations addressed ways in which the

international community could support these objectives, including through the 'Make Poverty History' goals of improving the quantity and quality of aid, debt relief and trade policies.

Whilst there was still a tendency to see Africa as a place of deprivation and conflict, in fact there had been very positive developments in recent years. These included the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Pan-African Parliament. Governance was very much better than 25 years previously; and, in spite of media attention on Darfur and other conflict situations, so was peace and security. This all meant that real progress was now possible, with the international community supporting Africa's efforts by helping it to build its physical and human infrastructure.

The Report had received strong and widespread support, both within Africa (where it had been endorsed by the AU Summit in early July) and within the rest of the international community. This reflected, at least in part, the comprehensive consultation process that had taken place both before and after the Report's publication. The European dimension was significant, and the decision of the established members of the European Union to reach the 0.7% target by 2015, with the countries which had recently acceded reaching 0.33% by the same date, had set a very positive framework for events later in the year, particularly the G8 Summit in July and the Millennium Review Summit in New York in September. The restart of the trade round in December 2005 would be crucial.

Whilst 2005 had, thus far, been a very good year for Africa in terms of commitments, it would be crucial that those commitments were carried through into implementation. That was a task for 2006 and beyond. There was a real role for Hungary in this continuing effort, for example by honouring its financial commitments and using increasing resources to help build capacity in Africa, and by supporting the opening of European markets to African goods. Some Hungarians had relevant experience in Africa; and many Africans had come to Hungary for training in the past. The direct example of Hungary and other new members of the European Union, who had had first-hand experience of fundamental political and economic change over the previous fifteen years, could be particularly relevant to Africa.

2. Summary of the Commission's Report: "Our Common Interest"

African poverty and stagnation is the greatest tragedy of our time. Poverty on such a scale demands a forceful response. And Africa – at country, regional, and continental levels – is creating much stronger foundations for tackling its problems. Recent years have seen improvements in economic growth and in governance. But Africa needs more of both if it is to make serious inroads into poverty. To do that requires a partnership between Africa and the developed world which takes full account of Africa's diversity and particular circumstances.

For its part, Africa must accelerate reform. And the developed world must increase and improve its aid, and stop doing those things which hinder Africa's progress. The developed world has a moral duty – as well as a powerful motive of self-interest – to assist Africa. We believe that now is the time when greater external support can have a major impact and this is a vital moment for the world to get behind Africa's efforts.

The actions proposed by the Commission constitute a coherent package for Africa. The problems they address are interlocking. They are vicious circles which reinforce one another. They must be tackled together. To do that Africa requires a comprehensive 'big push' on many fronts at once. Partners must work together to implement this package with commitment, perseverance and speed, each focusing on how they can make the most effective contribution.

2.1 Getting Systems Right: Governance and Capacity-Building

Africa's history over the last fifty years has been blighted by two areas of weakness. These have been capacity – the ability to design and deliver policies; and accountability – how well a state answers to its people. Improvements in both are first and foremost the responsibility of African countries and people. But action by rich nations is essential too.

Building capacity takes time and commitment. Weak capacity is a matter of poor systems and incentives, poor information, technical inability, untrained staff and lack of money. We recommend that donors make a major investment to improve Africa's capacity, starting with its system of higher education, particularly in science and technology. They must help to build systems and staff in national and local governments, but also in pan-African and regional organisations, particularly the African Union and its NEPAD programme.

Donors must change their behaviour and support the national priorities of African governments rather than allowing their own procedures and special enthusiasms to undermine the building of a country's own capacity.

Improving accountability is the job of African leaders. They can do that by broadening the participation of ordinary people in government processes, in part by strengthening institutions like parliaments, local authorities, trades unions, the justice system and the media. Donors can help with this. They can also help build accountable budgetary processes so that the people of Africa can see how money is raised and where it is going. That kind of transparency can help combat corruption, which African governments must root out. Developed nations can help in this too. Money and state assets stolen from the people of Africa by corrupt leaders must be repatriated. Foreign banks must be obliged by law to inform on suspicious accounts. Those who give bribes should be dealt with too; and foreign companies involved in oil, minerals and other extractive industries must make their payments much more open to public scrutiny. Firms who bribe should be refused export credits. Without progress in governance, all other reforms will have limited impact.

2.2 The Need for Peace and Security

The most extreme breakdown of governance is war. Africa has experienced more violent conflict than any other continent in the last four decades. In recent years things have improved in many countries, but in other places violent conflict is still the biggest single obstacle to development. Investing in development is investing in peace.

The most effective way to tackle conflict – to save both lives and money – is to build the capacity of African states and societies to prevent and manage conflict. That means using aid better to tackle the causes of conflict. It means improving the management of government incomes from natural resources and international agreements on how to control the ‘conflict resources’ which fuel or fund hostilities. It means controlling the trade in small arms.

African regional organizations and the UN can help prevent and resolve conflict when tensions cannot be managed at the national level, through, for example, effective early warning, mediation and peacekeeping. Donors can support this by providing flexible funding to the African Union and the continent’s regional organizations; and supporting the creation of a UN Peacebuilding Commission. The co-ordination and financing of postconflict peacebuilding and development must be improved to prevent states emerging from violent conflict from sliding back into it.

2.3 Leaving No-One Out: Investing in People

Poverty is more than just a lack of material things. Poor people are excluded from decision-making and from the basic services the state ought to provide. Schools and clinics must be available to the poorest people in Africa. This is an urgent matter of basic human rights and social justice. But it is also sound economics: a healthy and skilled workforce is a more productive one, fulfilling their potential with dignity. Investing for economic growth means rebuilding African health and education systems, many of which are now on the point of collapse. This requires major funding, but it is not only a question of resources. It is also about delivery and results. These are powerfully strengthened when local communities are involved in decisions that affect them.

Properly funding the international community’s commitment to Education for All will provide all girls and boys in sub-Saharan Africa with access to basic education to equip them with skills for contemporary Africa. Secondary, higher and vocational education, adult learning, and teacher training should also be supported within a balanced overall education system. Donors need to pay what is needed to deliver their promises – including the cost of removing primary school fees.

The elimination of preventable diseases in Africa depends above all on rebuilding systems to deliver public health services in order to tackle diseases such as TB and malaria effectively. This will involve major investment in staff, training,

the development of new medicines, better sexual and reproductive health services and the removal of fees paid by patients, which should be paid for by donors until countries can afford it. Funding for water supply and sanitation should be immediately increased, reversing years of decline. Top priority must be given to scaling up the services needed to deal with the catastrophe of HIV and AIDS which is killing more people in Africa than anywhere else in the world. But this must be done through existing systems, rather than parallel new ones.

Governments should also be supported to protect orphans and vulnerable children and other groups who would otherwise be left out of the growth story. Around half of the extra aid we are recommending should be spent on health, education and HIV and AIDS.

2.4 Going for Growth and Poverty Reduction

Africa is poor, ultimately, because its economy has not grown. The public and private sectors need to work together to create a climate which unleashes the entrepreneurship of the peoples of Africa, generates employment and encourages individuals and firms, domestic and foreign, to invest. Changes in governance are needed to make the investment climate stronger. The developed world must support the African Union's NEPAD programme to build public/private partnerships in order to create a stronger climate for growth, investment and jobs.

Growth will also require a massive investment in infrastructure to break down the internal barriers that hold Africa back. Donors should fund a doubling of spending on infrastructure – from rural roads and small-scale irrigation to regional highways, railways, larger power projects and Information & Communications Technology (ICT). That investment must include both rural development and slum upgrading, without which the poor people in Africa will not be able to participate in growth. And policies for growth must actively include – and take care not to exclude – the poorest groups. There should be particular emphasis on agriculture and on helping small enterprises, with a particular focus on women and young people. For growth to be sustainable, safeguarding the environment and addressing the risks of climate change should be integral to donor and government programmes. This programme for growth takes over a third of the total additional resources we propose.

2.5 More Trade and Fairer Trade

Africa faces two major constraints on trade. It does not produce enough goods, of the right quality or price, to enable it to break into world markets. And it faces indefensible trade barriers which, directly or indirectly, tax its goods as they enter the markets of developed countries.

To improve its capacity to trade Africa needs to make changes internally. It must improve its transport infrastructure to make goods cheaper to move. It must reduce and simplify the tariff systems between one African country and another. It

must reform excessive bureaucracy, cumbersome customs procedures, and corruption by public servants, wherever these exist. It must make it easier to set up businesses. It must improve economic integration within the continent's regional economic communities. Donors can help fund these changes.

But the rich nations must also dismantle the barriers they have erected against African goods, particularly in agriculture. These barriers hurt citizens in both rich and poor countries. Rich countries must abolish trade-distorting subsidies to their agriculture and agribusiness which give them an unfair advantage over poor African farmers. They must lower tariffs and other non-tariff barriers to African products, including stopping the bureaucratic application of rules of origin which excludes African goods from preferences to which they are entitled. And they must show this ambition by completing the current Doha Round of world trade talks in a way which does not demand reciprocal concessions from poor African nations. Careful attention must be given to ensure that the poorest people are helped to take advantage of the new opportunities and to cope with the impacts of a more open system of world trade. Africa must be provided with the funds that can help it adjust to the new opportunities of a changed world trading regime.

2.6 Where Will the Money Come From: Resources

To support the changes that have begun in Africa, we call for an additional US\$25 billion per year in aid, to be implemented by 2010. Donor countries should commit immediately to provide their fair share of this. Subject to a review of progress then, there would be a second stage, with a further US\$25 billion a year to be implemented by 2015. Ensuring the money is well spent will depend on two factors. First, good governance in Africa must continue to advance. But, second, donors must significantly improve the quality of aid and how it is delivered: that means more grants, more predictable and untied aid, and donor processes that are less burdensome on the already stretched administrations of African countries. It must also be better harmonized with the aid of other donors and better in line with the priorities, procedures and systems of African governments. Above all, it must be given in ways that make governments answerable primarily to their own people.

These changes are needed not just from individual donor nations but also from multilateral institutions – both African and global. The African Development Bank needs to be strengthened and the role of the Economic Commission for Africa enhanced. The IMF and World Bank need to give higher priority to Africa's development. They also need to become more accountable both to their shareholders and to their clients, and to give Africa a stronger voice in their decision-making.

Rich nations should commit to a timetable for giving 0.7 per cent of their annual income in aid. To provide the critical mass of aid which is needed now, the aid should be front-loaded through the immediate implementation of the International Finance Facility. Practical proposals should be developed for innovative financing methods such as international levies on aviation, which can

help secure funding for the medium and longer term.

For poor countries in sub-Saharan Africa which need it, the objective must be 100 per cent debt cancellation as soon as possible. This must be part of a financing package for these countries – including those excluded from current debt schemes – to achieve the Millennium Development Goals to halve world poverty by 2015, as promised by the international community at meetings in Monterrey and Kananaskis.

3. Conclusion

Bold comprehensive action on a scale needed to meet the challenges can only be done through a new kind of partnership. In the past, contractual and conditional approaches were tried, and failed. What we are suggesting is a new kind of development, based on mutual respect and solidarity, and rooted in a sound analysis of what actually works. This can speed up progress, building on recent positive developments in Africa, towards a just world of which Africa is an integral part

ⁱ Tony Blair (Chair) Fola Adeola, K Y Amoako, Nancy Kassebaum Baker, Hilary Benn, Gordon Brown, Michel Camdessus, Bob Geldof Ralph Goodale, Ji Peiding, William Kalema, Trevor Manuel, Benjamin Mkapa, Linah Mohohlo, Tidjane Thiam, Anna Tibaijuka, Meles Zenawi.

ⁱⁱ "Our Common Interest", Report of the Commission for Africa, March 2004, London, UK

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AND THE CHALLENGES TO AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

Dr. Duduzile MOERANE-KHOZA, Ambassador of South Africa to Hungary

Development in Africa and strengthening Africa's global position has been for the longest time about the struggles to liberate African countries from colonial domination and slavery, and in many ways to enable Africa to create opportunities for improving the very basic living conditions of its people. For decades, Africa has been grappling with the issues of Africa and Africa's development prospects, and there are significant turning points and moments where some of the ideas have been successful. There is however, also evidence of where this engagement has yielded less than desired development outcomes. It became clear to Africa that even with such good intentions, Africa's problems included more than the negative results of colonial domination, the most serious of some deficiencies were of Africa's own making.

It is common knowledge that development in Africa has remained uneven and spatial with many African countries failing to meet even the very basic needs of their people. This has however, not resulted in a paralysis in dealing with the daunting task of ensuring that the continent is rid of underdevelopment, conflict and instability, crippling poverty and disease". It is not hard to find examples of Africa's engagement with development initiatives. Hence it is also noteworthy to acknowledge the heroic efforts of African leaders particularly since the 1970's where they began "to craft their own indigenous development paradigms in the light of their own perceptions".

Since then, much progress has been made in Africa, especially with the promotion of democracy and peace and security - the two key obstacles to our progress on the development front. There is also recognition in Africa and the world that peace, security and democracy are necessary preconditions for attracting investments, garnering growth and development and reducing poverty. The advancement of the peace processes in countries like Sudan, Somalia and the DRC, are but a few examples highlighting the progress being made throughout the continent to ensure that peace and stability prevail.

For the purpose of today's deliberation on Africa and development, it seems reasonable that we anchor our approach to the most recent of these development initiatives particularly the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

The African Continent is currently engaged in a deep and fundamental renewal process to break the vicious cycle of political instability, poverty, and underdevelopment, as well as Africa's weak capacity to defend and advance her

interest in the global arena. The key building blocks of this renewal strategy are increased political unity, and concerted action through the African Union (AU), and accelerated socio-economic transformation through the AU programme, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

NEPAD is a pledge by African leaders based on a common vision and a firm conviction that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalized world. At the core of the NEPAD process is its African ownership, which must be retained and strongly promoted so as to meet the legitimate aspirations of African peoples. While the principle of partnership with the rest of the world is equally vital to this process, such partnerships must be based on mutual respect, dignity, shared responsibility, and mutual accountability. The expected outcomes are:

- Economic growth and development and increased employment;
- Reduction of poverty and inequality;
- Diversification of productive activities;
- Enhanced international competitiveness and increased exports and;
- Increased African integration into the global market.

The NEPAD is therefore, an attempt to address the weaknesses that lie at the core of the failure of previous initiatives to put Africa on the path of economic development such as the lack of political will. It is also intended to squarely face impediments to Africa's advancement without placing all the blame on history, especially Africa's colonial legacy. These impediments are summarized into two categories:

a. Conflict and Instability

There is a clear recognition that social development and economic progress are not possible where conflict and instability prevail. Africa has been the zone of the majority of wars and other conflicts in the world. This has not only retarded progress but has caused catastrophic devastation, which will take many years to repair. A humanitarian crisis has resulted from these rampant conflicts and various instabilities giving Africa the unenviable distinction of having the world's greatest number of refugees and internally displaced persons.

b. Dictatorial and Corrupt Governance

The NEPAD recognizes and accepts that democracy is an indispensable condition for sustained development. The Implementation Committee at their second meeting

in Abuja, Nigeria in 2002 came up with a Peer Review Mechanism whereby African states will police each other to ensure strict adherence to democratic principles and practice, ensuring that objectives contained in such documents as the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, the Protocol on the establishment of an African Court on Human and People's Rights and the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government.

The major challenge now for Africa is the acceleration of the Africa integration agenda and the positioning of this agenda in the global dialogue and development strategies. The acceleration of the Africa integration agenda lies at the heart of what could be done at the home front to advance Africa's global standing. It is important to note that this agenda began in the post-independence period, in the 1960s a time which resulted in the birth of the Organization for African Unity (OAU).

In the 1980s the integration process progressed with the Lagos Plan of Action which laid out the blueprint to transform the economy of the continent, with a priority focus on agriculture and food security. This plan was revised in the 1990s resulting in the Abuja Treaty which was tailored along the lines of the European Union. The treaty went far beyond the OAU Charter recognizing among other things, the "promotion and protection of human and peoples rights and introduced concepts of accountability, economic justice and popular participation on development.

A meeting in Kampala organized by the African Leadership Forum came up with a proposal to establish an African Conference on Security Stability and Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). The African leaders rejected the idea, but it resurfaced when President Obasanjo was elected into power and the idea was later adopted by the OAU Assembly.

In Sirte, Libya in 1999, a shift began to occur as African leaders took decisions which were to result in the Launch of the African Union (AU) and the New Economic Partnership for Development (NEPAD) programme. It is now common knowledge that the decision to launch the African Union was taken out of recognition that the integration model proposed by the Abuja Treaty was not merely too economic, but also inappropriate in Africa where the economies of most countries are too weak, raw material dependant and externally oriented.

The African Union is therefore, an amendment of the model proposed in the Abuja Treaty, but the objective still remains that of the establishment of the African Economic Community. What is different with the Union model is that the political institutions, which were not given priority in the Abuja Treaty, are now considered the primary organs for the rapid movements towards the establishment of the African Economic Community.

From this perspective, the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union at the 2000 OAU Summit in Lome, Togo was an important turning point. The AU Act fundamentally transformed the Organization for African Unity into an African Union. The Act broadened the scope and objectives of the African Union

to create a comprehensive mandate which included the "respect for democratic Principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance.

Another contribution of the Constitutive Act is the development of common values and standards which redefined the concepts of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. The latter principle is retained but with a qualification in Article 4(h), which recognizes the right of the Union to "intervene in a member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity". Article 4(j) recognizes the right of a member state to "request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security". All this was built on the decision taken and principles adopted in Algiers in 1999 which included the "condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government.

Indeed the Lome Summit adopted the historic "Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government" thus defining for the first time in African history, a set of common values and principles for democratic governance. Unconstitutional changes were defined as follows:

- a) military coup de tat against a democratically elected government;
- b) intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected Government;
- c) replacement of a democratically elected government by armed dissident groups and rebel movements;
- d) refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair and regular elections.

There are clearly no shortages of ideas in Africa relating to Africa's development prospects. These are anchored in four development pillars namely, self reliance and regional integration, partnership with the continent's development partners notably the North e.g. US's Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), China's Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social development, Japan's Tokyo International Conference on Development (TICAD) the European Union's Successor to the four Lome Conventions, the ACP-Partnership Agreement also known as the Cotonou Agreement, UN Millennium Declaration, G8 Action Plan.

The issues of democracy, good political, economic and corporate governance are necessary conditions for development. These necessary conditions coupled with other NEPAD priorities such as infrastructure development, banking and financial standards, agriculture and market access are creating positive conditions conducive for development, better investment in human development, agriculture and infrastructure, strengthening of key economic sectors, mobilizing resources, balancing relations with the industrialized world and increasing Africa's participation and competitiveness in the world economy. NEPAD therefore is a programme owned, managed and driven by Africans, designed to end centuries of

poverty and underdevelopment.

The establishment of the AU through the Constitutive Act, with its profound vision and progressive principles, has generated high expectations for rapid political, social and economic progress. It was therefore important that this profound vision and progressive principles contained in the Constitutive Act were complimented by a holistic, comprehensive and strategic policy framework and programme of action, NEPAD therefore complements the Constitutive Act. NEPAD was accepted by the African Heads of State and Government as the socioeconomic development programme of the African Union in July 2001.

Accordingly, the Constitutive Act sets out the core values and principles that are necessary if our continent is to achieve democracy and economic development, while NEPAD seeks to implant these values in a concrete manner. The AU is paying particular attention to the important matters of peace and security. The establishment of the Pan African Parliament ensures public representatives of our countries engage in a structured way with the challenges of NEPAD.

The African Union through its NEPAD programme also creates a platform for introspection and critical examination of the progression of the member countries towards the vision and principles of the Constitutive Act and to share good practice. This is done through the Peer Review Mechanism, a voluntary process. Thirty countries have voluntarily signed up for peer review, and indication of the determination of African countries to stay the course of Africa's development.

Challenges

Clearly, the foundations for Africa's renewal have been laid; there are positive achievements in the creation of conducive conditions for sustainable development and in carrying forward the agenda of NEPAD. Africa continues to welcome the support of development partners, this support need to be dramatically scaled up and accelerated in line with the existing commitments going back to the Millennium Declaration, the Monterrey consensus, the Johannesburg Plan of Action, the G8 Africa Action Plan and the European Union commitments to Africa's development. Issues of market access, increased ODA, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and debt cancellation remain a priority. There are indications of progress and the support of development partners remain crucial

Perhaps fundamental transformation will be effected when these partnerships and commitments agreed upon become fully realized. There can be no illusions of the difficulties Africa faces in this time of globalization as indicated earlier, no one would disagree that the persistence of poverty remains the primary challenge in Africa. This coupled with diseases especially the communicable diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS signals the need for continued assistance especially in the capacity building and increasing access to curative measures.

African countries have a greater responsibility to create an enabling environment that will enhance investor confidence, arrest and reverse capital flight and attract foreign and domestic investment and the lack of infrastructure which exacerbates the problems even in intra-country, regional and continent wise trade relations. Within this context, it should be mentioned that Africa admires the ethical environment within which development happens in many partner countries. The building of investigative capacity within development to protect the environment is one example to learn from. Africa would greatly benefit from such skills sharing.

In conclusion, it is clear that Africa has embarked on an ambitious and irreversible path for the development of Africa and its people. There are several rather straight forward conclusions to be drawn from this presentation. There is no doubt that the African people and leaders are committed to stay the course of development. There is also a greater understanding that certain conditions have to obtain for development to be realized. Through the democratic processes on the continent, the work that the AU is doing through the Pan Africa Parliament, the Peace and Security Council, NEPAD and other processes, despite the occasional setbacks, the renaissance of the African continent would be on course.

To the extent that the agenda of the OAU succeeded in bringing an end to colonialism in Africa, South Africa remains the example of Africa and the global community's constructive partnership. The Apartheid state was blight on the conscience of all humanity. The United Nations rightly called Apartheid a crime against humanity. The end of Apartheid was a victory to all humanity and that this ending of Apartheid was accomplished peacefully spared the world the ugly traumatic spectacle of war. South Africa's progressive Constitution and its dedication and commitment to human rights and good governance shines like a beacon in the rest of Africa.

South Africa has joined African leadership in bringing about peaceful reconciliation and ending violent instability in African countries and has played an important role in development of NEPAD. South Africa has made a conscious decision that it cannot and must not remain an island of relative prosperity and progress in an African sea of poverty, retrogression and instability accepting that her destiny is intricately tied to that of the rest of the African continent.

There is also reason to believe that our global partners will support Africa's endeavour to honour her responsibility towards the development of the continent. Africa understands that partner countries assistance is voluntary, and that Africa's own responsibility for dealing with these problems is mandatory.

What should then be the contributions of the global community?

The global community can assist in supporting NEPAD programs at EU level, G8 level, WTO and other at country level. Most urgent are:

- Debt relief for highly indebted countries. There have been major successes on

this front.

- Market access for Africa's agricultural products.
- Capacity building in all aspects relating to peacekeeping and conflict resolution.
- Empowerment programmes for new companies and SMEs in the form of capacity building for understanding rules and regulations and become Euro-market ready. Assist Africa's regional structures to deal with peace and security.
- Support poverty alleviation programmes.
- Assist in the challenges faced by Africa and the fight against communicable diseases which include malaria, TB and HIV /AIDS.

The conference today on Africa day is indicative of the significance of the relations between Africa and partner countries and organizations represented here today. It is the above challenges that we are putting to you to communicate to your countries and organizations.

CAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES ACHIEVE DEVELOPMENT: THE ANGOLAN CASE?

Joao Miguel VAHEKENI, Ambassador of Angola to Hungary

Good day,

We have talked about development through many different approaches, but now I would like to go into more detail on this concept and talk about whether African countries can actually achieve this development. I will then shift the focus to the case of Angola.

What is development? There are many different definitions for the term, but the one I feel is most appropriate is the following:

« Development corresponds to the need for man to improve his present situation towards a state of better-being ».

Concept:

The concept of development concerns not only a condition inherent in man but it also refers to the process leading to it.

The support of development:

I have no intention of dwelling on the philosophical principles which are behind the concept of development. I am not an expert in the field. But when observing the facts of life, one can say that development draws its modernity from the nature of the framework it is based upon, i.e. the State. In the African state, such ambition would appear unrealistic, perhaps even excessive given the complexity of the problems it poses.

But development could not be limited to the economic sphere. It concerns society as a whole, in all aspects. Economic development cannot be separated from other social interactions, since it is a product of internal rather than external factors.

The evaluation scale:

The development of a given society passes through the development of its members. Their state of mind is the best evaluation index of the degree of development of a society. A developed human being and a developed society are valued as such, depending on their ability to express life continuously in its complexities and abundantly through its works.

Nature of the promoter:

It is generally observed that the modernity of the development is linked to the

nature of its promoter, that is to say the State.

In Africa, the State became the main agent of development. It was supposed, on the one hand, in an environment where market and players are very weak, to enable the transition from a subsistence economy to a modern economy and on the other hand, to enable African society as a whole to progress towards modernity.

The aim was to enable the whole to progress at the same rate, without any privileged special social categories. The aim was to give African societies cohesion, stability after the unbalance suffered as a result of introducing a new colonial economic order.

There was neither lack of choice, nor lack of sponsors. But one can legitimately question the choices that were made; the components of a State supposed to gear society towards progress. Also, one could question whether the development of society should be the prerogative of a minority?

It is nowadays common practice to stigmatize African countries. They have to face several problems existing at the time of Independence, such as depending totally on the export on basic goods, a lack of industrial base and a limited cover of their needs in terms of health, education and so on...

Has the African State fulfilled its ambitions?

When you observe the evolution of African States one can say that in various respects, related to the State, its history, its characteristics and the level of development of the colonial countries – one cannot lead if one does not possess the required skills – the African state has more or less found a solution for the problems related to the complex development process.

However, many weaknesses remain within the State, such as a weak technology, a high rate of illiteracy, a low rate of savings, the relative inefficiency of political institutions, much parallel solidarity which discredit the State and the government. Despite this, the African countries must persevere because development is a significant factor of stability.

The case of Angola

Angola is a country with a **surface** of 1 246 700 km². Its **population** is estimated to be of 13,000,000 inhabitants. The ages are distributed as follows: the range of 0-14 years old represents 43.31 %; 15-64 years old 53.98 %; + 65 represents only 2.71 %. It has a land border of 5198 km and a long coast of 1600km. The bordering countries are the **Republic of Congo** and the **Democratic Republic of Congo** in the North; the **Democratic Republic of Congo** and the **Republic of Zambia** to the East and in South the **Republic of Namibia**.

Angola has a *road network* of 76626 km (of which 19156 km paved roads). It has a *railway network* of 2771 km and a *waterway network* of 1295 km.

Angola became independent through a very violent process, which lasted until 2002. During 27 years, the supporting framework of development suffered from the war. Its infrastructure was destroyed, its economy disintegrated and this led to very weak domestic development.

Since the end of the war in 2002 the country has suffered from serious macroeconomic instability, characterized by a high inflation rate and large fiscal deficits sustained by large unrecorded expenditure. In a bid to address these problems the government has embarked on a reform programme that has included the setting-up of a unified budget, a single Treasury account and an online system that tracks the flow of funds between the Treasury, the Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA, the central bank) and the state-owned Banco de Poupança e Crédito, which operates the budget. As a result, the government is slowly obtaining greater control over its finances. Nevertheless, many fundamental problems persist, including the ongoing quasi-fiscal operations carried out by the state-owned oil company, Sonangol.

Also in the same period, the relations with the IMF have generally improved in the light of the government's attempts to strengthen budgetary transparency and fiscal management.

Contrary to the common belief, the source of the war was neither personal power, nor the division of the country, but the nature of the State. At present, there is no war in Angola but the question remains the same: what type of State is indicated for Angola? And what type of development does Angola need.

The assets of Angola

Angola is attractive to foreign investors because of its mining resources. It is the second largest oil-producing country south of the Sahara desert with a production of over 1,100,000 barrels of oil per day. It is also one of the main world producers of diamonds. It ranks 5th in the world. It also has a vast and dense hydraulic network enabling the supply and irrigation of farming land. The Angolan coast also serves as an access to the sea for its landlocked neighbours.

Angola on the way to rebuilding

A policy of major renovations was decided. It aims at renovating infrastructure damaged during the war, providing some work to the population, and creating new living conditions for the people. These works also concern health and education. Illiteracy is an obstacle which accentuates the feeling of distress amongst the population. Modern education accessible to all is currently being introduced as well as the reform of the official political structure of the country. Angola needs to allocate more funds to sectors such education and health. Angola needs to reform the system of justice, a modern network of water distribution, electricity, road and railway network. These elements are indispensable when considering development.

Angola's economic growth is dominated by the developments in the oil

sector. Crude oil output is already raised above 1.1m barrels/day and it is expected to attain 1.35m barrels/day in 2006 as new oilfields come on stream, in particular from deepwater blocks 15, 17 and 18.

With oil production set to rise rapidly, the average of the real GDP growth rate is forecasted to be of 18% during the period of 2005-07. However the energy-driven expansion will be capital intensive and import dependent. I hope that it will be linked to the other sectors of the economy. Although this would boost internal mobility and trade, raise spending on infrastructure, and increase commercial and investment interest in the non-oil sector; Angola needs the economic environment not be characterized by weak physical and human infrastructure, a flawed judicial system, and poor economic and regulatory policy.

Another problem to be solved, concerns the overpopulation of the Capital Luanda. In many African countries the capital symbolizes progress, the success of the policies of development. For the nationals living in rural medium, these cities, incarnate the capacity, fascinate and cause the desire to approach them. We have the opportunity to avoid the mistakes resulting from the rural migration related to the raising urbanization in many African countries.

Conclusion

When observing the history of successful development in the world in the 19th century compared to present industrial states and more recently Asian countries, one can see that development is dependent on the State. The latter needs to limit its role, to act as a catalyst and as a promoter. There is also a pressing need for the Angolan administration to become modernized. It must be reformed and cleared of all obstacles such as the patronage networks and the confusion between the State and the Party.

Its efficiency lies at the heart of the issue of development. Development needs an economic, social and technical base but also requires the setting up of rules and institutions which constitute its foundations. It is time for African countries to make a critical revision of their development process.

HELP THE POOREST - OUR COMMON CHALLENGES

Gábor GYÖRGY, Head of EC Representation in Budapest

“More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.”

US President Truman
January 1949

This statement was made 56 years ago. Regrettably, it is still valid today.

Today half of the world's human beings live in poverty. Half of them live in extreme poverty. I may as well say that they die in extreme poverty, because extreme poverty kills.

I have started this reflection with poverty because fighting poverty is what the European Union as a whole has agreed to focus its efforts on.

Poverty is the development challenge of our time.

The European Union is working with the rest of the international community to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted in 2000 at the United Nations Summit, which aim at substantial progress towards poverty eradication as well as to improved access to basic health, education, water and sanitation. The very core of this agenda is the promise to halve by 2015 the proportion of people living with less than one dollar a day, and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.

This means that – if everything goes according to plans – in 2015 there will still be more than 600 million people living in poverty worldwide, and that more than 500 million will still suffer from under nourishment.

This is the best scenario.... The worst option is that almost 1 billion people will be poor and that 750 million will not have enough to eat.

Indeed, we need to strengthen our efforts to help ensure a better life for the world's poor.

The European Union is today the world's biggest aid donors responsible for 56 per cent of all overseas development aid. In 2004 we provided development assistance worth of 36 billion euro. Last June, the European Council agreed with the Commission's proposal to grant additionally €20 billion per year of development assistance by 2010 and €45 billion per year by 2015. At least 50% of this increase will go to the African continent. The EU also committed to

strengthen coherence of its non-aid policies.

The EU is also the main trading partner for developing countries and the world's biggest provider of trade related assistance, worth around €750 million per year. The Everything But Arms initiative gives the Least Developed Countries (LCDs), duty and quota free access to our market of over 450 million people for all their exports except arms.

The European Union is also more than € 1.6 billion of debt relief through the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative.

However, we can and should do more and better. We also have to address new challenges and adapt to changed circumstances, both in Europe and in developing countries, and in the world in general.

This is why we proposed to revisit the framework of the EU development actions.

On 13 July the Commission adopted a proposal defining the new development policy of the European Union in view of a joint statement by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission. This "European Consensus" would provide, for the first time in 50 years of development co-operation, a common framework of objectives, values and principles that the Union – all 25 Member States and the Commission - supports and promotes as a global player and as a global partner.

The new EU Development Policy puts poverty eradication at its core. It highlights the importance of the partnership with developing countries and the promotion of good governance, human rights and democracy. It stresses the role of civil society and tackles conflict situations and failed states

The EU's Development Policy will cover all developing countries, and for the first time in 50 years, this will be done within a single framework of principles for the 25 Member States and the Commission. If we really want to make poverty history, we have to act together. This is why the strategy is based on coordination and harmonization.

We need to pay special attention to the poorest regions where our support is needed most. Focusing efforts on Africa, which lags far behind other continents in reaching the Millennium Development Goals, is essential. To this end the Commission proposed on 12 October an ambitious EU Strategy for this continent, to be endorsed by the European Council hopefully next December. Once adopted, the Strategy will be the first example of how the new EU Development Policy can be translated into concrete actions.

The Strategy for Africaⁱⁱⁱ provides a common, comprehensive, and coherent framework for action for all EU Member States and the European Commission to support Africa's efforts to reach the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

One of the focus areas of the Strategy, in line with the new EU Development Policy orientations, is to develop and strengthen the cooperation and coordination between the 25 Member States and the European Commission. It is clear that the EU stands stronger if all EU actors pull in the same direction and speak with one voice. Increasing aid effectiveness, improving coherence, and facilitating

cooperation will be key issues in the next few years.

It is also clear that our development efforts will be more successful if our approach is comprehensive. Helping Africa reach the MDGs is an enormous challenge. Our efforts therefore cannot be limited to traditional “development cooperation”. We must find coherence and compatibility between our development policies and policies in other areas, such as trade, research, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), etc.

One important innovation in the Strategy is that it, for the first time, provides a common EU approach for the whole of Africa. While recognizing Africa’s diversity, the Strategy aims at fully exploiting the potential of a continental approach when there is a clear added value.

In the spirit of ownership, particular emphasis has been placed on ensuring that our development policies and actions are in line with African needs and priorities. The Strategy has therefore been developed on the basis of extensive consultations with African partners.

Under the Strategy, the EU will reinforce action in a number of key policy areas deemed essential for Africa’s efforts of attaining the MDGs.

1. First of all, it calls for addressing central prerequisites for sustainable development, primarily peace and security and good and effective governance.

One of the most important elements in this Strategy is the recognition that there can be no sustainable development without peace and stability or without good and effective political governance. It is proposed that the EU step up its efforts to promote peace and security at all stages of the conflict cycle, from conflict prevention, via conflict management to conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. In this area it will be particularly important to seek coherence with actions undertaken in the CFSP/ESDP context and actions by international partners, including the UN. Replenishment of a €250M Africa Peace Facility, that has been a particularly successful tool to support African leadership in the peace and security field, is essential.

The second central precondition for sustainable development is good and effective governance. Some African countries have made remarkable progress towards sustainable democracy but much remains to be done. Under the Strategy, the EU will therefore seek to support legitimate and effective governance by building effective central and local institutions; reforming Africa’s security sector, reinforcing respect for human rights and strengthening the fight against corruption. To support these objectives, the Commission proposes to launch an ambitious Governance Initiative that will in particular back reforms in countries that subscribed to an unprecedented Peer Review mechanism.

2. Second, the Strategy promotes measures that create the economic environment for sustainable development, including trade, regional integration and interconnectivity;

Despite recent improvements in economic performance, economic growth is still insufficient and in trade in particular Africa continues to be marginalised. Africa still only accounts for about 2% of world trade.

In order to ensure that globalization can become a positive force for Africa's development, the EU will therefore seek to stimulate and expand more rapid and broad-based economic growth in order to contribute to an effective reduction of poverty. Actions in this area will include creation of regional integrated markets as the primary component of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), improving market access and trade (South-South and North-South), stimulating private sector development, and boosting African agriculture.

Limited access to transport and communication services, missing links in cross-border connections and regional networks, and limited access to energy, water and sanitation seriously constrain economic growth. The Strategy proposes strengthening Africa's infrastructure by launching a Partnership for Infrastructure. The Partnership will support programmes (Trans-African Networks) that facilitate interconnectivity at a continental level for the promotion of regional integration.

3. Finally, the Strategy proposes strengthening our action in the areas that have direct impact on the achievement of the MDGs, including improved access to social services (health, education) and environmental sustainability.

The reality is striking. 40% of all Africans survive on less than one dollar a day. Only six out of ten African children go to primary school. Communicable diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, have hit Africa the hardest, and in 2004 alone, AIDS killed over two million people in Sub-Saharan Africa and affected an additional three million.

The EU will promote availability of basic services available to the poorest people in Africa (MDGs 1-6). In this area, measures will include: improving access to basic and vocational education, supporting the establishment of a network of centres of excellence in higher education linked with European network so as to foster exchange of students and researchers, tackling communicable diseases and fostering employment.

The EU should also assist Africa to protect its environment. In this area actions will include protection of water resources, conservation of biodiversity, fighting against desertification and countering the effects of climate change.

In addition to these policies and actions, the Strategy emphasizes, in line with the new Development Policy, the need to improving the way the EU works together by strengthening donor coordination and complementarity.

Conclusion

The European Union or its predecessor, the European Communities, has been providing support to developing countries since its creation in 1958. In an increasingly globalized world, there is no doubt that effective development cooperation is not only justified by solidarity, but also by mutual interest. The long

term objective of achieving a peaceful, democratic, stable, environmentally and economically viable situation in all countries is in everybody's best interest. With a new Development Policy and delivery on commitments on increasing both the volume and coherence of its development aid, the EU will be better equipped than ever to assist developing countries on their way to a better future. Focusing on Africa, we can help those who need our assistance most. Joint efforts of 25 Member States and the Commission that share common vision, objectives and principles is essential if we want to lift millions of people out of poverty and make a real difference in the living of the world's poor.

Thank you.

ⁱⁱⁱ The whole document can be found among the Annexes of this book.

A WORLD BANK GROUP ACTION PLAN

Franz KAPS, Senior Partnership Advisor, World Bank

1. Introduction

The World Bank is the largest external funder of Africa's development and works with the whole development community to cofinance, coordinate, and implement development assistance. The Bank is working to help Africans help themselves — and their environment — by providing resources, sharing knowledge, building capacity, and forging partnerships in the public and private sectors.

In addition to providing debt relief to the poorest countries, the Bank's main priorities in Africa are to tackle the HIV/AIDS pandemic, spur private sector development, help countries empower communities — as well as help them prevent and recover from conflict — and create and share knowledge.

The World Bank's strategy in Africa is to accelerate progress toward the *Millennium Development Goals*. In conjunction with the vision layed out by African heads of state in the *New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)*, the Bank in 2004 supported projects in infrastructure, agriculture, regional trade, health, nutrition, population, education, community-driven development, and capital flows.

AFRICA FAST FACTS

Total population:	0.7 billion
Population growth (annual %):	2
Life expectancy at birth:	46 years
Infant mortality per 1,000 births:	101
Female youth literacy (% of females ages 15-24):	77
2004 GNI per capita:	\$600
Number of people living with HIV/AIDS:	25.2 million

Note: Life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rate per 1,000 births are for 2003; female youth literacy is for the most recent year available from 2000 to 2002; HIV/AIDS data are from the June 2004 UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic; other indicators are for 2004 from the World Development Indicators Database.

The World Bank's work in Africa is based on the four strategic pillars highlighted in the seminal study *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?*

- Improving governance and resolving conflicts
- Investing in people
- Improving competitiveness and diversifying economies
- Reducing dependency on aid and strengthening partnerships.

As of June 2004 the Bank was funding 334 projects in the region, with a net commitment of \$16.6. The International Development Agency, the Bank's lending arm to developing countries, delivered over \$4 billion in credits and grants, representing an increase of \$464 million over the previous year, and IBRD disbursements totaled \$42.8 million.

Forty-six percent of new IDA commitments in fiscal year 2004 were to Africa. The Bank's long-term objective is to ensure that the region receives 50 percent of all new IDA commitments. Africa also gained \$3.9 billion in relief from the *Highly Indebted Poor Country* (HIPC) Initiative.

2. Annual Report of the World Bank on Africa

(Summary of Fiscal 2005 Activities)

Africa's economy grew by 4.4 percent in 2004, with virtually all countries reporting positive growth. The region is projected to grow by 4.1 percent in 2005 as the benefits of past reforms and a more peaceful environment continue to translate into expanded economic activity. But the region faces serious challenges. More than 314 million Africans live on less than \$1 a day—nearly twice as many as in 1981. The continent is home to 34 of the world's 48 poorest countries and 24 of the 32 countries ranked lowest in human development. The HIV/AIDS pandemic costs Africa 1 percentage point of per capita growth a year, while malaria kills about 2,800 Africans a day.

Some progress toward improving human development was made during the past year, but the challenges remain enormous. To address them, several global development initiatives were launched in fiscal 2005. Key among them were calls for a doubling of aid, fairer trade, and greater debt relief.

Since the establishment of the *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (NEPAD) and the *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* (PRSP) process, African countries have taken much more effective ownership of their own development. Both NEPAD and the PRSP process are based on partnerships with donors, dependable financial flows, measurable results, empowerment of poor people, participation by civil society and local communities, and accountability of recipient governments to their own people. The Bank has endorsed the Commission for Africa report^{iv}, which emphasizes accelerated economic growth and the participation of poor people in economic expansion.

2.1 World Bank Assistance

The World Bank is the largest provider of development assistance to Africa, and it has increased its support dramatically in the past five years. IDA commitments of \$3.9 billion in fiscal 2005 represented an increase of more than 80 percent compared with fiscal 2000, and disbursements of \$4 billion, more than double the fiscal 2000 figure. Africa has also benefited from a total of \$3.1 billion of relief from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

The Bank's strategy for assisting Africa is outlined in the Strategic Framework for IDA's Assistance to Africa, which draws on the report *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* The framework focuses on reducing conflict, improving governance, increasing economic growth, enhancing competitiveness and trade, and improving aid effectiveness. The strategy is complemented by a vision of "hopeful realism" about Africa's capacity to reduce poverty. This vision focuses on five areas: developing the private sector, increasing regional integration, building capacity, doubling aid flows, and increasing Africa's share of world trade.

In June 2005 the Bank sponsored a conference in Cape Town, South Africa, to focus on the challenge of financing Africa's huge infrastructure needs. More than 200 policy makers, financial experts, and private sector and civil society representatives attended.

2.2 Reducing Conflict

Conflict is estimated to cost affected African countries 2.2 percentage points of economic growth each year. In collaboration with NEPAD, the Bank is working to achieve peace and stability. These conditions are needed if countries in the region are to attract foreign investment and increase their exports.

In fiscal 2005 the Bank provided assistance to 17 conflict-affected countries and low-income countries under stress. It also worked to increase transparency and reduce incentives for illegal trade in commodities linked to conflict, such as oil, gas, diamonds, timber, and precious metals.

A key objective of NEPAD is to help build capable and effective states that provide basic services, promote equity and security, and create an enabling environment for investment, wealth creation, and wealth sharing, particularly through the peer review mechanism. In support of this objective, the Bank directs more than 20 percent of its new lending toward public sector governance. Interventions cover expenditure management, civil service reform, decentralization, accountability mechanisms, and legal and judicial reform.

The Bank also provides catalytic grants to the Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa and assistance for the establishment of the African Institutes for Science and Technology, which seek to increase scientific and technical achievement through regional approaches.

2.3 Increasing Economic Growth, Competitiveness, and Trade

Fifteen African countries averaged economic growth of 5 percent a year over the past decade, but their success was not enough to offset the continuing drop in Africa's share of world trade. Trade expansion requires strengthening the agriculture sector, which employs 70 percent of Africa's labor force and accounts for 40 percent of its exports. The Bank is promoting efforts to meet the objective of NEPAD's Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program of increasing agricultural output by 6 percent a year through 2015. It is working to liberalize intraregional trade, set up capital markets, eliminate cascading tariffs that penalize African products, and help ensure the successful conclusion of the Doha Round of trade negotiations.

2.4 Increasing Regional Integration

With 15 landlocked economies and a gross domestic product the size of Belgium's, Africa needs more effective regional integration to prosper. In July 2004 the Bank established a Regional Integration Department that will fund multicountry pilot projects worth about \$500 million by fiscal 2007. Since fiscal 2001 the Bank has supported 11 similar projects totaling about \$550 million. The programs cover trade facilitation, regional approaches to HIV/AIDS, private sector development, regional power systems, telecommunications, transport, tertiary health and education, agricultural research, migratory pests, food security, transnational environmental issues, and the weather-related vulnerability of rural communities.

2.5 Building the Private Sector

The private sector has the potential to be the engine for growth and job creation, but changes in the business environment are needed if that potential is to be realized. Africa is a high-cost, high-risk place to do business, according to the Bank's *Doing Business in 2005* report. As a result, it received just \$9 billion of the world's \$135 billion in foreign direct investment in 2003. To help make Africa more attractive to foreign investors, the Bank is promoting constructive and practical partnerships between Africa's private sector and national governments. It also facilitates innovative approaches to financing. For example, the Bank, IFC, and MIGA are working together to support increased private participation in priority infrastructure projects. The Bank and IFC have also jointly begun a micro, small, and medium enterprises initiative.

2.6 Simplifying and Harmonizing Aid Flows

Africa requires substantial increases in assistance to reach the 7 percent annual economic growth needed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, to finance \$17 billion in annual infrastructure investments, and to fund the \$2.1

billion needed to attain the goal of Education for All. The Bank, which chairs the Strategic Partnership with Africa, is working to simplify, harmonize, and reduce the cost of providing aid to Africa. It is urging international partners to honor the promises they made in 2003 at the Monterrey Summit to increase assistance by \$12 billion a year and to fulfill the commitments they made in the Commission for Africa report.

3. The Africa Action Plan

(Planning for the "Decade of Africa")

Africa is the world's foremost development challenge. HIV/AIDS continues to ravage populations, as do regional conflicts and their aftermaths. While some countries have seen real growth, the number of poor on the continent has doubled over the past two decades. At current trends, Africa will fall short of meeting the Millennium Development Goals set for 2015. But a new international focus on the continent, coupled with an enormous change in African leadership on the development agenda, has created a unique chance for an African strategy. The Africa Action Plan is a response to these events and this opportunity.

The Africa Action Plan ("Meeting the Challenge of Africa's Development: A World Bank Group Action Plan"), which was presented to the Board on September 6, appears at a unique juncture of events. The "Year of Africa" has been announced, and the continent now stands at the center of the development community's agenda. World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz has named Africa a development priority; and at Gleneagles, Scotland the G-8 leaders of the world's richest nations have pledged to support Africa's development.

The Action Plan is the result of an April 2005 request by the Bank's Board of Executive Directors that the Region present an action plan to the Development Committee detailing its Africa strategy.

The plan also addresses the Gleneagles call for international coordination of increased assistance to Africa to meet the Millennium Development Goals. Gobind Nankani, Africa Region Vice-President, describes the Action Plan as "a working document, that will help us better support country-led efforts to achieve results, advance a shared growth agenda, build more capable states, and encourage partnerships for Africa at the country, regional, and global levels."

The push for outcomes is essential to the plan. "Results matter to everyone," says Mr. Nankani. "Populations are asking their leaders to make a difference in their lives. And donors want to know that additional resources will translate into results."

3.1 Strengthen Drivers Of Growth, Leave No One Behind

The plan underlines that the poor and marginalized must benefit from a shared growth agenda. It contains 25 initiatives and 133 suggested actions, focusing on three broad areas:

- Building capable states and improving government.
- Strengthening the drivers of growth. This means a vibrant private sector, expanded exports, infrastructure investment, increased agricultural productivity, as well as investments in education, health, and access to economic opportunity for the poor.
- Increasing the impact of partnerships among governments, donor countries, and development agencies.

Box A

A. Agriculture exports to open world markets

For many African countries, an agriculture export push will be the means by which they kick-start sustainable growth and open markets to African products. Many countries have the climatic conditions to compete in a world market—for example, the cut flowers industry in Kenya and Ethiopia and horticultural products in Senegal. More important, 70 percent of Africans find employment and livelihood in agriculture.

The AAP sees agriculture as a driver of growth, and sees the Bank as an advocate of a fair trading environment through analytical work that shows the cost and benefits of African exports. This work should not be confined to OECD countries but extend to Asian markets as well.

The Action Plan makes specific commitments, such as increased financial support for free primary education in 15 countries and more funding for roads, power, and other infrastructure.

It also proposes an expansion of the Bank's Malaria Booster Program by 150 percent in 17 countries, and expects an upscaling of lending support for HIV/AIDS programs in 10 countries, as well as greater investment towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

In addition, the Africa Action Plan supports the African Infrastructure Consortium in mobilizing resources for country and cross-border regional infrastructure projects.

The growth agenda will differ from country to country, and the country strategies contained in the countries' Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers will be the foundation for actions. The Action Plan draws from the PRSP menu then highlights special focus areas. For example, in health, the Action Plan recognizes that HIV/AIDS is a scourge across the continent; at the same time it accepts that,

in certain Central and West African countries, malaria is at least as serious a problem in terms of its impact on health and on the GDP. The Africa Action Plan is clear that each country has individual priorities and distinct issues.

3.2 Partnerships

Donor fragmentation, complicated processes, and unclear roles have often clouded partner relations. The Africa Plan insists on simplified procedures and harmonization within the World Bank Group, and integration of efforts with other development partners.

The strategy takes into account that the World Bank group is only one of many development partners supporting African development. Mr. Nankani sums it up: “We must be thinking beyond IDA lending...how working with other partners, such as the African Development Bank, the European Commission, or the European Investment Bank, we can share technical capacity and country knowledge to bring more alignment among partners.” The Africa Action Plan also offers real actions for strengthening country-led partnerships to implement IDA 14.

Box B

B. Countries taking the lead

When the country has a major role, all partners can come together. A good example of donor alignment and coordination is Tanzania. The government, assuming a primary role, is working with seven development partners, including the World Bank, to prepare a joint country partnership strategy. Similar processes are starting in Uganda, and Nigeria. Says Mr. Nankani: “Outcomes should drive our behavior- we should be pulling in the same direction.”

3.3 ...and Integration

African leaders know that, in some cases, regional answers to problems are the best answers. Africa Region Chief Economist John Page points out, “If you are an exporter in Mali or Burkina, many of the solutions to your cost and competitive programs come from your neighboring countries. They come from how the port works at the coast. They come from whether the railroad line will offer you competitive rates.”

Regional integration goes beyond infrastructure issues. “Mosquitoes don’t recognize borders, says Page; “neither do truck drivers. And, of course we know that’s a major reason for the spread of HIV/AIDS.”

The Africa Action Plan supports regional investment in infrastructure and health. In addition, it asks for monitoring of cross-border diseases and surveys of

transport costs in export corridors. Even education can fall under the regional rubric through the creation of area centers of excellence.

3.4 A Plan to Build Capacity and Rebuild Societies

Every African assistant strategy must work to strengthen institutions and public services. The action plan commits to doing this country by country. Countries and development partners can also work together to build statistical, monitoring and evaluation capacity.

It is a stark fact that one-third of African countries are affected by conflict. The Action Plan underlines that development strategies should reflect the singular needs of countries emerging from conflict to help in the transition from war culture to productive society.

3.5 An Agenda for Change

In Africa, leaders—and civil society—are taking ownership of their development programs as many countries see improvements in economic, institutional, and social performance. Donors have responded to the new focus: Aid has increased, debt has been cancelled, and trade and investment issues are being addressed.

The Africa Action Plan provides priorities and directions that must be translated into country-specific work—and country-led strategies will give life to these priorities.

According to Vice-President Nankani, the biggest challenge now is implementation. “The Millennium Development Goals are set are for attainment by 2015. We have ten years ahead of us. And we talk about the ‘Year of Africa.’ We should be talking about the ‘Decade of Africa.’ We have before us a tremendous opportunity — because of leadership in Africa and international support — to work with our partners to support these actions by countries towards these goals.”

^{iv} “Our Common Interest”, Report of the Commission for Africa, March 2004, London, UK (See also Ambassador Wickstead paper in this book.)

UN MISSION IN WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO)


György SZÁRAZ, Major General, Former Commander of MINURSO

On Africa's Atlantic coast, at the western extremity of the Arab world, lays Western Sahara, site of Africa's longest post-colonial conflict. While more than one billion people have been decolonized over the past fifty five years, Western Sahara is still recognized by the international community as a “non-self-governing territory,” occupied for more than thirty years by its powerful neighbor, Morocco. Just prior to the scheduled end of Spain's colonial administration in 1976, the territory – then known as Spanish Sahara – was partitioned between Morocco and Mauritania and, within three years, came under exclusive Moroccan control. This occurred despite the landmark October 1975 decision by the International Court of justice that upheld the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination in the face Morocco's claims.

Geography and economy of Western Sahara

Western Sahara is located in Northwest Africa, bordering the Atlantic Ocean (1110 km of coastline), between Morocco (443 km on the North) and Mauritania (1561 km on the East and South). It also borders 42 km on the Northeast with Algeria. Its area covers 266.000 sq km. Moroccan government name for Western Sahara is the “Southern Provinces”, which indicate the two big areas, Rio de Oro and Saguia el-Hamra. The land is mostly low, rocky and sandy flat desert with some small mountains in the South and Northeast, and the most arid and inhospitable on the planet.

Aside from its rich phosphate deposits and fishing waters, Western Sahara is one of the poorest territories in Africa. It has only a few natural resources and lacks sufficient rainfall for most agricultural activities. There is speculation that there may be rich offshore oil and natural gas fields, but the debate persists as to whether these resources can be profitably exploited, and if this would be legally permitted due to the non-colonized status. Its economy depends on pastoral nomadism, fishing, and phosphate mining as the principal sources of income for the population and most of the food for the urban population must be imported. All trade and other economic activities are controlled by the Moroccan government, which has encouraged citizens to relocate to the territory by giving subsidies and price controls on basic goods. These heavy subsidies have created a state-dominated economy in the Moroccan controlled parts of Western Sahara, with the Moroccan government as the single employer.



The infrastructure is also very weak. There are only three airports, two ports and some 6000 km of road (only 1800 km paved). But the Moroccan government considerably invested in the social and economic development of the Moroccan controlled Western Sahara with special emphasis on education, modernization and infrastructure. Laayoun (El-Aaiun) in particular has been the target of heavy government investment, and has grown rapidly. Several thousands of Sahrawis study in Moroccan universities and literacy rates are appreciated at some 50 % of the population.

Population

The indigenous population of Western Sahara is known as Sahrawis. These are Hassaniya-speaking tribes of mixed Arab-Berber heritage, effectively continuations of tribal groupings of Hassaniya speaking Moorish tribes extending south into Mauritania and North into Morocco as well as East to Algeria. The Sahrawis are traditionally nomadic Bedouins and can be found in all surrounding countries, but war and conflict has led to major displacement of the population. Physically indistinguishable from Hassaniya speaking Moors of Mauritania, the Sahrawi people differ from their neighbors partly due to different tribal affiliations (as tribal confederations cut across present modern boundaries) and partly as a consequence of their exposure to Spanish colonial domination. Surrounding territories were generally under French colonial rule.

Like other neighboring Saharan Bedouin and Hassaniya groups, the Sahrawis are Muslims of the Sunni sect and the Maliki law school. Local religious custom 'urf is, like other Saharan groups, heavily influenced by pre-Islamic Berber and African practices, and differs substantially from urban practices. For example, Sahrawi Islam has traditionally functioned without mosques in the normal sense of the word, in an adaptation nomadic life. The originally clan- and tribe-based

society underwent a massive social upheaval in 1975, when a part of the population was forced into exile and settled in the refugee camps of Tindouf, Algeria.

As of 2005, an estimated 306.000 people (excluding the Moroccan army of some 130.000) live in the Moroccan controlled parts of Western Sahara, mainly in the four cities; Laayoune (173.000), Smara (34.000), Dakhla (37.000) and Boujdour (27.000), and about 35.000 people live in rural zones. The Polisario controlled parts of the country are barren and have no resident population, but they are traveled small numbers of Sahrawis herding camels, sheep and goats, going back and forth between the Tindouf area and Mauritania. However, the presence of mines scattered throughout the territory by both the Polisario and the Moroccan army makes it a dangerous way of life.

The Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria, home base of the Polisario, hold approximately 155.000 Sahrawi refugees from the area. Morocco disputes this number, saying it is much lower, and insists that many of them are non-Sahrawi Africans who have relocated there in order to profit from aid efforts. The UNHCR and the numerous other aid agencies that are present in the camps have found no evidence of this.

The Western Saharan refugees, or Sahrawis, who live in these camps, are more than 80 % women and children. Their struggle began more than three decades ago in their homeland of Western Sahara. The temperature reaches a scorching 60 C in summer and plunges below freezing in winter. Sandstorms, called siroccos, rip through the refugee camps without warning. Flash floods wipe out entire tent neighborhoods, destroying everything in their path. In the refugee camps there are no jobs, no electricity, no food and no water. Except for a vegetable garden and a chicken farm servicing only about 1000 people, Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf camps are wholly dependent on external aid to meet their basic needs. While UNHCR, local and Non Governmental Organizations, and international aid agencies provide some assistance to the refugee women, inadequate medical services and an extremely limited food supply continues to threaten the lives of women and children in the camps. Thirty years of living in refugee camps have had serious health consequences for women as food shortages and limited health resources are endemic. The most serious health problem amongst women is iron deficiency caused by malnutrition. The malnutrition rates in the refugee camps significantly affect females of all ages.

History of the conflict

The Western Sahara area has never formed a state in the modern sense of word. Sanjaha Berber tribes inhabited the land before Islam arrived in the 8th century AD, and achieved quick expansion. Arab immigrants blended with the population and left a lasting cultural impact. Its Arabic dialect, the Hassaniya remains mother tongue of the Sahrawi inhabitants of the area as well as of their Moorish compatriots in Mauritania. The Almoravides, a dynasty which maintained a strict interpretation of the Qur'an, originated in this region and ended up controlling all of

North Africa. In the late nineteenth century, during the European rush to carve up Africa, this territory was a part of a larger nomadic circle, encompassing portions of Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco and northern Mali.

In 1884 the Spanish laid claim to the southern coastal region, called Rio de Oro, and later occupied the northern interior region, Saguia el Hamra. In 1958 Spain joined the previously separate two districts to form the province of Spanish Sahara. Sahrawi nomads began guerilla attacks against Spain as early as 1957. These early effort were backed by the King of Morocco with the hopes that with Spain out of the way, the king could have his dream of “Greater Morocco”. The early Sahrawi nationalist were unsuccessful, but spawned the first urban anti-colonialist movement which emerged in 1967, the Organization for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Ouad ed-Dahab. This movement threatened the Spanish authorities and was actively repressed.

An intensive campaign to mobilize the Sahrawi people on behalf of their independence led to a massive demonstration, in 1970, against the efforts by the colonial power to turn the Sahara into a Spanish province. The Spaniards reacted by massacring the demonstrators and dissolving the liberation movement. Having understood that there was no other way out, the Sahrawis decided to take up armed struggle. On 10th of May 1973, the Constitutive Congress for the Liberation was held, and officially formed a nationalist organization, known as the **Front POLISARIO** (Frente Popular Para la Liberacion de la Seguia al Hamra y el Rio de Oro).

Shortly afterwards, the first armed action was carried out. Such actions have caused an escalation of bombardments, massacre and torture of the civilian population who have been forced to make a mass exodus to the areas controlled by the Front Polisario and over the border to Tindouf in Algeria, which has been supporting the struggle of the Sahrawis for self-determination. There, they were granted asylum and began to build refugee camps in an area of the desert considered uninhabitable. The Sahrawi women, to create a new life in exile, have played an essential role in running the camps from the beginning. They have developed committees and systems for health care, education, and social affairs, resource distribution and play an active role in the political process. The Algerians left Polisario in charge of the area, and Polisario promptly made it its base. The organization could now draw recruits from the refugees, and also added experienced fighters from former pro-Spanish militias and police forces. In addition to this, Algeria began pouring heavy armaments into the movement, and it rapidly transformed from Bedouin raiding party into a modern fighting forces.

The Front's guerilla army grew rapidly, and Spain had lost effective control over most of the countryside in early 1975. Successive Spanish attempts to create loyal Sahrawi political institutions (such as the Djema'a and the PUNS party) to support its rule, and draw away from radical nationalists, failed. In late 1975, Spain held meetings with Polisario leader El-Ouali, to negotiate the terms for a handover of power. But at the same time, before the death of the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, Spain was confronted with an aggressive campaign of territorial demands

from Morocco and Mauritania, both countries argued that Spanish Sahara formed an historical part of their own territories.

The United Nations became involved after Morocco asked for an opinion on the legality of its demands from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the UN also sent a visiting mission to examine the wishes of the population. The mission returned its report on 15th of October, reporting “an overwhelming consensus” in favor of independence. On October 16, the ICJ, to the dismay of both the Rabat and Nouakchott governments, declared that the historical ties of these countries to Spanish Sahara did not grant them the right to the area; neither Morocco nor Mauritania has any claim to the territory of Western Sahara. The court announced that the Sahrawi population, as the true owners of the land, held a right of self-determination.

Neither Morocco nor Mauritania accepted this, and on 31st of October 1975, Morocco sent its army into Western Sahara to attack Polisario positions and to prepare the **Green March**. On November 6, 1975, approximately 350.000 Moroccans converged on the city of Tarfaya in southern Morocco and crossed the border 10 km into the Western Sahara territory. They brandished Moroccan flags, banners calling for the return of the Moroccan Sahara and to “reunite it with the Motherland”. The color green for the march's name was intended as a symbol of Islam. When the marchers reached the border - even though the majority never crossed it - Spanish troops were ordered not to fire to avoid bloodshed.

After nearly a century of colonial rule, Spain agreed to withdraw from Western Sahara, but not without first negotiating and on 14th of November 1975 signing a secret agreement with Mauritania and Morocco, which divided the territory between the two countries. According to the **Madrid Accords** Spain transfers the administration of its colony 2/3 to Morocco and 1/3 to Mauritania (today Spain says, sovereignty was not transferred). Both nations then formally annexed the parts they had been allotted in the Accords. Morocco claimed the northern part, Saguia el-Hamra and little part of Rio de Oro, while Mauritania proceeded to occupy the southern third of the country under the name Tiris al-Gharbiyya. Spain's formal mandate over the territory ended on February 26, 1976. The day after, the Polisario proclaimed the **Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic** (SADR) as a government in exile. The Polisario, with Algerian backing, refused the Madrid Accords, and demanded that the ICJ's opinion on Sahrawi self-determination be respected: and so began a long, still unsettled war.

Polisario made the weak Mauritanian army its main target, and after the raids on the Mauritanian capital Nouakchott (when a gunshot killed El-Ouali, the first president of the SADR), Mauritania succumbed to internal unrest. In 1978 the army seized control of the Mauritanian government and Polisario declared a cease-fire, on the assumption that Mauritania would withdraw unconditionally. This eventually occurred in 1979, as Mauritania new rulers agreed to surrender all claims and to recognized the SADR. Following Mauritanian's withdrawal, however, Morocco extended its control to the rest of the territory, and the war continued.

Construction of the wall

The wall/berm was built between 1981 and 1987 in six stages. First the big cities, Laayoune, Smara and the phosphate mines at Bou Cra were surrounded, and it was so efficient against the Polisario guerilla fighters that the berm was expanded from a small area near Morocco in the north, to most of the western, central and southern part of the country as far as the Atlantic Ocean. The berm is a 2700 km long system of defensive walls, longer than the Israeli West Bank barrier and the Berlin Wall. It consists of sand and stone walls about three meters height, with bunkers, fences and landmines throughout. Military bases, artillery posts and airfields dot the interior behind the wall at regular intervals, and radar systems and other electronic surveillance equipment scan the areas in front of it. Its main function was to defend the Moroccan-controlled portion of Western Sahara against the Front Polisario. Currently, Western Sahara is largely administered by Morocco. The extent of Morocco's administration is north and west of the Moroccan wall/berm, approximately two-thirds of the country. Effectively, the Polisario controls only the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria and the areas to the east of the barrier, but these areas are more or less uninhabited.

Western attention to the berm, and the annexation of the territory in general, has been minimal. In Africa, the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco has attracted somewhat more attention: Algeria, which supports the Polisario, and the Organization of African Unity/African Union and United Nations have proposed negotiate solutions.

The cease-fire

The United Nations has been seeking a settlement in Western Sahara since the withdrawal of Spain in 1976 and the ensuing fighting between Morocco, which had reintegrated the territory, and the Front Polisario, supported by Algeria. In 1985, the United Nations Secretary-General, in cooperation with the OAU/AU, initiated a mission of good offices leading to “**the settlement proposals**”, which were accepted on 30 August 1988 by Morocco and the Polisario. In 1990, the Security Council approved the Secretary General's report containing the full text of the settlement proposals and the outline of the Secretary-General's Plan for implementing them. On 29 April 1991, the Security Council in its Resolution 690, decided to establish the **United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)** in accordance with the Secretary-General's report which further detailed the implementation plan.

MINURSO has been mandated to:

- Monitor the ceasefire;
- Verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the Territory;

- Monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO troops to designated locations;
- Take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees;
- Oversee the exchange of prisoners of war (International Committee of the Red Cross);
- Implement the repatriation programme (United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees);
- Identify and register qualified voters;
- Organize and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results.

The **Settlement Plan** provided for a transitional period during which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would have sole and exclusive responsibility over all matters relating to a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. The Special Representative would be assisted in his tasks by an integrated group of United Nations civilian, military and civilian police personnel. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) would carry out a repatriation program for eligible Western Saharan voters living outside the territory. The transitional period was to begin with the coming into effect of the cease-fire and end with the proclamation of the results of the referendum.

Settlement Plan Processes:

- 1.) Ceasefire
- 2.) Identification
- 3.) Appeals
- 4.) Confidence building
- 5.) Return of refugees
- 6.) Referendum
- 7.) Proclamation of the result

It was originally envisaged that the civilian component of MINURSO would range in size from about 800 to 1.000 personnel depending on the requirements of the various phases of the transitional period. At full strength, the military component would consist of approximately 1.700 personnel and the security unit of about 300 police officers. (In reality these figures were never reached.) According to the settlement plan, the referendum in Western Sahara should have taken place in January 1992.

Following the agreement between the Government of Morocco and the Front Polisario the war ended and the MINURSO was deployed on 6th of September 1991 to monitor the ceasefire and to organize and conduct a referendum, which would allow the people of Western Sahara to decide the

territory's future status. However, it was not possible to proceed in conformity with the original timetable, and until today referendum was not held.

Differences remain

Since the deployment of MINURSO the ceasefire has generally respected. The transitional period, however, has not begun, given the parties' divergent views on some key elements of the Plan, in particular with regard to the criteria for eligibility to vote. Both sides blame each other for stalling of the referendum. But while the Polisario has consistently asked for the UN to go ahead with the vote, standing only to lose from the status quo, Morocco has been troubled by the risk of losing a referendum or receiving a large enough vote against annexation to undermine years of nationalists rhetoric from the government.

In 1997, after a particularly long impasse between the parties, the Secretary-General appointed James A. Baker III. as his Personal Envoy. To attempt to solve the problem, the **Houston Agreement** reiterates and strengthens the key aspect of the original UN settlement: refugee repatriation, troop confinement, release of prisoners (in August 2005, the Polisario released the last 404 Moroccan prisoners of war), freedom to campaign, access for accredited international observers, equal access by the parties to the media, and UN authority to intervene to insure the fairness of the electoral process. The Houston Agreement made another attempt to implement the referendum, but failed. The Kingdom of Morocco officially declared that it was “no longer necessary” to include an option of independence on the ballot, offering instead autonomy.

In August 2001, James A. Baker III. proposed that instead of a referendum in independence, Western Sahara consider becoming an autonomous region of Morocco. The Polisario rejected the new proposal, which it saw as a reversal of the UN's promise to hold referendum on self-determination. In 2002, King Mohammed VI. of Morocco reasserted that he will not “renounce an inch of” the Western Sahara.

In August 2003, a UN Security Council resolution adopted a new Peace Plan, known as **Baker Plan**, that would turn Western Sahara into a semiautonomous region of Morocco for five years, after a referendum would be held to determine independence, autonomy, or integration into Morocco. The Polisario agreed the plan, but Morocco refused to consider it, declaring to hold a referendum is unnecessary. In June 2004, a frustrated James baker resigned after seven years as UN envoy.

Identification

MINURSO's **Identification Commission** was established in May 1993, and after completing the necessary groundwork, began the process of identifying potential voters. Procedural and operational difficulties, however, allowed only slow progress, and efforts to resolve differences between the parties were not successful.

In May 1996, the Secretary-General suspended the identification process and most MINURSO civilian staff were withdrawn including the civilian police. The military component remained to monitor and verify the ceasefire.

In early 1997, the Secretary-General intensified the examination of the main contentious issues, including in a series of direct talks between the parties and in September reported that all the agreements reached during the talks had taken effect. In December 1997, the identification process was restarted and despite a number of difficulties, identification of applicants was completed. However, the parties remained unable to arrive at a consensus on how to deal with applicants from the different groups.

The Identification Commission has prepared a computer database, which includes at about 266.000 names. In the end of 2003, the Secretary-General suspended again the identification process. The database and the hardcopies were transferred to Geneva.

Confidence Building Measures


The Special Representative of the Secretary General and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have promoted with the parties the implementations of confidence building measures, which aim to facilitate person-to-person contact between refugees camps and their communities of origin Western Sahara.

The **Telephone Service** linking the 27 February School in Tindouf and the Territory was established in 2003, and has been extended to the other refugee camps in 2004. More than 10.000 refugees have benefited from this service every year.


The first exchange of **Family Visits** – between Western Saharan refugees living in the Tindouf camps in Algeria and their relatives in the towns of the Territory commenced successfully on 5 March 2004. During the first six-month period, fifty 5-day exchanges of visits have taken place involving 619 persons originating from all refugee camps and 589 persons from the cities of Laayoune, Dakhla, Smara and Boujdour. In order to ensure the success of this exercise, MINURSO provided UNHCR with full logistical support services, both air and ground means of transport, as well as office communication and equipment. Unfortunately the family visits were suspended for more than one year and were renewed only in November 2005, although the number of applicants is increasing every day and has already reached the 20.000.

In the meantime the UNHCR is ready to implement the **Mail Service** between the refugee camps and the territory under the modalities proposed by the UNHCR and to organize **Seminars** to offer opportunities for dialogue and interaction of topics of a non-political nature between persons from civil societies but Morocco stated, however, that it would continue to reflect on the issue in order to reach suitable arrangements for the implementation of these services.

Strategy and tactics of the Parties




The Royal Moroccan Army has a static defense lay-out organized on 698 defensive strong points on the berm, intervention units are dislocated of 3 – 8 km from there and logistics elements are located in the towns of Laayoune, Dakhla and Smara.



Using natural relief and the strong and observation points, the main task of the Royal Moroccan Army is to monitor the other side of the berm and register everything. If there is a Polisario attack against the line, the mobile intervention units launch counterattack to reestablish the original positions. The equipment of the RMA is mainly modern American and French means and the troops (estimated figure is 100.000 – 120.000) are well trained.

Front Polisario




The Front Polisario Military Forces are organized into Military Regions of supposedly battalion strength focusing on show of force, observing and collecting intelligence, using hit and run actions, guerilla tactics, and using Algeria as a sanctuary.

The Polisario has a light infantry force with little or no heavy weapons. They use mounted jeeps and pick up trucks for mobility because they depend on speed of deployment to overcome their lack of military hardware. Their equipment is mostly very old (more than 30-35 years old) former Soviet and captured Moroccan weapons and vehicles. The general condition of their equipment is very poor.

The Front Polisario Military Forces Head Quarter is located in Rabouni, Algeria and the logistics base and other logistics elements are also here. In the Military Regions only a few hundreds soldiers are stationing and the estimated global military strength of the Polisario is about 10.000 troops.

Organization of MINURSO



In 2006, the total strength of the MINURSO is about 450-455 employees, including 231 military observers, 120 international civilian people from about 45 different countries and 102 local (Moroccan) civilian employees.

The Military Component

The current strength is 231 military officers from 25 countries, including one Force Commander, 203 UN Military Observers, 7 Clerks (NCOs) and a Korean Medical Unit with 20 doctors, nurses and technicians.

MINURSO's mandated main military tasks are derived from the Settlement Proposals and Implementation Plan: to monitor the ceasefire, to show the UN presence in the desert, mark mines/minelfields and unexploded munitions (UXOs) found in the area of responsibility and exchange such and other information with the parties and establish good contact with the parties.


The ground patrol and the helicopter reconnaissance flights are the eyes and ears of the Mission. Every month the whole Military Component delivers approximately 470 – 500 ground patrols with a distance of more than 100.000 km

and 9.500 man/hours, and 40 – 45 hello recces.

The MINURSO has fixed and rotating wing Aircraft (1xAN 26 cargo, 2x AN=24 personal and three MI 8 helicopters) for movement of personnel and cargo, which provide more than 40 logistics flights, plus the hello recces per month.

The Military Agreements

The **Military Agreement #1** was signed between the MINURSO and the Royal Moroccan Army as well as the Front Polisario in December 1997 and in January 1998 to maintain military status quo, to define activities forbidden and required request/notification, to establish procedure for investigating violations and to define rights of UNMOs. Although there were no major violations of the ceasefire, only infractions to the Military Agreement #1, during the past few years, the tension between the parties has increased and violation committed by both sides were reported regularly. The violations or possible violations of the RMA take place at what could be defined as medium risk level and which may not be offensive or directly provocative nature. However, all these has culminated into serious frustration of the Polisario, due to the many and on-going Moroccan tactical reinforcements. On the other hand, the violations of the Polisario to the Military Agreement #1 are reportedly smaller in number but typical of their guerilla tactics of collecting intelligence and show of force.




The **Military Agreement #2** with the Polisario was signed in April 1999 and **Military Agreement #3** with the RMA was signed in March 1999. The aim of these Agreements is to reduce danger from mines and UXOs, to exchange of information and mark/destroy previously known and newly discovered mines and UXOs. Under these two Agreements the Military Observers have marked every year several hundreds of mines and UXOs, and informed the parties. Generally the RMA has destroyed the objects, but the Polisario has no capacity to do the same.

Team-Site Operation

We can declare that since 1991 the Military Component can perform its tasks in a rather quiet environment. The MINURSO has a very good relationship at each level with the parties, both the Royal Moroccan Army and the Front Polisario. The Team-Sites have daily contact with the liaison officers of the Moroccan Sub-Sectors and the Polisario Military Regions, so the Military Observers can work without major problems.

Hazards and challenges in the field

- mines, minefields, unexploded munitions,
- stress, international environment, distance from the family,
- monotonous work,
- driving through the sandy and rocky terrains,
- weather, hot climatic conditions, extreme temperature, sand storm, etc.



First priority: Stay on the track and if you find mines, or UXOs, never touch it. You have to mark them and give the coordinates to the parties, but their removal and destruction are the parties' tasks.

Everybody begins the mission on a Team-Site and most of the Military Observers are working the first time for the UN. In the Team-Sites, the 14 – 20 Military Observers are from eight, ten or more different nations. They have to become accustomed to the local environment, to the different nations, cultures, religions, traditions and they have to use English the whole day. This is not so easy but everywhere the UNMOs are very friendly and in a few days everybody is “at home”. But the Team-Sites are not five-star hotels. UNMOs live in tents and everybody takes care of his belongings, washes his clothes, and cleans his room and the common facilities, etc.

The peacekeepers represent the United Nations, they have to conduct themselves in a professional and disciplined manner at all times. They must be always neutral and impartial. They are working continuously seven days per week, thirty or thirty-one days per month. There is no day off and there is only one maintenance day per week. Every Team-Site has to deliver at least two-three patrols per day. In the desert there are only desert tracks that are very rocky or very sandy and potentially very dangerous. UNMOs drive or site in a car several hours

(sometimes eight, ten or more), maybe six times a week. They must concentrate when driving the car. After a few months, the officers know everything in their area of responsibility. Every day they see the same faces, tracks and units; soon work becomes monotonous. For this reason, after five, six, seven months everybody has to move to another Team-Site or to the Force HQ.

Many UNMOs have children, being away from their families and not seeing them for a long time is also a stress factor. Fortunately everywhere in the Team-Sites there are satellite receivers, Internet connections and satellite telephone systems, so Military Observers can contact their family even every day, and there is a Leave/CTO (compensatory time-off) policy, which allow them to go home, if not two-three times, at least once per year.

The last big challenge is the weather. UNMOs work in the desert where normal daily temperature is 40 to 45° C from the early March to late October. Summer temperature, however can reach 50 degrees or higher. Most UNMOs experience first time such high temperature. Tents and patrol vehicles are air-conditioned, but many times they must work outdoors. The desert is always windy, the air dusty. Sandstorms are difficult to handle. Sometimes even the supply flights should be cancelled due to limited visibility.

Western Sahara today

The current mandate (UN Security Council Resolution N° 1634) of MINURSO has been extended from 1st November 2005 to 30th April 2006, but the Baker document appears politically dead. The prolonged cease-fire has held without major disturbances, but Polisario has repeatedly threatened to resume fighting if no breakthrough occurs. Morocco's withdrawal from both the terms of the original Settlement Plan and the Baker Plan negotiations in 2003 left the peace-keeping mission without a political agenda: this increased the risk of renewed war.

Demonstrations, began in May 2005 in Laayoune, after relatives protesting the transfer of a Sahrawi prisoner accused of drug dealing and insulting the Moroccan monarchy to a prison in Agadir, were violently dispersed by police, provoking further demonstrations. Protest spread by end of May to other cities and localities in Morocco and Western Sahara. International human rights organizations have expressed concern at what they termed abuse by Moroccan security forces, and a number of Sahrawi activists have been jailed. Pro-independence Sahrawi sources, including Polisario, have given the demonstrations the name "Independence Intifada", while sources supporting the Moroccan claims have attempted to minimize the events as being of limited importance.

During the last year violations by both parties have continued. They amount to a serious deterioration in compliance with the Military Agreement #1. The violations include activities such as the enhancement of physical structures in the restricted areas defined by the agreement and the imposition of restrictions on movement of United Nations Military Observers. These includes brief incursions into the buffer strip by armed elements from both sides, construction of new

physical structures and movement of military units without prior notification or approval by MINURSO. At the same time, civilian activities, including demonstrations by Polisario supporters, continued to take place in the buffer strip. Although the demonstrations do not constitute a breach of Military Agreement #1, they have contributed to increased tensions on the ground and may result in incidents and a deterioration of the situation of along the berm.

Demonstrations and protests are still occurring in March 2006, after Morocco declared in February that it was contemplating a plan for devolving a limited variant of autonomy to the Territory, but still explicitly refused any referendum on independence. The Front Polisario has intermittently threatened to resume fighting, referring to the Moroccan refusal of a referendum as a breach of the cease-fire terms, but most observers seem to consider armed conflict unlikely.

Conclusion

The prevailing calm, having lasted for so many years, deceives some people into thinking that it's time for the UN to pack up and go, forgetting that MINURSO patrolling and monitoring is a key factor in keeping the calm, and also that MINURSO has still not fulfilled its core mission of ensuring that the people of Western Sahara can exercise their right of self-determination (the purpose of the referendum which gives the mission its name).

Regrettably, the positions of the parties with regard to a settlement remained far apart during the years. The lack of progress was compounded by the overall tense political climate in the region. In addition to harsh public statements emanating periodically from the parties, demonstrations and allegations of human rights abuses in the Territory suggest that the situation could deteriorate further in the absence of a mutually acceptable solution. In view of the prevailing situation, MINURSO should continue to play an important stabilizing and cease-fire monitoring role on the ground.

PULL AFRICA OUT OF ITS POVERTY TRAP

Halima Mohammed FIJI, Ambassador of Ethiopia to Hungary

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen

I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to the Hungarian International Development Assistance nonprofit company (HUN- IDA) and its director, Ibolya Bárány, for inviting me to Hungary and giving me the opportunity to deliver to this prestigious conference.

The theme of this forum has enormous meaning in terms of the challenges we Africans face in development, peace, ensuring good governance and respect for human rights.

The suffering of the African people as a result of abject poverty, hunger and disease (especially HIV/AIDS) are subject of innumerable conferences held here and elsewhere. Such problems mostly result from uncontrollable natural phenomena and also to a good extent because of the lack of good governance and failed economic and social policies of governments.

The way out of the poverty trap for Africa has been widely discussed this time and I am glad that the world has turned so much attention to my continent. I can say by many measures, it have been great days for Africa with all sorts of events like Millennium Development Goals, commitments to the ideals of African Union, G-8 leaders pledging for more aid, NEPAD, the World Bank/IMF's poverty reduction strategy papers, UK Prime Minister Commission for Africa, etc.

The millennium campaign is being pushed by world leaders at the United Nations to advance moves towards the goals agreed by world leaders at the UN in September 2000. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) include a 50 percent reduction in poverty , primary school enrolment, reduction of child mortality by two-thirds, cutbacks in maternal mortality by three-quarters, the control of killer diseases especially HIV/AIDS and malaria, promotion of gender equality. A lot of success has been registered in Africa towards the attainment of these goals. Ten countries are on the right track to get all children to school by 2015. There are others which succeeded in reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS and to supply potable drinking water for all. Women participation in social and political arena has been increasing to greater scale. More than two thirds of the countries of South of Sahara have had multiparty elections, albeit of varying quality. As our Prime Minister Meles Zenawi indicated during his speech on the 60th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations "...the past five years have in fact demonstrated that even for countries such as Ethiopia, most of the MDGs are emphatically not unattainable Goals with unrealistic goals with unrealistic targets. In fact, in our particular case, for example, the fight against poverty in all its dimensions with clear commitment and on the basis of clearly defined strategy antedates the articulation of the MDGs."

While it is clear that the prime responsibility for achieving the goals belongs to the concerned countries, it must also be noted that they cannot do it unless there is more aid, and better quality of aid, fairer terms of trade and debt relief. We argue for more aid because our long standing cycle of poverty makes it imperative to do so. We also strongly believe that aid would be more effective in fostering growth in countries with good policies and when it goes along with the receiving country's priorities. We have been pleased that Africa and development Aid have been at the core of this year's G-8 summit, which was held in Scotland in July. Africans are daring to hope that this time offered help is not just empty words as appears to be happening on the full cancellation of the debt of highly indebted poor countries. If United States and EU will start acting on their longstanding pledge of 0.7 of GNP, then Africans will roll up their sleeves and get to work to get out of the wood.

With regard to fairer world trade arrangement the international community must aim for the good outcome of Doha Round to work on major reform of agricultural trade policies - border barriers and trade distorting subsidies in developed countries. Poor countries improved market access needs to be complemented by increased support to capacity building, including upgrading trade logistics and facilitation as well as trade related infrastructure to enable African exporters and producers to be fully competitive in the world market.

The recent pledge by the wealthy nations to help to rid the poorest countries of their weighty debt, launching a program that fell short of the immediate action demanded by Africa. We therefore insist on 100 percent unconditional debt cancellation. Total debt write-off will release the necessary resource for investment in poverty eradication program and facilitate the achievement of MDGs.

Let me highlight the steps we Africans contemplate within ourselves to struggle against poverty that ravage the continent's poor. We Africans well aware that we are not far from being blameless for the quagmire we are in. It is up to us to create the conditions for that not to occur and no one can do it for us. The achievement of South Africa is not a distance memory to assure anyone that the people of our continent are capable of resolving their deepest differences. It has also grown strong to secure the welfare of its population through policies that promote economic sustainability. In the decade of ending 2002, 16 countries of the continent sustained average annual growth rates of 4 percent or higher. Ethiopia scored average growth of 6 percent, up from 0.5 percent in the previous decade. Mozambique sustained growth of 7 percent and in the 1990s Ghana was able to lift 1 million of its citizen out of poverty. Botswana has done very well, in terms of governance and economic development, and there are many African countries that can be cited.

Our continent will also be a continent of nations at peace within and between ourselves. Our commitment to peace emanates from our conviction that without peace all our dreams for development will remain unfulfilled.

Of course, Excellencies and Ladies and Gentlemen, there are no quick panaceas to get us to these points. We have to build bricks after bricks slowly, carefully and surely. So we must be able to set our own priorities based on our own realities, experience and needs. The foundations are being laid. With the African Union, African leaders have created a vehicle for the continent wide transformation. The union's constitutive Act commits members to democratic principles and respect for human rights, good governance and rule of law. African leaders have devised the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the international community has accepted a detailed program of action for meeting our social and economic goals. To promote good political, economic and governance we have instituted the African Peer Review Mechanism.

Overall, these should be African methodologies that would enable us to make the best possible use of donors' support to solve African problem through sustained domestic effort.

Before I sign up I would like to briefly outline the development endeavours in Ethiopia with the above perspectives. Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries of the world that *has* begun the development journey by designing sound policies. In 2002, Ethiopia drew up a Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) that targets economic growth averaging 7 percent a year in order to halve poverty by 2015. To this effect the Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization strategy (ADLI) is premised on a structural transformation of agriculture from subsistence level to commercial production, which would act as a catalyst for the development of industry and exports, and the generation of off-farm employment and income.

Specifically the government aims to increase agricultural value-added growth from an annual 2.2 percent to 7.5 percent a year, and nonagriculture growth from 5.8 percent to 6.6 percent. In the agriculture sector, this strong improvement in real output is premised on productivity growth rising from an annual 0.4 percent to an average of 9 percent a year.

The government response to the challenges of enhancing productivity rests on six interlinked strategies. These include: supporting the expansion of cooperatives and improving access to market, improving access to rural finance, providing extensive technical and vocational education and training in agriculture, improving security of tenure, the development of rural infrastructure and designing and introduction of diversified extension package. Ethiopia's use of agriculture as the base of the country's overall development has indeed begun to justify itself from the positive signs that it *has* been able to achieve. We, however, face a number of challenges as we embark on our struggle to end hunger definitively. One of our biggest challenges is that of resources. So as to attain the structural transformation our agriculture, among other thing, requires investment in infrastructure. Rural road, electrification, telecommunication, schools and health facilities and logistics, all require finance which we are not able to mobilize mainly because we were not able to use our resources efficiently and partly because our partners have been unwilling to come up with the resources.

These and other challenges are ahead of us. We intend to mobilize domestic resources to the maximum extent possible. We also hope that our partners will provide us more and better Aid. The hope and the challenge are to double our crop production not over a decade but over the next five years that could lead to huge cuts in our rural poverty.

By way of conclusion, I would say that Africa has a long way to go, but contrary to what some maintain, improvement is possible.

Thank you again for being here, and thank you for your kind attention.

SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE EU STRATEGY FOR AFRICA AND THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION

Erika FODOR, Senior Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(Note: I have been collecting African proverbs for a long time. Please allow me to quote a few of them to enrich the ideas of this text.)

1. The “EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa’s Development“

The objective of the EU Strategy for Africa document^v - to be adopted by the European Council in December 2005 - is to present a long-term EU Strategy to promote the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa.

International awareness of the situation in Africa has significantly improved in recent years and the continent is now giving evidence of all indications that today there is real momentum for change. Recently, the member states of the EU have started to organize various programmes and international meetings focusing on Africa that intend to explain, encourage and mobilize along the main elements of this strategy. Some of these programmes are especially productive: mainly those that involve African experts and African civil organizations.

In Hungary several forums, both domestic and international, have been initiated related to the realization of the EU’s Africa Strategy mainly between those who are involved in the different aspects of Africa and development co-operation (economists, anthropologists, historians, diplomats, literary men, civilization researchers, artists etc). We know about numerous events, organized in the capital and in the countryside, where discussions have been started about Africa’s development involving different types of social groups. The general opinion is that we have to face clichés and the lacking of necessary knowledge. In spite of all this, we hope that the way to raise public awareness and solidarity is through enriching and expanding information. This is necessary for Hungary to participate in those various and colorful programmes related to Africa’s development that are currently being organized by the European Union and its member states.

“If you do not know where you are going, at least know where you have come from.” (Ghana)

2. About the Report of the Commission for Africa

Before we say a few words about how we see the perspectives of the realization of the EU Africa Strategy from Hungary's point of view and based on our experiences, let us mention those viewpoints of Hungarian Africa specialists that have been formed about the several-hundred-page-long Report of the Commission for Africa^{vi}. The establishment of the Commission was initiated by Tony Blair. The Hungarian Africa specialists group - representing various professions – along with other civil organizations dealing with Africa, initiated the debate on the Africa Report with the support of the British Embassy. (We also have to thank the British Embassy for helping to realize a web page, www.africainfo.hu , which started its operation in Hungarian, French and English)

The Report of the Commission for Africa has been prepared by an international group (from Africa, Europe, America, Canada, Japan China etc.) focusing on African interests in our globalized world. The Commission examined the possibilities of African development from various perspectives and made recommendations related to international development co-operation. Among others, the following points have also been raised during the Hungarian debates:

- 1 We have no reassuring information about the money given by donor countries to Africa: where this money went, what it was used for, what changes and consequences were initiated by these financial donations.
- 2 We also lack information about the following: how have the recipients of the African development co-operation changed and have they been able to develop at all in the past few decades? Could the need for sustainable development channel foreign donations and support towards this direction?
- 3 What kind of local financial resources have been mobilized parallel to this? Does the support given by the international donor community have an impact on the African recipients and can Africa efficiently use these foreign resources?

“He who eats alone, dies alone.” (Ethiopia)

3. Cultural traditions in Africa

The Commission deserves credit for its approach by emphasizing – in a separate chapter – the importance of the familiarity with the African cultural traditions. For those who wish to help or wish to participate in the development of Africa in any way, it is important to know better the local cultures even if it is sometimes

difficult. The motivations of the local population for active participation are vital from the aspect of final results: do they have the capacity to receive and integrate something new and continue to live with it and build on it? These are important conditions for sustainable development.

The EU Africa Strategy emphasizes the importance of African cultural traditions and takes them into consideration during the design and implementation phases of different development projects.

“If you want to know how important your legs are, try standing on your head.” (Zambia)

3. Hungarian experiences

Hungary has started its relations with African countries as newly established states after the process of independence and decolonisation following World War II. As a consequence, diplomatic relations have also been established. Hungary has also built interstate cooperation with these new young countries: it started to send experts to Africa, received and educated students from Africa, and the development of commercial, cultural and other relations have also begun. During those decades from the 1960s up to the mid-80s (when the transition into market oriented economy and democratization started in Hungary), a wide ranging network of foreign representation (of state and business actors) has been developed. The formation of these relations were fairly selective, they were mainly developed with those African countries who chose the so called “socialist orientation“ model as their way for development.

Even though the political and economic relations between the socialist countries (including Hungary) and African countries have constantly been developed, socialist countries were unable to considerably contribute to the economic development of the African countries. During the 1980s the “socialist orientation” models in Africa have all failed one after the other.

“An antelope does not wear the shoes of an elephant” (Ghana)

4. Changes in Africa and Europe

Almost parallel to economic and social transitions in Middle and Eastern Europe, African countries, one after the other, have transferred their political structures to multiparty-system and the slow process of economic modernization has begun. During the past 15 years the relations between Hungary and the African countries have significantly been transformed, as it has happened to the African relations of

the European Union as well. Hungary, as an EU member, is restructuring its African relations on the basis of the EU's new development policy. In the new financial period Hungary is going to take part in the development and development cooperation in Africa by building broader and deeper relations as it has today. It is, however, still undecided how we can prepare well for the participation.

“It does not matter how high your hat is, everyone knows the level of your head inside it” (Nigeria)

5. Hungary – as a Member of the Cotonou Agreement

In 2000 the EU signed a partner agreement in the capital of Benin, Cotonou, with 77 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific region (48 countries were from the African continent). According to the agreement, the EU will assist in economic development, in the reduction of poverty and in creating political stability through new governing methods and it will also assist in pulling down commercial barriers. Those EU level international development programmes that are targeted at the countries of the Cotonou Agreement (including African countries) will be financed by the EDF (European Development Fund – currently the 9th EDF is still operational) and not by the EU's central budget. As a consequence of this, Hungary will be a contributor to the 10th EDF commencing in January 2008 and according to preliminary information, as a member, it will contribute several billion HUF to the development of Africa. Hungarian NGOs, business firms, foundations etc., as fully qualified organizations, can also bid for tenders. The broad scope of development will offer new opportunities for which Hungary has to prepare in time. It would be highly desirable that EU projects partly financed by Hungary were carried out with the involvement of as many Hungarian participants as possible.

We have to be honest: what we know about Africa today is not sufficient. Those African countries that we used to know well have changed and there are some that we have just recently started to get acquainted with. Unfortunately, we do not receive adequate help from the African countries either. They have not begun to realize that the EU has ten new member states and that they have new partners. We are their new partners.

“The best way to improve your memory is to lend people money” (Ghana)

6. Hungary participates in the implementation of the EU Africa Strategy

The ten new EU member states, including Hungary, have not prepared themselves for the African partnership. This is partly due to the fact that these new member

states have not prepared themselves either for the international development co-operation carried out by the European Union. During the accession period this was not a requirement to be met. At that time this might have been reasonable for the experts responsible for the EU accession but now it is a disadvantageous situation for us. Why? Because Hungary, during the preparation phase, has transformed its economy to a market-based model without the perspective of international development co-operation and a world outside the EU were not parts of the picture.

It is a very complex issue why more Hungarian business firms and civil society organizations cannot successfully apply for tenders related to EU development co-operation programmes. The answer to this question goes further beyond the earlier mentioned disadvantages. We do not have enough experience, we lack own resource capacities and capital. It is a fact that the majority of civil organizations have a very short history and the level of social awareness in the field of development assistance is relatively low.

The question of ability and capacity will both arise when the development programmes related to Africa will be open to us. While looking for answers and explanations, it is important that we do not focus on what we have missed (it may have been our fault or someone else's). Let us think about and plan what we are capable of achieving with our energy and readiness. We must utilize the experiences from those past few decades that we have behind us today, examining what we can rely on and what other new areas need to be explored. We need to be aware of Hungary's capacities and readiness. We shall, with gratitude of course, make use of the help of old EU member states, the preparation programmes of the EU and the capacity building programmes of other donor countries and international organizations including international financial institutions.

“Make some money, but don't let money make you” (Tanzania)

7. A change is needed in our way of thinking

We have to make the Hungarian social actors familiar with the EU Africa Strategy mainly because we agree with its objectives, but also because Hungary will be a responsible participant in the successful implementation of the strategy, too.

Our knowledge about Africa is superficial and poor. We do not know enough about the many faceted development that is currently taking place in Africa. Our attention is arrested by the exotic themes, the poverty, the epidemics and those limited ad hoc pieces of information about the conflicts of this continent. If we look at the programmes of the BBC or TV5 we are shocked by the richness of daily news. With reference to Africa, tourist organizations cannot offer too many new ideas for tourists, apart from the usual organization of trips for seeing different cultures and the trips for professional meetings, or those who have the opportunity to travel to Africa must satisfy themselves with national parks, interesting but

ordinary sights and exotic themes.

We have to bring the everyday problems of the African people closer to Hungarians. We have to show their approach to fighting the problems of their continent, countries and their families. We have to put an end to the assumption in our minds that Africans expect everything from someone else and that they do not have any idea about how to overcome their own difficulties.

“He who sells sand as salt, is paid stones as money” (Nigeria)

8. How do we prepare ourselves and how *should* we do it?

In order to make Hungarian civil organizations, competent institutions and business firms more equipped for the implementation of African development targets from 2008, a large number of preparation courses and programmes need to be started. We have to get acquainted with the African development principles and practice of the EU, we have to learn how to submit successful bids for tender, and we have to participate in the project implementation of more experienced donor countries. We also have to build relations with local organizations in Africa, and with the international organizations operating in Africa.

We have to create information services that gather and disseminate cultural and economic information on African countries in order to provide the actors of Hungarian economy with sufficient knowledge.

On the other hand, we have to make people living in African countries more familiar with Hungary as well. In order to realize this, we have to open new channels of information with special regard to the fact that our currently operating foreign representations do not have the necessary capacity to carry out these future responsibilities and tasks.

“Ambition without knowledge is like a boat on a dry land” (Ghana)

^v The whole document can be found among the Annexes of this book.

^{vi} “Our Common Interest”, Report of the Commission for Africa, March 2004, London, UK

ANNEXES

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 12.10.2005
COM(2005) 489 final

**COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL,
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE**

**EU STRATEGY FOR AFRICA: TOWARDS A
EURO-AFRICAN PACT TO ACCELERATE
AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT**
{SEC(2005)1255}

Introduction

Africa is on the move. International awareness of the situation in Africa has significantly improved in recent years and the continent is now giving sustained signs that today there is real momentum for change. The birth of the African Union (AU) and NEPAD, the reinforced role of Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the emergence of a new generation of leaders at national level have changed Africa. It is also changing the relationship between Africa and Europe.

Europe's relationship with Africa is not new. It is deeply rooted in history and has gradually evolved from often painful colonial arrangements into a strong and equal partnership based on common interests, mutual recognition and accountability. Europe and Africa are connected by strong trade links, making the EU the biggest export market for African products. For example, approximately 85% of Africa's exports of cotton, fruit and vegetables are imported by the EU. Europe and Africa are also bound by substantial and predictable aid flows. In 2003 the EU's development aid to Africa totalled €15 billion, compared to €5 billion in 1985. With this, the EU is by far the biggest donor: its ODA accounts for 60% of the total ODA going to Africa. Moreover, some EU Member States retain longstanding political, economic and cultural links with different African countries and regions, while others are relative newcomers to African politics and development. At Community level, over the last few decades the European Commission has built up extensive experience and concluded a number of contractual arrangements with different parts of Africa that provide partners with a solid foundation of predictability and security.

But for too long the EU's relations with Africa have been too fragmented,

both in policy formulation and implementation: between the different policies and actions of EU Member States and the European Commission; between trade cooperation and economic development cooperation; between more traditional socio-economic development efforts and strategic political policies. Neither Europe nor Africa can afford to sustain this situation. The purpose of this Strategy for Africa is, therefore, to give the EU a **comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework** for its relations with the African continent.

One Africa. While Africa has many faces, different histories and diverse needs, it has now collectively embarked on a path of political, economic and cultural integration of the entire continent, crystallised in the regional integration efforts promoted by Africa's RECs and the launching of the AU and NEPAD. The EU Strategy for Africa will therefore, for the first time, address Africa as one entity. Under this Strategy, the EU will reinforce its dialogue with the pan African institutions. The Strategy will also fully exploit the potential of the recently revised Cotonou Agreement, the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, together with the European Neighbourhood Policy. These agreements cover respectively the EU's relations with sub-Saharan African countries, South-Africa & the countries of North Africa.

One Europe. Europe has also changed. The enlargement of the EU to include ten new members has taken the number of potential individual partners to twenty six: the twenty five Member States plus the EC. This development has increased the EU's potential political and economic impact but the enlarged membership also poses challenges in terms of aid coordination and complementarity. The EU Strategy for Africa will therefore make aid effectiveness and donor coordination central priorities in the years ahead.

Common objectives. The purpose of the EU's action is to work in partnership with the nations of Africa to promote peace and prosperity for all their citizens. In this EU Strategy for Africa, the principal objective is, therefore, to **promote the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa**. This objective is strengthened and complemented by the specific objectives pursued within the Cotonou Agreement, the TDCA, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, and the European Neighbourhood Policy, including the support to political reform and economic modernisation.

This EU Strategy for Africa should further strengthen the sound strategic partnership between an enlarged Europe and a re-emerging Africa. It is hoped that this partnership will be formalised with the conclusion of a Euro-African Pact at a second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon. The Strategy will further reinforce the basic principles that govern this relationship, most prominently *equality, partnership and ownership*. While these principles are not new, their significance and implications have changed with developments in the external political and economic context. In view of the increasing role of both the RECs and the AU, and the increasing complexity of the EU's relations with Africa, *subsidiarity* and *solidarity* will also become central tenets of the EU Strategy for Africa. Finally, it is crucial that the EU's relations with Africa should be increasingly pervaded by a culture of

dialogue, which forms a basic element of our different contractual agreements.

Key to the success of the partnership will be its ability to cement the bonds between the two continents beyond the formal political and economic interaction. One important component of this broad-based dialogue is the launching of **twinning partnerships** bringing together African and European universities and schools, parliaments, towns and cities, municipalities, businesses and industries, trade unions, civil society networks and museums. Another innovative proposal is the creation of a European programme for people with skills to share who want to learn more about, and get involved in, Africa's development.

The Strategy must reflect both the many different economic and social situations between and within African countries, and the different contractual relations the EU has with them. For those countries still some way from reaching the MDGs the EU should focus its support in areas considered prerequisites for attaining the MDGs (**peace and security** and **good governance**), areas that create the economic environment necessary for achieving the MDGs (**economic growth, trade and interconnection**) and areas directly targeting the MDGs (**social cohesion, decent work, gender equality and environment**). These objectives should be supplemented, especially for those countries closer to the EU, by support for economic integration and political cooperation with the EU. Taken together, these measures constitute the EU's common, comprehensive and coherent response to Africa's development challenges.

Prerequisites for attaining the MDGs

Over the last few decades, wars and violent conflicts in Africa have destroyed millions of lives and decades of economic development. It is now universally recognised that there can be no sustainable development without peace and security. **Peace and security** are therefore the first essential prerequisites for sustainable development. The EU should step up its efforts to promote peace and security at all stages of the conflict cycle, from conflict prevention, via conflict management to conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. In recent years Africa has demonstrated its willingness and ability to plan, lead and conduct its own peacesupport operations. The Peace Facility for Africa, which has rapidly become the financial foundation of Africa's emerging peace and security architecture, should therefore be replenished and strengthened to support these efforts. The EU should also continue to promote the sound management of natural resources in Africa, thus tackling the environmental root causes of many conflicts.

Security has become a top priority worldwide since 11 September 2001. Both EU Member States and North African partner countries have suffered major terrorist attacks. The security of citizens is now a major priority for both Africa and Europe. Ensuring security & the rule of law, with equity, justice and full respect for human rights, are now fully recognised as fundamental, shared priorities.

A second central prerequisite for sustainable development is **good and effective governance**. In this area too, Africa is showing signs of positive change.

Together, African countries have signed up to a set of progressive values and principles of good governance. Some of them have even committed themselves to being regularly monitored in the framework of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), a unique tool for peer review and peer learning. The EU should launch a Governance Initiative that encourages participation in the APRM process and provides support to African countries for implementation of APRM-driven reforms. One central element of the process of governance reform is the establishment and strengthening of credible national institutions, whether at central level – such as parliaments, the police and judiciary system or public financial management systems – or at local and regional level. However, governance is not only about institutions, but also about appropriate policies and adequate legal and regulatory frameworks. The EU should therefore continue to promote transparency and effective exchange of information between authorities in order to fight corruption, money laundering and terrorism. The EU should also continue to promote the human rights and equal opportunities protect the vulnerable groups, especially women. Concretely, the EU should support the creation of an EU-Africa Forum on human rights to encourage the sharing of expertise and resources. In the countries covered by the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy, progress towards good governance will be encouraged through the establishment of a substantial Governance Facility.

Creating an economic environment for achieving the MDGs

Despite improvements in economic performance, many parts of Africa continue to be marginalised. In an increasingly globalised world economy, Africa accounts for only about 2% of world trade and its share of global manufactured exports is almost negligible. To halve poverty by 2015, it is estimated that Africa needs to achieve average growth of at least 8% per year. The EU should therefore assist in stimulating sufficiently rapid, broad-based and sustainable **economic growth** in order to contribute to an effective reduction of poverty. The EU should continue to help African countries to implement macroeconomic and structural policies that encourage private investment and stimulate pro-poor growth. Another key vector for economic growth and regional integration is the development of South-South, North- South and multilateral **trade**. Increased economic integration within regions stimulates growth by increasing market size and exploiting economies of scale. The aim to foster integrated markets and promote trade and development lies at the heart of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that the EU is currently negotiating with four Sub-Saharan regions of Africa. Maintaining a close coordination between trade and development policies is essential. The Doha Development Agenda and the EPAs both seek to ensure the progressive integration of Africa into world markets. The EU should also support African countries in the promotion of a stable, efficient and harmonised regulatory framework encouraging private business initiatives, including in the area of electronic communications and services. In this context, the EU should promote a Euro-African Business Forum

bringing together entrepreneurs and public and private investors from both Europe and Africa.

Macroeconomic stability, the creation of regional markets and an appropriate private investment climate are crucial preconditions for sustained economic growth. However, this pro-growth framework needs to be accompanied by appropriate measures to boost and diversify production and to establish the necessary infrastructure and networks. The EU should target specific support on increasing the competitiveness and productivity of African **agriculture**. In the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy, North African partner countries will implement a roadmap including the continuing liberalisation of trade in agriculture, processed agriculture and fisheries products and the liberalisation of trade in services and establishment, with the aim of concluding negotiations by the end of 2006.

Limited access to transport and communication services, energy, water and sanitation also constrains economic growth. The EU should therefore establish a Partnership for Infrastructure to support and initiate programmes that facilitate **interconnectivity** at continental level to promote regional integration. In the framework of this Partnership, the EU should support Africa's efforts to identify and address missing links, harmonise transport policies, develop integrated water management, develop cross-border and regional energy infrastructure and promote efforts to bridge the digital divide at all levels, including through initiatives to develop sustainable low-cost electronic communications.

Tackle the MDGs directly

40% of all Africans survive on less than one dollar a day. Only six out of ten African children go to primary school. Communicable diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, have hit Africa hardest and in 2004 alone AIDS killed over two million people in Sub-Saharan Africa and affected another three million. The EU should therefore help to make **basic social services** available for the poorest people in Africa (MDGs 1-6), contributing to the establishment of a social safety net for the most vulnerable. Beyond primary education, the EU should support education, research and access to knowledge and transfer of know-how as a lifelong process: from secondary and higher to vocational education. Building on the success of and experience from the Erasmus programme, the EU should support the creation of a Nyerere programme for student exchanges across Africa. The EU should also step up its action to deliver decent health care through the strengthening of national health systems, capacity building and health-related research and the replenishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. These services need to be further complemented by improvements in access to water, sanitation, sustainable energy and ICTs. Full participation of non-state actors should be ensured in all these areas to strengthen ownership and improve service delivery for the poor. Preventing and eradicating poverty requires the promotion of productive employment and decent work for all. In Africa, too

many jobs for young labour market entrants are in the informal economy with low productivity and income, poor working and living conditions and with little or no social protection.

These measures, important as they are, will, however, not in themselves be enough to redress existing inequalities and lack of social cohesion. Africa's demographic boom, rapid urbanisation and large-scale migration pose new challenges. First, therefore, a more integrated approach to sustainable urban development is needed, based on the twin pillars of good urban governance and good urban management, plus better territorial development and land use planning. Second, more comprehensive efforts should be made to turn migration into a positive force in the development process, for example by transforming brain drain into 'brain gain' or by supporting the management of migration flows.

Africa's environment is fragile and prone to water shortages, climate change and desertification. Current population growth and agricultural expansion have caused land shortages and the intensification of agriculture has contributed to further land degradation. A healthy **environment** has benefits beyond Africa's borders. But it is first and foremost one of the most valuable assets for the sustainable development of Africa and EU assistance is necessary for its protection. Making Africa's development sustainable is the only way to protect the livelihood of Africa's poor in the medium and long term. Specific action should include the conservation of biodiversity, for example by supporting the establishment of an appropriate legal framework for sound use of natural resources, the management of environmental diversity and desertification, and action to counter the effects of climate change. A central aspect of these efforts will be the development of local capabilities to generate reliable information on the location, condition and evolution of environmental resources, food availability and crisis situations.

More and more effective aid

While aid flows to Africa are substantial and have been increasing over recent years, additional political and financial commitments are required to give Africa a decisive push towards the MDGs. In June 2005 the European Council made such an ambitious commitment. The European Council agreed, on the basis of a Commission proposal, to double aid between 2004 and 2010, and allocate half of it to Africa. By making this commitment, the EU is still on track to reach the UN target of allocating 0.7% of its GNI to development aid by 2015. Compared to what is expected in 2006, this commitment should result in an estimated additional €20 billion in ODA per year by 2010 and an additional annual €46 billion per year by 2015. The EU also agreed to allocate at least 50% of this agreed increase to Africa.

EU aid should not only be increased, but also improved. Aid effectiveness should be a crucial focus area in the coming years. In the past, lack of coordination and complementarity between donors has often prevented sound development policies from being converted into tangible development achievements. The EU has gone a long way towards improving this situation, most recently at the High-

Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris (March 2005). To go even further, the EU should now implement an **Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness** and apply it in Sub-Saharan Africa as a priority. This Action Plan will pave the way for specific proposals for the creation of an operational and interactive EU donor atlas, agreement on individual country roadmaps for harmonisation, the adoption of joint programming documents and the development of common procedures. In addition, the EU should foster more **general and sectoral budget support**. This will not only make aid delivery more transparent, predictable and result-oriented but will also enhance the EU's collective political leverage. Overall, it will be important to demonstrate that the substantial increases in aid flows have served their purpose in helping recipient countries in their attainment of the MDGs.

Conclusions

In recent years, a forward-looking Africa has re-emerged on the international scene with more confidence, dynamism and optimism than ever before. Governance has improved considerably in recent years, sustained economic growth is being recorded for the first time in decades, and the AU/NEPAD and regional organisations have provided Africa with political and economic roadmaps and a vision for the future. Africa's development is now at the top of the international political agenda and there is a broad international consensus on the basic action that needs to be taken. There is now a unique window of opportunity to give Africa a decisive push towards sustainable development. For Northern Africa, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy have also opened up the concrete perspective of a new and deeper partnership across the Mediterranean basin, which will be reconfirmed during the forthcoming tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration.

As a long-standing partner and close neighbour of Africa, the EU is well placed to assume a leading role in this process. Europe and Africa are bound together by common history, interlocking cultures and shared objectives. Sustainable social, economic and political development in Africa is therefore our common concern. While Africa embraces a new vision for the continent's future, the EU has to answer its call with the same sense of responsibility and urgency. The next ten years (2005-2015) will be a watershed in relations between Europe and Africa. The EU Strategy for Africa outlined in this communication, expected to be adopted by the European Council in December 2005, constitutes the EU's response to the challenge of getting Africa back on the track of sustainable development and of meeting the MDGs by the target year of 2015. This is our common mission, and our common duty.

ANNEX TO THE EU STRATEGY FOR AFRICA

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Introduction

Africa is on the move. International awareness of the situation in Africa has significantly improved in recent years and the continent is now giving sustained signs that today there is real momentum for change. With the birth of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and the African Union (AU) in 2002, Africa has equipped itself with a strategy and institutions capable of guiding Africa on the road towards political and economic integration. The Cotonou Agreement, the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy provide the framework for the EU's support for these processes. The Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the building blocks of the continental integration process, are committed to fostering economic growth and political stability and, at national level, many countries are making considerable progress in the field of governance. In the past five years, for example, more than two thirds of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have held multiparty elections. In the late 1990s Sub-Saharan Africa also saw the first signs of a reversal of the trend of stalled growth of the previous two decades and in 2004 the region recorded real GDP growth of 5.1%, compared to 4.2% in 2003 and average annual growth of 2.3% between 1980 and 2000.

However, despite much progress, Africa's road towards sustainable development remains long. Today, 40% of all Africans are still living on less than one dollar a day, today three out of every four persons who die of AIDS are Africans, and today one African out of five lives in a country affected by war or violent conflicts. In terms of per capita income, eighteen out of the twenty poorest countries in the world are African and the continent is the only part of the developing world where life expectancy has been falling over the last 30 years. It is clear that without substantial additional political will and financial resources Africa will only be able to reach most of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), not by the target year of 2015, but by 2050.

Europe is Africa's long-standing partner and closest neighbour and Africa's development is also very much in Europe's interest, economically, politically and strategically. Attaining the MDGs is therefore a shared objective and a common goal. The EU – all 25 Member States and the European Commission – should now together seize the unique opportunity created by the existing dynamics in Africa and present a common, coherent and comprehensive strategy to make Africa the first priority for implementation of the Commission's "MDG package"^{vii} and the "European Consensus", the EU's new development policy.^{viii} The objective of this communication is to present a long-term **EU Strategy to promote the achievement of the MDGs in Africa** to be adopted by the European Council in December 2005. This Strategy should, in turn, form the basis of a new Euro-Africa Pact, which the EU should aim to endorse at an EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon. The EU Strategy for Africa is based on extensive consultations with the African Union (AU) and Africa's Regional Economic

Communities (RECs) and should fully harness the potential of the recently revised Cotonou Agreement, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy..

To achieve these objectives, the EU must take into account the different political, economic, social and environmental trends in Africa (Chapter 1) and the basic principles which should govern the relationship between the EU and Africa (Chapter 2). On this basis, the EU should pursue a three-pronged strategy (i) to strengthen EU support in priority areas, (ii) to increase EU financing for Africa and (iii) to develop and implement a more effective EU approach (Chapter 3).

1. THE MANY FACES OF AFRICA

There are many Africas. Different political regimes, historical experience, cultural and religious contexts, economic dynamics and geographic characteristics mean that local communities, countries and regions often differ considerably from one another. This chapter does not aim to give an exhaustive analysis of all of these differences – abundant literature already exists – but rather to highlight some important recent trends and developments in Africa. This context is the starting point for the EU Strategy for Africa.

1.1. Geopolitical dynamics: areas of insecurity and centres of stability

Recent years have seen a number of new *external players* emerge in Africa, attracted by the continent's economic potential and political and strategic importance. This changing geopolitical context poses new challenges and opportunities for the formulation and implementation of the EU's Africa policy. Emerging economies, such as Brazil, India or China, have become important sources of foreign investment and provide new export markets for African commodities. *China* merits special attention given its economic weight and political influence. Sino-African trade has increased from \$10 billion in 2000 to \$28.5 billion in 2004 and since 2000 more than 25% of China's crude oil is imported from Africa. Despite radical domestic changes, the country has retained links with different African countries, which are now attracted by China's trading potential. Especially for oil- and commodity-dependent countries, China represents a substantial and continued source of financial income, mostly outside the traditional development and governance frameworks.

Also a number of Africa's more longstanding partners are showing renewed interest in Africa. The *United States* has recently reinvested in Africa for a variety of reasons, including a traditional interest in development, good governance and political stability but also newer reasons such as access to oil, the battle against terrorism and global strategic competition. As for *Japan*, the regular high-level meetings held with Africa since the 1990s, such as the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), display the rising significance of Africa in its foreign and economic policy. Finally, *Russia* has also, particularly

since 2001, forged closer links with a number of African countries, notably concentrating on their potential in the energy and mining sectors.

Even more important than these external influences are Africa's internal political dynamics. While some African countries and regions are scarred by violent conflicts or state fragility, or are still in the midst of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, others have been experiencing sustained periods of peace, security, economic and political stability and democratic participation. These *stable countries* play an essential role in stabilising their regions and setting an example of what can be achieved in a favourable political climate. Over the last few decades, most of northern Africa has, for example, been enjoying lasting stability. In west Africa, Ghana is the prime example of a well-governed and stable country which has been able to convert economic growth into tangible development achievements. In the East African Community (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) political stability and regional economic integration have created a community of stability which stands in sharp contrast to the structural instability of the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. In recent years countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, both still in the midst of post-conflict reconstruction, have increasingly been seeking to forge closer political and economic links with this group of east African countries. In southern Africa, although the precarious situation in Zimbabwe continues to give cause for concern, there is a similar bloc of stable countries, including South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Mozambique. It must be noted, however, that not all stable countries set examples of good or effective governance.

Similarly, some of Africa's largest countries often also serve as *anchor countries*, poles of attraction and economic and political driving forces for their neighbours. Together with some Northern Africa countries, the leading examples of such anchor countries are Nigeria and South Africa, in western and southern Africa respectively. Due to the size of their economies and their commitment to regional and continental integration, they play a central role in economic development and political stability across Africa. Politically, the leaders of these two countries, President Obasanjo and President Mbeki, have taken on the roles of peace brokers, often far beyond their own sub-regions. Economically, considerable private investment in the Great Lakes region also means that South Africa has a strong interest in stability and prosperity in that region too.

Despite these positive trends, two chronic areas of conflict and instability remain: the Mano- River region in west Africa and a line extending from Sudan and the Horn of Africa down to eastern Congo in eastern and central Africa. These two areas are dominated by a large number of *countries in conflict* as well as a high proportion of *fragile states*, i.e. states that – often weakened by endemic crises and conflicts or natural disasters – lack credible, legitimate and/or effective governance. The first case, the Mano River sub-region, includes countries such as Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Fuelled by the presence of considerable natural resources, including diamonds and timber, over the last ten years conflict has spread across borders and engulfed the entire region in a severe refugee crisis,

further contributing to the regional instability. As a result of these conflicts, Guinea has become the haven for up to one million refugees. This instability has also had an impact beyond the region, affecting the Casamance-region of Senegal in the north-west and, since 2002, Côte d'Ivoire in the east.

A second line of insecurity can be traced from Sudan and the Horn of Africa, across the Central African Republic and northern Uganda to eastern Congo. These conflicts are fed by a complex pattern of structural causes, such as poor management of scarce natural resources, bad political governance, uncontrolled refugee flows, inter-regional trade in arms and trafficking in human beings. The conclusion of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan in January 2005 was a major breakthrough and could potentially be a turning point for the entire region. The same is true for the positive political dynamics in Somalia, until recently considered to be a *collapsed state*. However, the ongoing Darfur conflict in Sudan, the “forgotten war” in northern Uganda, the persistent insecurity in the east and north of the Central African Republic and the instability in eastern Congo remain serious causes for concern.

This instability and insecurity is fed by an increase in transnational organized crime. The African continent has become an important transit area for international drug traffickers. 89 per cent of African countries are affected by human trafficking flows as source, transit or destination countries, while theft and smuggling of natural resources or arms trafficking is increasing. At the same time, drugs trafficking and consumption is a particularly serious threat for the continent. African trafficking networks, particularly West African, have become major players and Africa is now responsible for a quarter of the world's cannabis seizures. Trafficking in and abuse of cocaine, heroin and amphetamine-type stimulants are also increasing.

1.2. Geo-economic dynamics: different paths to growth

There are many paths to growth. Recent evidence points to the sustainable exploitation of natural resources and agricultural development, and the investment in human resources combined with the creation of a sound investment climate as central drivers of growth.

Africa has several *resource-rich countries*, mainly concentrated in Northern and Southern Africa and the south of the Great Lakes region and around the Gulf of Guinea. The growth performance of these individual countries has been rather uneven. In the southern belt, some countries have been able to turn these resources into a sustainable source of income and growth. Experience in Botswana and South Africa, for example, shows that, when the right set of policies is in place, mineral extraction can lead to sustained growth. The recent and rapid increase in oil prices has also brought about exceptional performances in other parts of Africa, including the economies of the Gulf of Guinea. In 2004, for example, real GDP growth per capita in Equatorial Guinea was 31.5%. The resulting influx of foreign capital has brought opportunities as well as political and

economic responsibilities to convert the new wealth into sustainable development. The results of the exploitation of resources other than oil and gas differ. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has the third highest average potential hydropower output in the world after China and Russia, but only two percent has yet been developed. By contrast, Mozambique has gradually become a major exporter of electricity.

Agricultural commodity-dependent African economies often rely on a very narrow range of exports. This leaves them highly vulnerable to long-term price decline and to fluctuations in the world prices of such commodities. From 1980 to 2000 the real price of sugar fell by 77 percent, cocoa by 71 percent, coffee by 64 percent and cotton by 47 percent. Unlocking agricultural growth will involve both increasing output and addressing the overall vulnerability and volatility of the sector. The improvement of the yields in cassava and rice production in west Africa is a good example of the first option. In eastern African countries like Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia diversification into non-traditional agricultural exports is being pursued with some success and in Kenya horticulture has become the fastest growing sub-sector in agriculture. Rapid expansion of fish and fish products exports in Senegal, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, when sustainably developed, contributed to a successful diversification of production.. There is also scope for more regional trade. Even a *landlocked country*, such as Mali, could become a major rice exporter in the west African region through enhanced trade and regional integration.

Another important driver of growth is the existence of a reliable and attractive *investment climate*. Currently, the bulk of investments in Africa are domestic: around 80 percent against 20 percent for foreign investment. Unsurprisingly, there is a correlation between the stability and governance performance of a country and the investment climate. Issues related to transparency and accountability are often considered particularly important by investors. In Uganda, which has undergone widespread economic reforms, GDP grew by around seven percent per year during 1993-2002, reducing the share of the population living below the poverty line from 56 percent in 1992 to 35 percent in 2005. In Tanzania, an improvement in the investment climate is largely behind the country's fastest growth in 15 years. In these countries, cooperation and dialogue with the national and international business community has proven to be a crucial component in the development of a positive investment climate.

Another key component of the investment climate is regional integration, the building of larger harmonised markets which are more attractive for investment in the productive sectors. The building of regional interconnections, including the establishment of harmonised policies and enhanced trade facilitation, are crucial issues in this context. A substantial increase in *intra-regional trade* has been witnessed in recent years, mostly due to progress in regional integration schemes. Intra-regional trade in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which established a free trade area in 2000, grew by 25% in 2003 to about €5 billion. In Northern Africa, the EU has supported the expansion of South-

South trade and regional integration through initiatives like the Agadir Free Trade Agreement signed in February 2004.

In these regions, the establishment of appropriate *interconnections* are key enablers of trade and integration as they reduce the costs of doing business and allow people to access markets more easily. These challenges are particularly crucial for insular countries, which require specific attention and support. The development of dynamic processes of regional integration, which will strengthen Africa's competitiveness in the world economy, is all the more welcome given the limited progress of many African countries in expanding and diversifying their exports. Some Sub-Saharan countries have for 20 years not significantly changed their export mix, which today too often still consists of a small number of unprocessed primary commodities. As a result, Sub-Saharan Africa's share of world trade has declined from 3% in 1950 to less than 2% today. A controlled and gradual increase in openness, first regionally and then towards the wider world, is therefore needed as a basis for a significant acceleration of growth and development. Given that Europe remains Africa's most important trading partner – for example, approximately 85% of Africa's exports of cotton, fruit and vegetables are imported by the EU – the EU has a key role in supporting these processes.

1.3. Geo-social dynamics: patterns of progress and clusters of inequality

Just as with peace and stability and with trade and growth, the picture in Africa is extremely varied when it comes to human development. A line of poverty cuts across the entire continent. However, different socio-political contexts and different government policies mean that development outcomes still vary considerably between countries and regions. This is, for example, reflected in indicators for inequality, education and health, although similar patterns of regional diversity can also be found in the areas of gender (in)equality, access to basic services and environmental sustainability.

While several African countries have managed to record impressive economic growth, a highly unequal distribution of income often prevents this growth from having a positive impact on poverty levels. There is therefore not necessarily any link between the overall prosperity of a country and its performance in terms of sustainable development, decent work opportunities and poverty reduction. The category of strikingly *unequal societies* includes many poor countries, such as Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic, but also wealthier countries like Lesotho, Botswana and South Africa. The most extreme case is Namibia, which has one of the highest levels of inequality in the world. Relatively even distributions of income are found in countries like Ghana and Uganda, where growth also has been more strongly linked to sustainable poverty reduction.

Not least against the background of continuously strong population increases, employment creation remains one of the major challenges for social development and poverty reduction. However, the **employment situation** remains

worrisome in most African countries. The vast majority of all new jobs for young labour market entrants in Africa are in the informal economy, with low productivity and income, poor working conditions, lack of career prospects and with little or no social protection. Women and ethnic minorities in particular continue to face disproportional difficulties on the labour market. At the same time, child labour remains a frequent phenomenon in many countries and constitutes an important income base for many families. In Sub-Saharan Africa alone the number of young people looking for work is expected to increase by 28% in the next 15 years, equivalent to 30 million people.^{ix}

Gradually, *literacy* rates are improving in Africa. Progress in primary education has been recorded in some of the poorest countries such as Burkina Faso, Benin and Eritrea, with overall numbers of children in primary school in Sub-Saharan Africa increasing by 48 percent between 1990 and 2001. Broadly speaking, enrolment rates in primary education show that southern and eastern Africa lag somewhat behind the rest of Africa. However, when it comes to secondary education, the Sahel countries Niger and Chad fare particularly badly, with enrolment rates well below 10%. Within those countries, rural areas tend to fare worse and certain groups, such as girls, disabled children and orphans, remain particularly marginalised.

Communicable diseases have placed a heavy burden on many countries and regions across Africa. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has hit southern and eastern Africa hardest: there is also a more limited, but growing, epidemic in west Africa and it is only the countries of north Africa that have so far escaped any large-scale impact. Adult prevalence rates range from under one percent of the population in Senegal and Mauritania to over 25 percent in Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho, where the pandemic has wiped out decades of development efforts and considerably decreased the average life expectancy. However, despite these devastating diseases, Africa continues to record rapid demographic growth, ranging from 2.2 percent to 2.8 percent per year. If this rate of growth were to be sustained, Africa would be home to not less than 2 billion people within 40 years

1.4. Geo-environmental dynamics: management of natural resources to combat poverty

The perception remains in some quarters that environmental protection is something of a luxury in Africa. Yet, evidence shows that *environmental degradation* often contributes to poverty and when forests disappear and water is exhausted or polluted, it is often the poor of Africa, especially children and women, who suffer most. Promoting sustainable natural resource management is thus a politically, socially and economically sound development strategy for Africa.

The African continent is environmentally very diverse. Climate conditions range from humid tropical in western and central Africa and in the western Indian Ocean islands, to arid and semi-arid in most southern African countries, while semi-deserts and deserts are features of northern Africa. *Climate change* will

further increase the strain on water resources, affect biodiversity and human health, worsen food security and increase desertification. Extreme hydrometeorological events such as flooding and drought are common across Africa, and set to increase as a result of climate change, while early warning systems are inadequate and disaster management is weak. Climate change adaptation is therefore an urgent necessity for Africa's development.

Two-thirds of Africa's total land area is arid or semi-arid and 34% of Africa's population lives in arid areas compared to just 2% in Europe. **Land** is central to development in Africa since the livelihoods of about 60% of the population depend on agriculture. The expansion of agriculture over the past three decades has involved the cultivation of marginal areas and the clearance of important natural habitats such as forests and wetlands. Such conversion is a major driving force behind land degradation. In the western Indian Ocean islands, for example, competition for land is so intense that coastal wetlands have been destroyed and inland swamps have been drained and used as construction sites. Draining wetlands for agriculture threatens not only habitats and biodiversity but also the livelihoods of pastoralists.

Soil erosion reduces the productivity of land, requiring farmers to apply more and more fertilizers and other chemicals that help check falling productivity. Land degradation is intricately linked to poverty and addressing this problem requires the participation of the resource users and, where appropriate, providing them with alternative livelihood options. A recent study estimated that desertification processes affect 46 per cent of the African continent and a total of almost 500 million people: the worst affected areas are along desert margins.

Africa's **renewable water resources** average 4,050 km³/year, significantly less than the world average of 7,000 m³ per capita/year. The spatial distribution of both surface water and groundwater is uneven. At least 13 countries suffered water stress or scarcity in 1990 and the number is projected to double by 2025. Groundwater is a major source of water in the region, accounting for 15 percent of Africa's total resources. Groundwater is used for domestic and agricultural consumption in many areas, particularly in arid sub-regions where surface water resources are limited. However, areas heavily dependent on groundwater reserves are also at risk of water shortages, as water is extracted far more rapidly than it is recharged.

Africa's **forest cover** is estimated at 650 million ha, representing 17 percent of the world's forests. African forests provide many goods and services. A study in Madagascar estimated the value of forest products to local villages to be US\$200,000 over ten years. In Ghana, it is estimated that 16-20% of the local population's food supply is met from forest products. Deforestation, both for commercial timber and to make room for agriculture, is therefore a major concern and represents an enormous loss of natural economic wealth to the continent. Selective vegetation removal and over-harvesting of non-timber forest resources, including medicinal plants, all add to this problem. The pressures on forests and woodlands are further exacerbated by the construction of access roads which open

up closed forest areas, making the resources more accessible, and their trade more profitable.

2. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE EU'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

2.1. The EU's longstanding relationship with Africa

2.1.1. A network of agreements

The EU-Africa relationship is deeply rooted in history. Over the last few decades, the EC and the Member States have concluded various contractual arrangements with different parts of Africa, reflecting the continent's diversity in terms of history, policies and needs.^x

The Lomé I Agreement, signed in 1975, was the first framework agreement with the countries of *Sub-Saharan Africa*, as part of the ACP group of states. This pioneering agreement already included principles such as partnership, the contractual nature of the relationship and the longterm predictability of financing. Following a number of subsequent Lomé Agreements, in 2000 the EC and its Member States concluded the Cotonou Agreement for twenty years with the 48 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. The Cotonou Agreement, revised in 2005, combines a political dimension with trade and development issues in a single comprehensive framework. *South Africa*, while a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement, concluded a separate parallel ambitious Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA).^{xi}

The EU's relations with the countries of *north Africa* are based on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Association Agreements, and on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)^{xii} and ENP Action Plans. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was launched in 1995 when the Barcelona Declaration identified the three main objectives of the Partnership as: (a) establishing a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue; (b) creating an area of shared prosperity through an economic partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area; and (c) bringing peoples together through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies. The Partnership is implemented by bilateral Association Agreements between the EU and each of the partner countries.^{xiii} Building on this platform, the ENP offers to these countries an increasingly close relationship with the EU, involving a significant degree of economic integration and a deepening of political cooperation in an approach founded on partnership, joint ownership and differentiation and aiming to promote the prosperity, stability and security of Europe's immediate neighbours.^{xiv} All five north African countries are beneficiaries under this policy, implementation of which started in 2005 with the adoption of a first set of ENP Action Plans, including those for Tunisia and Morocco, which representing the fruit of discussions with the partner countries and common agreement on priority reform

priorities and actions.

2.1.2. A new framework for development policy

While these agreements provide a long-term framework for dialogue, trade and cooperation, the EU needs to adapt its policy to the ever-changing political and economic context. The stronger consensus on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the changing security context after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and subsequent events, and the increased impact of globalisation are just some of the elements that have made it necessary to rethink the EU's policy towards the developing world.

In April 2005 the Commission issued the “*MDG package*”, providing the basis for the ambitious commitments made by the European Council in June 2005.^{xv} Building on this package, in July 2005 the Commission proposed to the Council and the Parliament to go even further and adopt a Joint Declaration on the EU's new Development Policy, the “*European Consensus*”.^{xvi} Once adopted, the “*European Consensus*” will provide, for the first time ever, a common framework of objectives, values and principles that the Union – all 25 Member States, the Commission and the European Parliament – supports and promotes as a global player and global partner.

The EU-Africa Strategy aims at providing a common, coordinated and coherent European initiative and response to the challenges Africa faces and therefore constitutes the first practical example of implementation of the abovementioned “*European Consensus*”.

2.2. Making a quantum leap in EU-Africa relations

2.2.1. Engaging with a changing Africa: equality, partnership, ownership

As we enter a new era in EU-Africa relations, it is time to reinforce the basic principles that govern this relationship, most prominently *equality, partnership and ownership*. While these principles are not new, their sense, significance and implications have changed with developments in the external political and economic context. The birth of the AU and NEPAD, the reinforced role of Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the emergence of a new generation of leaders at national level have not only changed Africa, but also affected its relationship with Europe. Rethinking these basic principles could fundamentally improve the nature and potential of the EU-Africa relationship.

Equality. The emergence of the AU and the RECs on the one hand and the consolidation of European integration on the other have created a new and more symmetrical institutional framework for relations between Europe and Africa, between the EU and the regional and continental institutions. Equality implies mutual recognition, mutual respect and the definition of mutual collective interests.

Partnership. This more balanced relationship has implications for the notion of partnership. First, between the EU and Africa. The EU is not only a donor of development aid, but also a political and commercial partner. Its relations with Africa therefore not only encompass development issues, but also include broad, concrete and constructive political dialogue. The EU can offer Africa lessons learned from its experience of continental integration, regional and social cohesion, institution-building and policy development. This partnership must also be based on mutual responsibility and accountability, which includes the mutual respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Second, with the rest of the world. As the EU and Africa share basic values and objectives, such as a more multilateral world order, fairer global development and the promotion of diversity, they must be strategic partners in the international community.

Ownership. Development policies and strategies cannot be imposed from the outside. The vision of good governance, respect for human rights and democracy embraced by the AU and NEPAD deserves the EU's full support and will add a new dimension to the concept of ownership as the basis for dialogue and cooperation with each country. These principles are at the heart of the Cotonou Agreement, the TDCA, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU should consistently and collectively support Africa and country-owned strategies and policies. In order to turn the principle of ownership into policy, *budget support* (aid directly contributing to a partner government's budget for sectoral policies or general programmes) should increasingly become the main aid delivery mechanism. This approach not only improves the ownership, efficiency and predictability of the support, but will also enhance a more mature policy dialogue leading partner countries to take their responsibilities in terms of objectives, means and governance mechanisms.

2.2.2. *Engaging with a multilayered Africa: subsidiarity and solidarity*

In view of the many different cooperation agreements, the growing role of both the RECs and the AU, and the increasing complexity of the EU's relations with Africa, *subsidiarity* and *solidarity* should also become central tenets of the EU Strategy for Africa.

Subsidiarity. Through these agreements, the EU should engage with Africa's three levels of governance – national, regional and continental – on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity: only matters which would be dealt with less effectively at a lower level should be reserved for a higher level of governance. Issues such as peace and security, migration, interconnection or disaster management require primarily regional or continental responses, while other questions, including basic social services, including like health care or primary education, are often better dealt with at national or sub-national level.

EU policies and action should therefore be tailored to the potential of each level. At *country level*, the EU should for Northern Africa, support national reform strategies and the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Action

Plans, while for Sub-Saharan African the EU should continue to centre support on the implementation of national development policies and poverty reduction strategies (PRSPs). At *regional level*, the EU should support (sub-)regional integration and development strategies and programmes of different Regional Economic Communities (RECs). For Sub-Saharan Africa this will entail the creation of regional integrated markets following the conclusion of EPA negotiations. This objective should extend to tangible support for coordinated supply-side and other reforms at national level, so as to seamlessly bind national development policies with regional integration objectives. The EU should support African efforts to rationalise the current regional integration schemes and institutions in accordance with the regional frameworks governing the EPAs. At *continental level*, finally, the EU should support the continental institutions and strategies of the AU and NEPAD providing answers to current Africa-wide challenges. This will require boosting the capacity of these supranational institutions to make them stronger, more effective and more credible in the eyes of African countries and citizens. To that end, the EU should enhance its support to the AU Commission, to the Pan-African Parliament, and other pan-African institutions. At the same time, the EU should develop synergies and complementary features between the different agreements to support these Africa-wide strategies more effectively.

Solidarity. The EU should support African efforts to develop enhanced intra-African solidarity between these three different levels of governance. This solidarity consists of, for instance, recognition that peace, security and governance is a shared responsibility of the entire African continent. The principle of ‘non-indifference’ promulgated by the AU lies at the heart of this new doctrine. Swift reactions by the AU following coups d’Etat, breaches of constitutional orders or violations of human rights vividly illustrate this attitude. The establishment of the Peace Facility, to which all Sub-Saharan African countries contributed via their EDF envelopes, is a good example of how Europe can support this African commitment.^{xvii} Another example could be to set up a mechanism supporting countries which are vulnerable and exposed to disasters and catastrophes.

2.2.3. Engaging with Africa on a continuous basis: political dialogue

Finally, it is crucial that the EU’s relations with Africa should be increasingly pervaded by a culture of dialogue. The importance of a permanent, frank and constructive political dialogue can hardly be overestimated. This also requires a common and consistent approach by the EU as a whole, assuming its leading responsibility in partnership with other international players and with the UN.

Experience gained so far inspired some of the recent amendments to the Cotonou Agreement, which provides for a regular and comprehensive political dialogue with the countries and regions in *Sub-Saharan Africa*. Following the revision of Articles 8 and 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, political dialogue has become more structured, more permanent and potentially more effective. The

revised Article 8 will allow the EC and African partners to use political dialogue swiftly and effectively and under almost all circumstances. Article 96 will become more powerful since it will be a second-level instrument for more difficult situations not solved through previous political dialogue. Sanctions, the effectiveness of which has to be carefully assessed, will be only the very last resort. In this way, political dialogue can be used to prevent violation of the 'essential elements' of the Cotonou Agreement^{xviii} instead of – as too often in the past – being a reaction mechanism only when a problem occurs. With the *North African* countries, the Barcelona Process and the ENP provide a solid framework for political dialogue. The Barcelona process regained momentum following the Naples ministerial conference in December 2003 and the November 2005 Barcelona Summit will be a new milestone in Euro-Mediterranean relations. The EU also needs to enhance its dialogue with the *African continent* as a whole, going beyond the regular ministerial meetings and raising the dialogue to the highest political level. Five years after the Cairo Summit, it is time to organise the EU-Africa Lisbon Summit.

The quantum leap in EU-Africa relations described under this heading can be well illustrated by recent developments in EU-South Africa relations. Ten years into democracy, *South Africa* has become an important strategic EU ally on the continent. It is an anchor country in the southern Africa region and a key actor in the regional integration process, the regional stability and the future Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with southern Africa. On the continental level, South Africa is one of the driving forces behind the AU and NEPAD, a beacon of democracy and good governance and a major peace-keeper. On a global scale, it plays an increasingly important role as a representative of Africa and the entire developing world. Therefore, South Africa and the EU have agreed to deepen and broaden their existing relationship through a holistic and innovative approach beyond 2006 with a view to building a strategic partnership. The Joint Cooperation Council has adopted Joint Conclusions that emphasise the need for an integrated approach to political dialogue, development cooperation, trade liberalisation and broad economic cooperation. This will result in a new type of cooperation based on mutual interests that particularly will address South Africa's imbalance and disparity between the "first economy" and its "second" informal sector.

3. A THREE-PRONGED EU RESPONSE STRATEGY

3.1. Strengthening EU support in priority areas

Chapter 1 showed that the road to sustainable political, economic, social and environmental development will look rather different for each African country or region. But the overview also demonstrated that many countries and regions face similar problems, all of which are crucial for Africa's ability to achieve the MDGs and all of which require enhanced action. Under the new Strategy for Africa, the EU – the European Community and the Member States – should therefore

strengthen its support in the areas considered prerequisites for attaining the MDGs (peace and security and good governance), areas that create the economic environment for achieving the MDGs (economic growth, trade and interconnection) and areas directly targeting the MDGs (social cohesion and environment). Taken together, these measures constitute the EU's common, comprehensive and coherent response to Africa's development challenges.

3.1.1. Prerequisites for attaining the MDGs and good governance

3.1.1.1. Foster peace and security

Peace and security are the first essential prerequisites for sustainable development. Over the last few decades, wars and violent conflicts in Africa have destroyed millions of lives and decades of economic development. Indeed, the *Copenhagen Consensus* project has demonstrated that, on average, countries in conflict suffer negative annual GDP growth of 2%.^{xix} In addition, wars and conflicts also provoke uncontrolled population movements, increase environmental pressure, destabilise the societies and governing structures of neighbouring countries and regions and often provide fertile breeding ground for terrorism and organised crime. Wars and conflict have an impact on all stages of the development cycle and there is therefore a crucial need for a comprehensive EU approach to all issues relating to conflict prevention, management and resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.

The EU will therefore *step up its efforts to promote peace and security at all stages of the conflict cycle*. Specific action should include:

- ***Develop a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention***, which seeks to integrate policies and action in the fields of security, development and democratic governance. The EU should increasingly use regional and national development strategies and instruments to address structural causes of conflict. The EU will maintain its support to addressing the root-causes of violent conflict, including poverty, degradation, exploitation and unequal distribution and access to land and natural resources, weak governance, human rights abuses and gender inequality. It will also promote dialogue, participation and reconciliation with a view to prevent possible outbreaks of violence. Especially in fragile states a culture of conflict prevention needs to be developed and fostered. A crucial role could be played by national and regional Early Warning Systems, and the EU should step up its assistance to support partner countries' and regional organizations' efforts to strengthen governance/institutional capacity building to enable them to engage effectively in prevention approach. "The monitoring of scarce natural resources (water, fertile land) and the promotion of sound management of shared valuable resources could also contribute to conflict prevention and sustainable peace.

- ***Cooperate in addressing common security threats***, including non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and combating terrorism. As regards terrorism, the EU should cooperate to reinforce the role of the UN in the multilateral fight against terrorism, including through the full implementation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and the UN Convention on Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, while ensuring respect for human rights in this context. As regards weapons of mass destruction and illegal arms exports, issues which also undermine regional security, improving overall coordination and cooperation to ensure full compliance with relevant international obligations and export control regimes.
- ***Support African peace-support operations*** by continuing to provide support to African-led, -owned and -implemented peace-support operations, notably through the strengthening and replenishment of the Peace Facility for Africa. Many lessons can be learned from the experience with the Peace Facility. The development-related objectives of the Facility have been successfully converted into practical action and that today the Facility constitutes the financial foundation of Africa's peace and security architecture, underpinning the leadership of the AU and the sub-regional organisations. It is time now, building on this experience, to set up a more comprehensive EU approach complementing these Community instruments through CFSP/ESDP approaches. A common EU policy with regard to the different conflicts in Africa is therefore needed. The EU should also pursue a common policy responding to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's call for establishing an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities, exploring the synergies between the different organisations involved and developing organisational capacities of African institutions, in particular through a proposed ten-year capacity building plan for the AU.
- ***Disarm to break the conflict cycle***. First, efforts to achieve coherent regional and national strategies for *disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and reinsertion (DDRR)* should be supported in order to contribute to the reintegration of ex-combatants – including child soldiers – and stabilisation of post-conflict situations.^{xx} This work can draw on the experience in central Africa, particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where a wide range of activities, ranging from the collection and destruction of arms to the development of a national army (e.g. through *centres de brassage*) are at present deployed. The EU should also promote an integrated approach to address the proliferation of *small arms and light weapons (SALW)* as well as landmines (see Box 1). To this end, the Commission recently launched two wide-ranging pilot projects supported by the European Parliament. On the basis of these and other experience, the EU should define a collective,

comprehensive and cross-cutting EU approach to address the diverse features of the problem, building on both first pillar and CSFP/ESDP instruments.

- ***Sustain peace in post-conflict situations*** by developing a more coherent and smooth transition between short-term (humanitarian assistance) and long-term (development) strategies in post-conflict situations. The proposed Stability Instrument will contribute significantly to improve the EU's capacity to respond to crises and post-crisis reconstruction by providing a single legal instrument, taking into account that post-crisis stabilisation requires a sustained and flexible engagement and a high degree of flexibility in decision-making and budget allocation. The EU should promote an integrated and comprehensive political dialogue and policy mix supported by appropriate instruments while strengthening implementation of its *linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)* efforts. These transition strategies should also integrate socially and environmentally durable solutions for refugees and other vulnerable groups. The EU should also develop a strategy and capacity to foster *security sector reform (SSR)* in Africa, which will take into account the related institutions and capacity building programmes of the EC and Member States, whilst identifying the scope of action to be pursued within the European security and defence policy (ESDP) framework. Finally, the EU welcomes the establishment of a UN Peace-building Commission.
- ***Tackle conflict resources.*** Access to and exploitation of valuable or scarce natural resources can be important contributing factors to the outbreak or continuation of conflicts. The EU should continue to promote effective implementation of the 'Kimberley Process Certification Scheme'^{xxi} for diamonds and should work with African partners to improve the control and traceability of other potential conflict resources. It should also support Africa Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (AFLEG) through the implementation of the EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT). This Action Plan sets out a series of measures to tackle illegal logging, addressing good governance in developing countries while enhancing the opportunities of the EU's internal market.

Box 1: Fighting landmines as a prerequisite for peace (Angola)

In 2002 the civil war in Angola came to an end. The omnipresence of landmines and unexploded ordinance, however, posed a serious obstacle to the general recovery of the country and will remain a challenge for years to come. Estimates suggest that approximately 4-5 million landmines are spread across Angola. The European Commission therefore decided to put in place a €26m Programme of

Emergency Mine Action for Sustainable Return and Resettlement. Through a combination of mine-clearance and institutional capacity-building, the programme helped Angola to overcome the legacy of almost 30 years of civil war and prepared the ground for the country's sustained development. It constitutes a model for all post-conflict countries.

3.1.1.2. Support legitimate and effective governance

Together, African countries have signed up to a set of progressive values and principles of governance. This is a major component of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy, and Northern African Countries which have agreed an ENP Action Plan have taken specific commitments in that respect. It is equally central in the Cotonou Agreement and the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). Some of them have even committed themselves to being regularly monitored in the framework of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), a unique tool for peer review and peer learning and basis for reform. Historical, human and cultural heritages must be taken into consideration when supporting and monitoring these processes. While these improvements are tangible, it is clear that the path towards sustainable democracy in Africa is difficult, long and rarely straight. Securing respect for the full range of human rights and the rule of law remains a major challenge. Strict restrictions on the right to assembly and the freedom of organisation and expression are still in place in many countries. Reliable information is still limited, corruption is often endemic, and violence against political opponents is commonplace. Indeed, many African countries suffer from a dual crisis of legitimacy, i.e. *weakness*, or even absence, of a genuine social contract between state and citizen, and *ineffectiveness*, i.e. limited capacity to deliver basic social services. The result is a growing disconnect between the 'legality' of the state apparatus and its 'legitimacy' in the eyes of ordinary people. While genuinely democratic elections create legitimacy and stability, too often elections instead become a source of conflict because they are flawed or because the losing side does not accept defeat. The organisation and role of the state – often reflecting the legacies of the past – is therefore a crucial issue. Primary responsibility for building democracy lies in the hands of Africa's people and of its ruling class. Governments and other public institutions need to increase their dialogue with civil society on policy issues to create more transparency and engagements on critical choices for development. They have to deliver what they have pledged.

There is a strong linkage between the promotion of development and the promotion of democracy. It is clear that democracy cannot be created or imposed by domestic elites or external actors but the promotion of sustainable socio-economic development can contribute to foster a greater demand for democracy. The appropriate role of external actors is therefore instead to support and encourage domestic efforts to build, strengthen and sustain democratic norms, procedures and institutions. In order to address the twin problems of weak and

ineffective governance, the EU will *support legitimate and effective governance as a second central prerequisite for development* and, thus, for attaining the MDGs. Specific action should include:

- ***Reform of the State (1): Build effective and credible central institutions.*** The construction of stronger central institutions is a shared objective at all levels of governance, including the regional and pan-African layers (see above on subsidiarity). Strengthening the capacity of African countries will enhance respect for human rights, freedoms of citizens, good governance and effectiveness of the State and deserves the EU's full support. This should include support for the *police and judiciary system* and other institutions in emerging democracies, including the national ombudsman, the court of auditors and inclusive election commissions. It also includes the strengthening of *public financial management (PFM)* systems, most notably through the mainstreaming of the public financial management performance measurement framework and implementation of the strengthened approach to supporting PFM reforms.^{xxii} Finally, it includes reinforcement of the capacity of Africa's *national parliaments* so that they can perform their legislative, oversight – including corruption-fighting – and representative functions better. Parliaments are the legitimate institutions for security sector reform (SSR), conflict resolution, national integration and reconciliation, but also for the co-design of their countries' development strategies.
- ***Reform of the State (2): Develop local capacity.*** A systematic dialogue with national governments and local authorities should be launched on how best to support decentralisation processes. Decentralisation empowers people and strengthens democracy, development strategy and action. Decentralisation allows a fair share of income to remain within regions instead of being absorbed by the centre. In addition, decentralisation also allows cities and rural communities to participate in conflict prevention and thereby transforming military claims into political claims. In the past, the Commission has, for example, supported the successful decentralisation process in Mali, which contributed to peacefully defusing the Tuareg uprising. Another instructive example is Rwanda which, following the genocide of 1994, has embarked on an ambitious process of decentralising administrative power in the framework of reconstruction of the state.
- ***Launch a Governance Initiative.*** The EU should back African-owned efforts to improve governance. The EU must encourage and support African countries systematically to develop good governance plans within their national PRSP. One powerful tool to boost efforts further is, in particular, the voluntary African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the reforms that it will trigger. To this end, the Commission should launch a Governance Initiative that will encourage participation in the APRM process and provide

further support to African countries for the implementation of their APRM-driven reforms. This support should be additional to, and fully in line with, poverty reduction strategy papers and should respect African ownership both of the process and of the reforms pursued.

- ***Reinforce respect for human rights and democracy.*** To encourage further sharing of expertise and resources, an EU-Africa Forum on human rights should be set up. This Forum will be underpinned by a network of human rights experts in Africa and Europe, with the goal of addressing substantive and institutional human rights issues in the context of a sustained dialogue. The Forum could be convened several times per year, should feed into major dialogue events and work towards the effective implementation of shared human rights commitments. Beyond this, the EU will make every possible effort for human rights issues to be discussed and addressed within the different forms of dialogue and international cooperation (such as in the UN) and mainstreamed into development cooperation. The EU should also place particular emphasis on the promotion, respect and protection of children's rights and basic needs, as well as the promotion, respect and protection of women's rights and gender equality. For Northern Africa, the Commission Communication on the Tenth Anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership proposed the creation of a Governance Facility that will serve to promote reform, through supporting and rewarding those partners that show a clear commitment to common democratic values and to political reform.
- ***Promote gender equality.*** The EU should ensure that gender equality is fully taken into account in all partnerships and in national development strategies including in poverty reduction strategies. In Africa women constitute the majority of both urban and rural poor. The EU should give priority to the elimination of illiteracy especially among girls and the promotion of their equal access to education, to investment in Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) in order to combat HIV/AIDS pandemic, to the reduction of maternal and child mortality, and to the participation of women in conflict prevention, peace building and reconstruction.
- ***Fight corruption and organised crime and promote good governance in the financial, tax and judicial areas.*** The EU should sustain and accelerate the process of ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption, a central plank of which is the requirement that countries confiscate and repatriate illicit assets, and the UN Convention against International Organised Crime. The EU should also promote full implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), encourage its African partner countries to join the Initiative and request EU companies and companies active on the EU market to disclose information. This scheme could also be extended to other industries, such as forestry and fisheries. In

addition, the EU Member States should also live up to their commitments under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Moreover the EU should encourage the adoption and implementation of international standards relating to the fight against money laundering, terrorism, tax fraud and tax avoidance. The EU also encourages African Countries' to sign and implement the main international instruments of crime prevention, like the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols and the UN Convention against Corruption. The EU should also address the limited institutional and technical capacity of African countries to deal with organized crime and drugs in an effective and comprehensive manner, through the development of internal strategies as well as capacity building.

3.1.2. *Creating a positive economic environment*

3.1.2.1. Boost economic growth

Despite improvements in economic performance, Africa continues to be marginalised in the international economy. In an increasingly globalised world economy, Africa accounts for only about 2% of world trade and its share of global manufactured exports is almost negligible. Most African countries have been unable to diversify their exports and often remain dependent on a limited number of agricultural or mining commodities which are sensitive to price changes and long term falls. Industrial activity is often linked to these resources, and in particular in mining, is often capital-intensive and creates few jobs. Without increased economic growth and private investment, few African countries will have the sustainable revenues they need to deliver basic social services such as education and health care. Boosting economic growth will thus be a key factor in achieving the MDGs. Indeed, to increase the chance of halving poverty by 2015, it has been calculated that Africa needs to achieve yearly average growth of at least 8%.

In order to ensure that globalisation can become a positive force for Africa's development, EU action should *stimulate sufficiently rapid, broad-based and sustainable economic growth* in order to contribute to an effective reduction of poverty. Specific action should include:

- ***Support macroeconomic stability.*** Macroeconomic and structural policies encourage private investment and stimulate pro-poor growth. Implementation of such policies will be particularly important in those countries which currently enjoy high oil and gas revenues. To ensure that these measures deliver improvements in the lives of poor people, the EU should provide particular support for national strategies for poverty reduction that reflect wide domestic ownership and provide a broader context for prudent macroeconomic policies that promote pro-poor growth.

- ***Creation of integrated regional markets (South-South trade).*** Creating integrated regional markets is at the heart of the concept of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that the EU is currently negotiating with four Sub-Saharan regions of Africa. These innovative agreements are being designed with development as the major objective and benchmark.^{xxiii} This process of integration and of fostering trade will continue to be accompanied by substantial and increasing financial support, notably for building trade capacities and for the implementation of supply side reforms. Already the main donor in this area, the EU should step up its trade related assistance to Africa. This assistance will be used to strengthen in-country and regional trade policy and negotiation capacity, to assist countries with the implementation of the WTO agreements and EPAs and to address supply side constraints in areas including regulatory issues, food safety, product standards in export markets. Supporting an ambitious trade facilitation agenda, one of the objectives of the ongoing DDA round, will also be part of the EPAs, in order to improve customs procedures and formalities, including transit regimes, which are of special relevance for Africa's landlocked countries. The removal of current barriers to intra-regional trade and investment and the establishment of more stable, transparent and predictable rules and reliable institutions will contribute significantly to the growth of local and regional economies. An important example of this process is the recent Agadir Free Trade Agreement signed in February 2004 between Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco and supported by the European Commission. Looking further into the future, and in accordance with the AU long term vision, the EPA should also act as building blocs for the progressive creation of a single African economic space. In order to be able to benefit more from increased opportunities to trade and to ensure that benefits from increased trade are distributed more evenly, trade needs to be better integrated into national development strategies and in particular into poverty reduction strategies. The EU should assist Africa in this process so to enable African governments to effectively use trade as a policy tool to reduce poverty.
- ***Increased market access and trade (North-South trade).*** For Northern Africa, the ambitious process leading to the creation of an Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade zone by 2010 will be achieved through the implementation of the existing Association Agreements. For sub-Saharan Africa, the EU has provided tariff and quota free access for the poorest African countries. In the EPA negotiations, the EU should provide effectively improved market access and simplify, harmonise and render rules of origin more development friendly. It should also continue to encourage other major developed or developing countries to follow its example. Moreover, it should assist African countries in their efforts in bringing its products to EU and world markets, to comply with rules and standards,

notably in the sanitary and phytosanitary areas, and to negotiate preferential market access for goods and services. In respect of opening access to the African markets for EU products, the EPAs foresee transition periods compatible with their development needs and constraints, with adequate protection for sensitive sectors where needed. In order to ensure Africa's gradual integration into the multilateral trading system, the EU will continue to assist Africa in negotiating and taking advantage of the new opportunities arising from multilateral trade liberalisation while strengthening the social dimension of globalisation and promoting productive employment and decent work opportunities. To reduce the impact of price shocks on commodity dependant countries, the EC should introduce innovative insurance instruments to complement its existing FLEX mechanism.

- ***Stimulate private-sector development.*** The promotion of a stable, efficient and harmonised legal framework for business is another vital key to growth. This has been pursued in Northern Africa through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and promoted using assistance from the MEDA programme. The European Investment Bank has also played a key role through the Facility for Euro Mediterranean Investment Partnership (FEMIP). Through the ENP Action Plans, the EU and relevant Northern African countries have agreed to address a wide range of regulatory and other issues which hamper the development of the private sector. In addition, with a more specific sub-Saharan Africa focus, the Commission will convene in 2006 a *Euro-African Business Forum* bringing together entrepreneurs and public and private investors from both Europe and Africa. This Forum will support and be complementary to the emerging regional business fora established or nurtured with African regions in the context of the EPA negotiations. It should draw up a *Plan of Action* for the private sector, aiming at fostering investment, boosting industry and creating jobs. The Forum could also discuss the adoption of a code of conduct on issues such as corruption, transparency and fair working conditions. Improved *access for SMEs to financial and non-financial services*, support for the development of micro-finance and promotion of partnerships between the public and private sectors should be pursued, for example by encouraging innovative business initiatives enabled by low-cost electronic communications. In South Africa, support for the Department of Trade and Industry's SWEEP programme is contributing to the expansion of the "Black Economic Empowerment" enterprises (see Box 2). To make sure that the development of the private sector is translated into more and better work for all, the establishment of national action plans or programmes on employment and decent work should be encouraged in close cooperation with partner countries and organisations such as the AU, NEPAD and the ILO. Pilot programmes on decent work, such as that in Ghana, have showed their potential for success. In this

context, extension of the Youth Employment Network (YEN)^{xxiv} could play a positive role.

Box 2: Linking industrial growth with black empowerment (South Africa)

Following the end of apartheid in South Africa, the government decided to make a radical change in the economic and industrial policy of the country. The Department of Trade and Industry put in place an Integrated Manufacturing Strategy (IMS) to boost industrial growth combined with a long-term Strategy for Small Business Development and Black Economic Empowerment. The core objective of the IMS is to accelerate at the same time growth and employment, while reducing the racial and geographical inequalities present in society. In 2003 the European Commission decided to support this policy through a €25 million Sector- Wide Enterprise, Employment and Equity Programme (SWEEP). The first results are more than encouraging and today the programme stands as a model for support to an equitable industrial policy, linking formal and informal economies.

Macroeconomic stability, the creation of regional markets and an appropriate private investment climate are preconditions for sustained growth. However, while such a pro-growth framework is crucial for sustainable economic development, it needs to be accompanied by appropriate measures to boost and diversify production and to establish and upgrade the necessary infrastructure and networks. Specific action should include:

- ***Boost agriculture and ensure food security.*** In addition to the policies sustaining the rural sector, the EU should target specific support on increasing the competitiveness and productivity of African agriculture through: (i) policies and programmes to improve the functioning of national and regional input and output markets, including through rural infrastructure and to promote organic farming and fair trade; (ii) the management of shocks, in particular through novel insurance instruments; and (iii) the strengthening of pro-poor, demand-driven agricultural research and extension, in particular by promoting research collaboration between the European and African research communities, at the level of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and by supporting regional research coordination mechanisms. All these areas can benefit from supra-national coordination and economies of scale. In areas with higher levels of institutional and economic development, the challenges of integrating into increasingly competitive and demand-driven chains and markets should be addressed as outlined in the EU Action Plan on Agricultural Commodity Chains.

- ***Exploit fish resources sustainably.*** The EC and several African coastal countries have long standing bilateral relations in the fishery sector. The new generation of EC fishery agreements, the Fishery Partnership Agreements (FPAs), implement a partnership approach. This approach provides regulated access rights to EC fishing vessels, while it also pursues the conservation and sustainable exploitation of local fish resources and provides support to the development of the local fishery sector. This approach must be implemented through a policy dialogue that, taking into account the financial benefits of fishery agreements provide a key contribution to the definition and implementation, by the coastal state, of the conditions of a policy of sustainable development of fishing activities in the waters of the countries concerned.

3.1.2.2. Interconnect Africa

Limited access to transport and communication services, water and sanitation, and energy constrains economic growth. These limitations, together with the missing links in cross-border connections and regional networks, mean that trade and commerce often become uncompetitive as transport and service costs in landlocked countries can reach three quarters of a country's total export value, equivalent for example to a 75% tax on Ugandan clothes exports. In addition, potentially lucrative use of natural resources becomes unprofitable due to insufficient or unsuitable infrastructure and trade links. Consequently, national economic growth is stifled and the ability of African countries to trade competitively at regional, continental and international level is held back.

The Commission therefore proposes to *establish an EU-Africa Partnership for Infrastructure to support and initiate programmes (Trans-African Networks) that facilitate interconnectivity at continental level for the promotion of regional integration.* The Partnership for Infrastructure should encompass investments in trans-boundary and regional infrastructure and their regulatory frameworks in the widest sense: transport networks (roads, railways, inland waterways, ports and airports), water and energy infrastructure and connections as well as ground-based and space-based electronic communications infrastructure and services.^{xxv} The Partnership for Infrastructure is based on a number of central principles. Firstly, the Partnership's success depends on *coherence* and *complementarity* with the action taken at country and regional level^{xxvi} and its long-term *sustainability*. Such sustainability is secured through the development of national operators and service providers as well as regional entities.^{xxvii} Secondly, by bringing Africa and Europe into a closer relationship the Partnership will ensure African *ownership* through close engagement with the African continental and regional institutions – the AU and the RECs – in accelerating the AU-NEPAD Action Plan on Infrastructure. Effective support for this Plan by the Partnership demands a substantive increase in funding levels and the deployment of flexible methods of financing.

Concretely, the EU will initially set up a task force that combines EC and

EIB resources and expertise open to Member States and their development financial institutions. This approach will enable an early start up of the Partnership and provides flexibility for designing an appropriate institutional structure that seeks efficient implementation and successful outcomes. This EU task force will facilitate coordination, the mobilisation of the substantial funds necessary to interconnect Africa and through participation in other international initiatives enhance its effectiveness. In the framework of this Partnership, specific action should include:

In general:

- ***Identify and address missing links.*** Missing links in trans-African and regional networks must be identified and prioritised to set up ‘Trans-African Networks labelled’ programmes. The appropriate international and regional agreements as well as the regulatory frameworks that improve network operations need to be harmonised and all undertakings must be based on solid research. AU/NEPAD has an overall monitoring and guiding role to play, including in pooling technical expertise. The RECs have responsibilities for defining their regional policy action and priority investment programmes for transport and communications in the economic and trade development of the region.

By sector:

- ***Harmonise transport policies*** through support to the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Programme (SSATP) that facilitates the harmonisation of sustainable transport policies between regions and efficient operations along regional and trans-African corridors. EU support in this area has already permitted the creation of “corridor observatories” and improved transit transport agreements. The EU should furthermore support development and modernisation of access to ports and port infrastructure, emphasising efficient and non-discriminatory licensing procedures for ports facilities in order to promote sea going external trade. In addition, the EU should support the reform of the African aviation sector with a view to share with the African regional organisations the experience of the EC internal market and consolidate the exchange of regulatory and operational know-how, technology transfer^{xxviii} and technical assistance, in particular in the area of safety, security and air traffic management. On the regulatory side, this new cooperation framework will have to bring existing bilateral air service agreements into legal conformity, notably through the signature of so-called “Horizontal Agreements”^{xxix} with the European Community.
- ***Develop integrated water management*** through support to the African Ministerial Council on Water (AMCOW) and to regional bodies, such as

river basin organisations, for the improvement of integrated water management in transboundary river basins. Through the EU Water Initiative and the associated Water Facility, the EU has already launched support for the Nile Basin Initiative and in five river basins (Kagera, Niger, Volta, Lake Chad and Orange-Senqu). For North Africa, building on a long established co-operation tradition, the focus will be on developing sub-regional energy projects to promote the Euro- Mediterranean Energy Market.

- ***Develop cross-border and regional energy infrastructure*** through support to the new Forum of Energy Ministers in Africa (FEMA) and to regional institutions and stakeholders for developing cross-border and regional energy infrastructure, including the enhanced exploitation of renewable and other sustainable local energy sources and services. This support should be provided in the framework of the EU Energy Initiative and the associated Energy Facility. ***Bridge the digital divide in Africa*** in the framework of the follow-up to the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). This should include supporting the development of advanced and low-cost technologies for electronic communications and the development of regulatory frameworks to create a sound business environment for innovation, growth and social inclusion. By acting as early adopters of new technologies, national research and education networks can develop new and innovative methods to overcome inadequacies of the market, e.g. by developing cost-effective communications solutions. The successful model used in north Africa to link these networks with each other and to GÉANT in Europe should be extended to the Sub-Saharan countries. The overall objective of these measures should be to bridge the digital divide at all levels – within countries, between countries and regions as well as between Africa and the rest of the world.

3.1.3. Tackle the MDGs directly

3.1.3.1. Put people at the centre of development

40% of all Africans survive on less than one dollar a day. This stark poverty has consequences in a number of areas. Only six out of ten African children go to primary school. Communicable diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, have hit Africa hardest and in 2004 alone AIDS killed over two million people in Sub-Saharan Africa and affected another three million. Africa's social crisis is, in particular, a phenomenon of the urban areas that have been expanding rapidly over the last few decades. While in 1975, 21% of Sub-Saharan Africa's population lived in cities, today this figure stands at over 50%. This massive urbanisation has contributed to uncontrolled population growth and has rendered the social infrastructure inadequate.

The EU should therefore help *to make health education and basic social services available for the poorest people in Africa (MDGs 1-6)*, contributing to the establishment of a social safety net for the most vulnerable: women, elderly, children and disabled people. It will also help encourage employment and decent work as a key tool for preventing and eradicating poverty.^{xxx} In this context, the EU should promote increased cooperation between state and non-state actors (NGOs, private sector, trade unions, etc.) to ensure greater effectiveness in service delivery. Specific action should include:

- ***Investing in minds.*** To stimulate a coherent and strategic approach, the EU should increasingly support primary education through sectoral budget support. At the same time, the EU should support education, access to knowledge and transfer of know-how as a lifelong process going beyond primary education: from *secondary and higher to vocational education*. Emphasis should also be put on cooperation with Africa in higher education to build high-quality tertiary capacity through networking, mobility of students and scholars, and institutional support and innovation, including the use of ICTs, as is done in Northern Africa countries through the EC's TEMPUS programme, and the establishment of a communications infrastructure for the research and development sector. In addition, building on the success of and experience from the Erasmus programme, the EU should support the creation of a Nyerere programme for student exchanges across Africa.^{xxx} In addition, a pilot scheme for student and teachers exchanges between Africa and Europe could be examined.^{xxxii} This programme and scheme should also contribute to the development of Euro-African networks of selected universities and centres of excellence. Africa is also invited to make full use of the opportunities offered by the Erasmus-Mundus programme for student exchanges between Africa and Europe, including through the possible creation of a specific "Africa window" within the Erasmus-Mundus programme, similar to those already created for, e.g. China and India. In the context of the 7th RTD Framework Programme that will come into force in 2007, the EU should facilitate networking between researchers from non-EU countries working in the EU and research organisations in their countries of origin.
- ***Deliver decent health care.*** The strengthening of national health systems and capacity, including the improvement of health infrastructures and the provision of essential, universal and equitable health services is key and requires sustained financing. The EU is developing a coherent and coordinated response to the crisis in human resources for health, which will support the needs identified in the NEPAD Health Strategy. The EU is also supporting the replenishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria with a view to maximising benefits for Africa. In addition, the EU is contributing to the development of new drugs and

vaccines against communicable diseases, *inter alia* through the European and Developing countries Clinical Trials Partnerships (EDCTP). In response to the Council's request,^{xxxiii} the Commission should, together with the Member States, develop a roadmap on possible joint action based on the European Programme for Action to confront HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.^{xxxiv} The EU should, in this context, promote synergies and provide a coherent and coordinated response to the three diseases across relevant policy areas.^{xxxv} In this sense, the Commission intends to put forward a Communication on combating HIV/AIDS within the European Union and the Neighbouring countries later this year. The EU has been at the forefront of international efforts to ensure access to essential medicines for developing countries. These efforts contributed to the adoption of the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and public health in November 2001, which confirms the right of WTO members to use flexibilities in the TRIPs Agreement, including issuing compulsory licenses of pharmaceutical products, for reasons of public health.

- ***Expand access to water supply, sanitation, energy and ICTs.*** The Africa-EU Partnership on water affairs and sanitation, launched at the WSSD in the context of the EU Water Initiative, will be the framework for EU efforts to make more sustainable use of available and finite water resources, to meet basic water and sanitation needs and contribute to improving water resources management at local, river basin, national and transboundary levels. The Water Facility acts as a catalyst to support these processes and to mobilise additional resources. The EU Energy Initiative, also launched at the WSSD, will continue to be a framework for EU efforts to increase access to affordable energy services that facilitate economic and social development. The associated Energy Facility will leverage resources for mobilising additional investment in delivery of affordable, reliable and sustainable energy services to the poor, notably from renewable energy resources, as well as for the development of clean and energy efficient technologies for gas and oil production. Projects in the energy sector should also systematically include energy efficiency objectives. The EC COOPENER programme also focuses support on energy for sustainable development and poverty alleviation, providing co-financing to projects aiming at creating the institutional conditions for improved access to energy in Sub-Saharan Africa.
- ***Stimulate employment policies and decent work.*** Action to promote decent work for all in line with the ILO agenda is essential and should cover measures and initiatives on employment, social protection, rights at work, including core labour standards (CLSs), social dialogue and gender equality.^{xxxvi} The *Argane* project in Morocco is an instructive example of how the EU can support gender equality, employment and environmental

protection in mutually reinforcing ways (see box 3). The EU should, in particular, contribute to strengthening labour market institutions and players, including employers' and workers' organisations and social dialogue between them. In this context, core labour standards should be further promoted, as essential prerequisites for the effective functioning of the labour market.

Box 3: Increasing female employment (Morocco)

In south-west Morocco the Commission and the EIB have, since 2003, financed a €40m project to improve the living conditions of women working with the argana tree. The attraction of argana oil has directly benefited 4,500 women giving them sustained revenue over a long period of time. As a result, these women have become strong advocates of sustainable management of the trees, which are crucial in the fight against deforestation. This project is therefore a good example of how the EU can support gender employment and environmental protection in mutually reinforcing ways.

These measures, important as they are, will, however, not in themselves be enough to redress existing inequalities and lack of social cohesion which hamper efforts to attain the MDGs. These are complex multi-faceted problems which require multi-faceted and comprehensive responses. Action will therefore also be required in the following cross-cutting areas:

- ***Sustain and promote cultural diversity.*** Africa's cultural diversity and linguistic heritage should be preserved by stimulating and protecting cultural production, promoting access to culture and supporting cultural industries, including by protecting authors' rights. The forthcoming UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions will offer a new international framework to promote international cooperation aiming at preserving cultural diversity. Culture determines the way societies and economies function and is therefore crucial to the success of any development effort. Diversity is an asset, not an obstacle, as experience in the EU shows. In addition to providing support for various cultural programmes and exchanges, it is thus also necessary to take the cultural dimension into account in development processes and to promote indepth local, national, regional and continental inter-cultural dialogue. One key component in accelerating this dialogue between Europe and Africa is the launching of *twining partnerships* bringing together African and European universities and schools, parliaments, towns and cities, municipalities, businesses and industries, trade unions, civil society networks and museums. In the same vein, the EU could launch a European programme for young people who want to learn more about, and get involved in, Africa's development.^{xxxvii} The key product from these

partnerships would be a vast and wide-ranging network of deep, well-founded, institutional support partnerships, cementing the bonds between the two continents.

- ***Improve sustainable territorial management*** through the development of an integrated approach to support sustainable *urban development*, based on the twin pillars of good urban governance and good urban management. In addition, the EU should support better *territorial development and land use planning*. Action in these fields is all the more necessary as the progressive emptying of the countryside has widened the gap between the haves and the have-nots in Africa. The EU should develop innovative approaches to local development which, through participatory planning, reinforce transparency and accountability in the management of natural resources. Such approaches strengthen the role of secondary centres as development hubs for their rural surroundings and improve the livelihoods of rural populations. Land reform will also play a vital role in bridging the social gap and the EU is determined to support it. In this endeavour, the EU is providing support to the timely access to Earth Observation data which has proven particularly well adapted to the African context.
- ***Turn migration into a positive force in the development process.*** As stated in the recent Commission communication ‘Migration and Development’,^{xxxviii} migration can be a positive force for development in both Africa and Europe. This approach will continue to be promoted, and enhanced, *inter alia* by making it easier, cheaper and safer for African migrants living in the EU to send money back to their countries of origin, by turning brain drain into ‘brain gain’, by helping African countries tap into the potential available in their diasporas in Europe and by facilitating various forms of brain circulation, including return migration and temporary or virtual return by which African migrants can make their skills available to their home countries. Particular attention should be paid to the human resources crisis in Africa’s health-care sector. At the same time, the EU should pay greater attention to intra-African forced migration and refugee flows, as vectors for economic and political destabilisation and will support African countries in their efforts to deal with these flows. At the same time, security is a major preoccupation of citizens and governments, not least around the Mediterranean, and enormous progress – extending also to related issues of illegal migration & trafficking of human beings – has been made in the cooperation & coordination between the EU and its North African partners in particular. Such work remains a high priority, and is clearly recognised as such in the Barcelona process and the ENP Action Plans.

3.1.3.2. Build an environmentally sustainable future

Many Africans rely heavily on natural resources for their subsistence, particularly in times of crisis, for example during famines or conflicts or in the wake of natural disasters. However, Africa's environment is fragile and prone to water shortages, climate change and desertification. Current population growth and agricultural expansion have caused land shortages and the intensification of agriculture has contributed to further land degradation. An estimated 65 million people living in or near forests depend on forest production for their livelihood. These forests are now coming under increasing pressure for commercial exploitation.

The EU will therefore *assist Africa to protect its environment, one of its most valuable assets*. Specific action should include:

- ***Manage environmental diversity: forestry, fisheries and water.*** First, in order to safeguard the jobs, rural livelihoods, environmental goods and services that forests provide, the EU should also support the sustainable management of *forest resources*. This should take the form of promotion of community-based forest management and improved governance for forest resources, as set out in the 1999 Communication on Forests and Development and the EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT). Second, the incorporation of clear mechanisms to ensure the sustainable use of *fish stocks* in national and regional policies will enhance the fight against illegal fishing, protect the marine and coastal environment and mitigate the harmful effects of fishing activities.^{xxxix} Third, the EU should enhance its efforts, launched with the African-European Union Strategic Partnership on Water Affairs and Sanitation (Johannesburg, 2002), to address integrated water management. Through twinning partnerships that bring together African and EU scientists, an Africa Observatory for Sustainable Development should be established to generate relevant information on the environment conditions and the distribution of resources. Similarly, dedicated information systems should be set up to detect and analyse early warning signs of potential crisis situations.

Box 4: Space policy in support of sustainable development in Africa


The PUMA initiative, initiated at the request of five African RECs in 2000 and funded by the EU (11 M€), has ensured the access to information on the environment and satellite data to all 53 African countries for early warning of natural disasters, improved food security, better health management, more efficient water and energy use, while strengthening environmental monitoring. The Commission has provided technical support (50 receiving stations) and capacity building (training of a critical mass of 350 African professionals). PUMA, successfully completed in September 2005, is the precursor of the African Monitoring of the Environment for Sustainable Development (AMESD) initiative

requested by the same RECs, coordinated by the AU, in its 2002 Dakar Declaration. AMESD will allow all African stakeholders to improve the management of their environment through a more efficient use of remote sensing and ICT data and information. AMESD will also be the African interface of the European GMES initiative.

- ***Stop desertification and improve sustainable land management (SLM).*** Operational partnerships anchored in domestic policies will ensure appropriate links between land degradation and poverty eradication, food security, sound water management, agriculture and rural development priorities. Successful participatory local experience and knowledgesharing between stakeholders will be scaled up to boost implementation. The EU should also promote the integration of UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) National Action Plans (NAPs) into the national development strategies of African partners.
- ***Conserve biodiversity*** by supporting African regional, sub-regional and domestic efforts to implement the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), its Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and CITES. This should, in particular, cover measures relating to the WSSD targets for significantly reducing the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010, the establishment of representative and well-managed protected areas systems by 2012, combating overexploitation and illegal trade in wildlife and its products. Support should also be provided for the African Biodiversity Network, to further work on alien invasive species, to regional preparatory processes for upcoming meetings under the CBD and to achieving a more effective implementation of domestic biosafety frameworks. The protection of the transborder biosphere in Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger is a good example of effective regional cooperation relating to the conservation and management of natural resources.
- ***Counter the effects of climate change***, including through the implementation of National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) for African LDCs. This should be done within the framework of the recently adopted Action Plan accompanying the EU Strategy on Climate Change and Development.
- ***Support the sound management of chemicals***, by building capacity to manage risk, by protecting human health and environment and by implementing the international chemicals conventions, agreements and projects, such as the African stockpile programme, to destroy obsolete pesticides.

3.2. Increase EU financing for Africa

Aid flows to Africa are substantial and have been increasing over recent years. In 2003 the EU's (Member States' and the Commission's) development aid to Africa totalled €15 billion, compared to €5 billion in 1985. With this, the EU is by far the biggest donor: its ODA accounts for 60% of the total ODA going to Africa (see table). This document shows, however, that the objective of helping Africa to achieve the MDGs by the target year of 2015 cannot be achieved unless an additional political and financial commitment is made to Africa.



EU Member States set new aid targets. In June 2005 the European Council made such an ambitious commitment. The EU agreed new targets for Official Development Assistance (ODA) and committed itself collectively to increase ODA to 0.56% of GNI by 2010 and 0.7% by 2015. Compared to what is expected in 2006, this commitment should result in an estimated additional €20 billion per year in ODA by 2010 and an additional €46 billion per year by 2015. The EU also agreed to allocate at least 50% of this agreed increase to Africa. If implemented correctly, this will mean that by 2015 the EU collectively will be disbursing an additional €23 billion a year in Africa. Finally, the EU also called upon other donors and non- OECD countries to join this global effort. It is now time to put these commitments into practice and the Commission should closely monitor their implementation.

Also innovative financing mechanisms can contribute to the financing necessary to achieve the MDGs. Some Member States will implement the International Finance Facility (IFF) as a mechanism to frontload resources for development. A group of countries have already launched the IFF for immunisation, making firm financial commitments. A group of Member States will implement a contribution on airline tickets to enable financing development projects, in particular in the health sector, directly or through financing the IFF.

Some other EU Member States are considering whether and to what extent they will participate in these initiatives or otherwise continue to enhance traditional ODA.

A more ambitious Community financial framework. In order to increase Europe's collective leverage, the Community financing should be increased substantially. Approximately €4 billion shall be available on an annual basis for Sub-Saharan Africa under the post-9th European Development Fund (EDF) multi-annual financial framework for the ACP and other thematic and horizontal budget lines. In the framework of the conclusion of the negotiations on revision of the Cotonou Agreement, on 21 February 2005 the Council committed itself to "maintain its aid effort to the ACP countries at least at the level of the 9th EDF, not including balances; to this should be added the effects of inflation, growth within the European Union, and enlargement to take in 10 new Member States in 2004, based on Community estimates." This EU Strategy for Africa should constitute the reference framework for the programmes and action under the post-9th EDF. In order to maximise their impact these funds should be allocated through national, regional and intra-ACP indicative programmes on the basis of the principles of differentiation, subsidiarity and institutional sustainability. For northern Africa, the European Neighbourhood Policy in general and the implementation of the Action Plans in particular should be supported, from 2007 onwards, by a new dedicated financial instrument, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which will replace MEDA and other instruments currently operating in neighbouring countries.

In line with the strategy outlined in this document, the new financial framework should foster regional, inter-regional and pan-African cooperation and integration. Support for cooperation between north African and Sub-Saharan countries, subject to different cooperation agreements with the EC, should be facilitated. The EU should also ensure that north African countries will be able to participate in inter-regional and pan-African initiatives financed from the EDF. The ENPI should also include provisions for supporting cooperation between the countries of northern Africa and their Sub-Saharan neighbours on issues of common concern, including migration.^{x1}

3.3. A more effective EU approach

Sound development policies sustained by substantial development aid are crucial, yet they will not in themselves bring about any change unless they are effectively converted into concrete and coherent development action. Cumbersome procedures and administrative requirements often place a heavy burden on the already scarce human resources of the recipient countries. Arguably the cost of the lack of coordination and complementarity among donors cannot be overestimated and it is Africa that suffers most under this burden. This is particularly important considering that the administrative capacity in most African countries is weak. The problems are exacerbated by the fact that donors apply different and sometimes

even contradictory procedures, demands and conditions.

At Community level, the Commission has, in the context of the next Financial Perspectives 2007-2013, proposed a simplified structure for the delivery of the Community's external assistance. In place of the existing range of geographical and thematic instruments, which have grown in an *ad hoc* manner over time, six instruments are proposed for the future. This new approach is geared towards facilitating coherence and consistency, and achieving better and more with resources available. Work has also been undertaken to improve financial and administrative procedures, and the Commission has proposed revising the rules in the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget which prevent smooth cooperation with beneficiaries and further coordination with other donors. The revised Financial Regulation should enter into force in January 2007, at the same time as the new cooperation instruments established for the next Financial Perspectives. The proposed amendments include, in particular, changes to tenders, grant awards and (de)centralised management. They also facilitate co-financing with other donors as they allow the Commission to accept financial contributions from Member States and other donors for projects to be managed by the Commission and to delegate the Commission's management powers to donors outside the EU.

Also at EU level, major commitments for a more coordinated and complementary development policy have been made, most recently at the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris (March 2005). In May 2005 the General Affairs Council reconfirmed an accelerated effort in Africa as a priority. Moreover, in several countries, such as Mozambique, Ethiopia, Uganda and Morocco, donors are establishing innovative mechanisms to improve aid effectiveness. On the basis of these commitments and experience, more can be done to move to practical action. The 26 EU players – the 25 Member States plus the EC – should take the lead in this process and set an example through their joint action. The New Development Policy Statement creates a common framework for such action by the EU as a whole. Working principles and rules have been agreed,^{xli} objectives, targets and benchmarks have been further specified.^{xlii}

Therefore it is now time to take tangible action in a structured way. While in specific areas firm proposals have been presented, such as the future Peace Facility, the EU-Africa Partnership for Networks and Infrastructure and the EU Governance Initiative, a more systematic approach is needed. Therefore the EU should adopt an **Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness** and apply it to Sub-Saharan Africa as a priority. The Plan will be presented in 2006 and should build on four initiatives, based on the decisions taken by the GAERC (November 2004) to be monitored following a set timetable:

- ***Make the EU donor atlas an operational tool for monitoring effectiveness.*** Going beyond the successful mapping of development assistance, the donor atlas should in the future become an operational tool for the annual

monitoring of the EU's aid effectiveness commitments and provide a mechanism that guides the EU's future action.

- **Establish national roadmaps for coordination.** Through the establishment of a roadmap supporting local harmonisation processes in each African country, the EU will drastically reduce the transaction costs and help to build up its partners' capacity and responsibilities.
- **Adopt joint programming documents.** Today each individual EU Member State and the European Commission conclude separate programming documents with each recipient country. The adoption by the EU as a whole of a Joint Framework for multi-annual Programming (JFP) will therefore considerably improve complementarity and effectiveness within the EU. Based on previous experience, the Commission should propose a common format in the first half of 2006.
- **Develop common procedures.** The EU must simplify existing cumbersome procedures, notably through the establishment of a Joint Format for Financial Agreements (JFA). Based on experience gained in countries such as Zambia or Mozambique, the JFA implies a single dialogue, disbursement and support mechanism for all donors in each country. Cofinancing and pooling of funds should be systematically pursued.

The EU should also improve the quality of its aid by making its aid delivery more transparent, predictable and result-oriented. To achieve these goals and to enhance its collective leverage, the EU should foster more general and sectoral **budget support** (see above on the concept of partnership). Budget support programmes offer many potential advantages. They encourage greater ownership, reduce transaction costs, facilitate a more effective use of aid, since they are *de facto* untied, and, through the use of government procedures, contribute to long-term capacity building and sustainability. Budget support is used consistently with the obligations for transparent and accountable financial and administrative management of development funds. By bringing all public expenditure within the budgetary framework, budget support programmes also allow national governments to have a more optimal mix between capital and recurrent expenditure. All these factors, when combined with a results oriented approach, raise the prospects of a much greater impact on service delivery and the fight against poverty.

At present eligibility for budget support is largely framed by assessments of national or sectoral policy, macroeconomic stability and improvements in public financial management, often drawing on the work of the IMF. While recognising the soundness of these criteria, it is important that the EU reaches its own judgement in accordance with its vision and interests in certain political realities and development needs. It is therefore recommended that: (i) EU positions are made more visible and coordinated within the IMF decision-making process; and (ii) innovative approaches are envisaged vis-à-vis fragile states or countries in transition, which up until now have often been excluded from budget support.

However, in these situations rather than pursuing short-term budgetary considerations the EU should instead be guided by a long-term strategic approach. Therefore, budget support, framed by a continuous and strong political dialogue and by stringent monitoring mechanisms, could be considered as an option.

Finally, there may still be a need for broader and deeper debt relief. Apart from remaining committed to full implementation of the enhanced HIPC initiative, the EU would consider supporting new international initiatives, which might for example cover countries emerging from conflict or suffering from external exogenous shocks.

In addition, it is clear that sound scientific and technological knowledge is indispensable as a basis for strategic and sustainable development policies and for efficient and effective development cooperation.

4. CONCLUSIONS

In recent years, a forward-looking Africa has re-emerged on the international scene with more confidence, dynamism and optimism than ever before. Governance has improved considerably in recent years, sustained economic growth is being recorded for the first time in decades and the AU/NEPAD and the regional organisations have provided Africa with political and economic roadmaps and a vision for the future. The Cotonou Agreement, the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy provide an effective framework for EUAfrica relations. Africa's development is now at the top of the international political agenda and there is a broad international consensus on the basic action that needs to be taken. There is now a unique window of opportunity to give Africa a decisive push towards sustainable development.

As a long-standing partner and close neighbour of Africa, the EU is well placed to assume a leading role in this process. Europe and Africa are bound together by common history, interlocking cultures and shared objectives. Sustainable social, economic and political development in Africa is therefore our common concern. While Africa embraces a new vision for the continent's future, the EU has to answer its call with the same sense of responsibility and urgency. The next ten years (2005-2015) will be a watershed in relations between Europe and Africa. Together Africa and the EU should reinforce their efforts to tackle the scourge of HIV/AIDS, poverty, environmental degradation, violent conflict and the lack of basic social services and essential investment. The EU Strategy for Africa outlined in this communication, expected to be adopted by the European Council in December 2005, constitutes the EU's response to the challenge of getting Africa back on the track of sustainable development and of meeting the MDGs by the target year of 2015. This is our common mission, and our common duty.

^{vii} Communications from the Commission 'Speeding up progress towards the MDGs. The EU's contribution' (COM(2005) 132); 'Accelerating progress towards attaining the MDGs – financing for development and aid effectiveness' (COM(2005) 133); and 'Policy coherence for development. Accelerating progress towards attaining the MDGs' (COM(2005) 134).

^{viii} Communication from the Commission 'Proposal for a Joint Declaration by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the European Union Development Policy. The European Consensus' (COM(2005) 311). Available on: http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/tmp_docs/european_consensus_311_final_13_07_2005_en.pdf#zoom=100

^{ix} See ILO, Youth pathways to decent work, report submitted to the International Labour Conference, 93rd session, June 2005

^x The only African country that is not party to any contractual agreement with the EU is Libya.

^{xi} South Africa is also a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement.

^{xii} See COM(2004) 373 final, ENP Strategy Paper.

^{xiii} In North Africa, Association Agreements exist with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt; Libya has observer status in the Partnership.

^{xiv} The ENP will build on mutual commitment to common values, principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, including minority rights, promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development.

^{xv} Communications from the Commission 'Speeding up progress towards the MDGs. The EU's contribution' (COM(2005) 132); 'Accelerating progress towards attaining the MDGs – financing for development and aid effectiveness' (COM(2005) 133); and 'Policy coherence for development. Accelerating progress towards attaining the MDGs' (COM(2005) 134).

^{xvi} Communication from the Commission 'Proposal for a Joint Declaration by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the European Union Development Policy. The European Consensus' (COM-2005-311). Available on:

http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/tmp_docs/european_consensus_311_final_13_07_2005_en.pdf#zoom=100

^{xvii} Notably through intra-ACP financing and the 'shaving-off' of a percentage of the B envelopes under the 9th EDF.

^{xviii} Including respect for human rights (Cotonou Article 9).

^{xix} The *Copenhagen Consensus* project sought to improve prioritisation of the numerous problems the world faces by gathering some of the world's greatest economists at a meeting in Copenhagen in 2004 to assess some of the world's biggest challenges.

^{xx} In line with the EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict, the EU will also sustain its efforts to prevent the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict and to contribute to UN efforts in this field, including the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1612 and relevant resolutions preceding it.

^{xxi} The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme was created to tackle the problem of illicit trade in diamonds, for example through the provision of targeted support for implementation by African producer countries.

^{xxii} Implementation of the strengthened approach to supporting PFM reforms is being developed by the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) partnership between the European Commission, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UK's Department for International Development, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. Analysis and support of PFM systems will remain one of the main objectives of general budget support operations. At the same time, it will be necessary to prevent or at least mitigate any possible negative environmental and social impact, *inter alia* by ensuring appropriate follow-up to Commission-led Sustainability Impact Assessment of the EPAs.

^{xxiii} The main thrust of the agreements will be to assist Africa in attaining a better economic governance and business environment in order to lower the cost of doing business, encourage investment, make industry more competitive and exports cheaper and more effective.

^{xxiv} The YEN is an initiative of the ILO, the World Bank and the UN. A number of African countries (Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal) have already volunteered to prepare national action plans on youth employment. Social partners are closely involved in this. The June 2005 International Labour Conference decided that the YEN should be strengthened and expanded.

^{xxv} Including for schools and universities, following the model successfully used in north Africa, EUMEDconnect. The EUMEDconnect project (www.eumedconnect.net) links the North African National Research and Education Networks amongst themselves and to the European backbone network GÉANT (www.geant2.net).

^{xxvi} For each individual sector, this means: *Transport*: Reduce the cost and improve the quality of infrastructure and services by promoting optimum use of existing multi-modal transport systems and adequate maintenance of the existing infrastructure supporting trans-African and regional networks. *Water*: Sustain the use of available and finite water resources in meeting the populations' water and sanitation needs and improve national and local management of river basin catchments that has an impact at transboundary levels. *Energy*: Facilitate essential investments in generation and transmission of energy that develop crossborder connections and grid extensions, and regional energy agreements that improve affordability and access to energy services. *ICT*: Develop connections with the continental and regional networks and opening of the telecommunications sector to competition for efficient and low-cost provision of ICT services.

^{xxvii} Sustainability is, however, secured almost exclusively at country level. This calls for the EC to: Widen application of its well-developed sectoral approach in the transport and water sectors for improving sectoral governance and economic and financial and institutional sustainability. During the past six to eight years, the sectoral approach has led to better sectoral governance involving the private sector and civil society as well as improved road services and access to water. Roads Boards with stakeholder participation govern Road Funds in over 20 SSA countries and nine semi-autonomous Road Authorities/Agencies exist. Similarly in the water sector. Such national achievements in these sectors are critical for fostering sustainability at regional and continental levels. Develop more Sector Programmes and, in countries where conditions are appropriate (e.g. Ethiopia, Benin, Mauritius, Zambia, etc.), use the sector budget support method, which facilitates efficient delivery of infrastructure and services and fosters sustainability in support of regional networks. Build on the interventions of the EU Water and Energy Initiatives and associated EC facilities that are increasing linkages between national and regional strategies, which sustain coherence between crossborder connections and rural distribution of energy services as well as integrate water management at national and transboundary levels.

^{xxviii} Including EGNOS and GALILEO in satellite navigation and SESAME in air traffic management.

^{xxix} Council Decision of 5 June 2003 (so-called "Horizontal" mandate) authorising the Commission to reach agreements with third countries on behalf of the European Community, on the replacement of certain provisions in existing bilateral agreements.

^{xxx} UN September 2005 Summit Conclusions

^{xxxi} Erasmus Mundus Scholarships have already allowed over one hundred African post-graduate students to obtain post-graduate academic qualifications in Europe

^{xxxii} Modalities of the implementation of such scheme should be further discussed and specified with Member States.

^{xxxiii} Council conclusions of 24 May 2005 on "A European programme for action to confront HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis through external action".

^{xxxiv} Commission communication of 24 April 2005 (COM (2005) 179 final).

^{xxxv} Selected areas of action include affordable pharmaceutical products, regulatory capacity, human resources in the health sector, and research and development of new tools and interventions.

^{xxxvi} Council conclusions on the social dimension of globalisation include support for the promotion of decent work for all (3 March 2003).

^{xxxvii} Currently, an "European Voluntary Service" exist within the framework of the Youth programme (Decision n°1031/2000/Ge of the EP and Council of 13 April 2000).

^{xxxviii} Strengthening the links between migration and development offers significant untapped potential for furthering development goals, as was explored and elaborated in the Commission communication 'Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations'.

^{xxxix} The new generation of EC fishery agreements (Fishery Partnership Agreements – FPAs), while providing regulated access rights to EC fishing vessels, pursues the conservation and sustainable exploitation of local fish resources and provides support to the development of the local fishery sector.

^{xl} Articles 28 and 29 of the revised ACP-EC Partnership Agreement and the attached Council/Commission Declaration.

^{xli} GAERC, 11/2004.

^{xlii} High-Level Forum 2005.

SOME INTERESTING FACTS ABOUT SUB SAHARAN AFRICA^{xliii}

1. The country with the highest GNI per capita for 2003 in Africa is Seychelles (\$7,350). It is followed by Mauritius (\$4,100), Botswana (\$3,530), Gabon (\$3,400), and South Africa (\$2,920).
2. The country with the largest population is Nigeria, with 136.5 million people. It is followed by Ethiopia, with 68.6 million people, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, with 53.2 million.
3. The biggest economy is South Africa, with a real GDP of \$145,338 million (2003). The second largest economy, Nigeria, has a GDP of only \$48,766 million.
4. The smallest economy in the ADI is Sao Tome and Principe, with a GDP of \$53 million (2003).
5. The country with the greatest land area is Sudan, 2.37 million sq. km. The second largest is the Democratic Republic of Congo, with an area of 2.26 million sq. km.
6. The countries with the highest life expectancy are the Seychelles and Mauritius, 73 years (2003).
7. The country with the lowest total life expectancy, 36 years (2003), is Zambia, followed by Lesotho and Sierra Leone with 37 years.
8. The country that has made the greatest gains in life expectancy in the past decade is Somalia – from 42 (1990) to 47 (2003) years. This is followed by Sudan from 52 (1990) to 59 (2003).
9. The countries with the greatest reduction in life expectancy over the past decade in SSA are Lesotho (-20 years), Botswana (-19 years), and Zimbabwe (-18 years).
10. The country with the highest percentage of people above 65 years is the Seychelles, at 6.9 percent (2003).
11. The country with the lowest percentage of people above 65 years is Uganda, at 1.8 percent (2003).
12. Nearly half the population of Uganda (49.8) and Niger (48.9) are under 14 years old (2002).
13. The country with the highest fertility rate is Niger, 7.1 (2003).
14. The country with the lowest fertility rate is Mauritius, 2 (2003).
15. During the past two decades fertility rates have dropped in every African country.
16. The greatest drop in fertility is found in Cape Verde: from 5.5 in 1990, to 3.5 in 2003.

17. The country with the highest infant mortality rate is Sierra Leone, with 166 per 1,000 live births (2003). The second highest rate is found in Liberia, with 157 per 1,000 live births.
18. The country with the lowest infant mortality rate is the Seychelles, with 11 per 1,000 live births (2003). The second lowest rate is found in Mauritius, with 16 per 1,000 live birth.
19. The countries with the highest maternal mortality rate are Sierra Leone, with 2,000 per 100,000 live births, and Malawi, with 1,800 per 100,000 live births.
20. The countries with the lowest maternal mortality are Mauritius, with 24 per 100,000 live births, and Botswana, with 100 per 100,000 live births.
21. The country with the highest level of child malnutrition is Angola: 53 percent of children under 5 are stunted (short for their height). Mauritania has the lowest levels, with 10 percent.
22. The country with the greatest HIV prevalence is Swaziland, where one out of every four adults has contracted the virus (38.8 percent of people in the 15-49 age group). This is followed by Botswana while the least is Mauritania (0.9).
23. The country with the highest adult literacy is Zimbabwe (90 percent).
24. The country with the lowest adult literacy is Niger (17 percent).
25. The country with the lowest female literacy rate is Niger at 9 percent.
26. The country with the highest female literacy rate is Zimbabwe at 86 percent.
27. The country with the highest net primary school enrollment rate is Seychelles, at 99 percent.
28. The country with the lowest net primary school enrollment rate is Burkina Faso, 36 percent.
29. The country with the highest primary school pupil-teacher ratio is the Chad, at 68 pupils per teacher.
30. The country with the lowest primary school pupil-teacher ratio is the Seychelles, at 14 pupils per teacher.
31. The country with the highest proportion of primary female teachers is the Seychelles, at 86 percent. The country with the lowest proportion of primary female teachers is Chad, at 11 percent.
32. The country with the highest proportion of females in its labor force is Rwanda, at 50.2 percent (2002).
33. The country with the lowest proportion of females in the labor force is Sudan, at 30.3 percent (2002).
34. The country with the highest rate of child labor (as percentage of population age 10-14) is Mali, at 49.8 percent. The lowest is found in South Africa, with zero.
35. The countries with the most telephone mainlines are Mauritius and the Seychelles, both with 270 and 269 per 1,000 people, respectively.
36. The countries with the fewest telephone mainlines are the Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad with 2 and 0 per 1,000 people, respectively.

The average for Sub-Saharan Africa is of 15 per 1,000 persons for mainlines and 37 per 1,000 people for mobile phones.

37. In 81 percent of SSA countries, there are more mobile phones per 1,000 people than mainlines per 1,000 people.
38. The country using the most electric power per person is South Africa (3,860.1 kwh per capita).
39. The country using the least electric power per person is Ethiopia (25.3 kwh. per capita).
40. The country with the most urbanized population is Djibouti, at 84.6 percent.
41. The country with the least urbanized population is Rwanda, at 6.6 percent.
42. The country with the highest road-to-population ratio (1,000 km/one million persons) is Namibia, with 36.5 (using 1977 values).
43. The countries with the lowest road-to-population ratio (1,000 km/one million persons) are Malawi and Mauritius, with 1.7 (using 1997 values).
44. The country with the lowest percentage of population with access to safe water is Ethiopia, with 22 percent.
45. The country with the least access to safe sanitation is Ethiopia, with only 6 percent of the population having access.
46. The country that received the highest net aid per capita during 2002 is Cape Verde (\$306), followed by São Tomé and Príncipe (\$239) and the Seychelles (\$110).
47. The countries that received the lowest net ODA per capita in 2003 were Nigeria (\$2), Togo (\$9), Central Africa (13), and South Africa (\$14).
48. The country with the highest cost for starting a business in 2004 is Angola (\$6,621), while Ethiopia has the lowest at \$74.
49. The country with the highest cost for closing a business (% of estate) in 2004 is Chad (\$76), which is also the country with the longest time period for closing a business.

^{xliii} Source: World Bank

THE UN MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Goal 1.- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day

▮ *Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger*

Goal 2. Achieve universal primary education

Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary education

Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women

Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015

Goal 4.- Reduce Child mortality

Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five

Goal 5: Improve maternal health

Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability

Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources

Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water

Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020

Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development

Develop further an open trading and financial system that is- rule based, predictable and non-discriminatory, includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction- nationally and internationally

Address the least developed countries' special needs. This include tariff and quota-free access for their exports; enhanced debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries; cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction

Address the special needs of landlocked and small island developing States

Deal comprehensively with developing countries' debt problems through national and international measures to make debt sustainable in the long term

In cooperation with the developing countries, develop decent and productive work for youth

In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries

In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies- especially information and communications technologies

PUBLICATIONS OF THE UNA OF HUNGARY

1. Az Egyesült Nemzetek Alapokmánya és a Nemzetközi Bíróság Alapszabálya;
2. Az Emberi Jogok Egyetemes Nyilatkozata;
3. Az Emberi Jogok Nemzetközi Törvénye;
4. Az ENSZ-ről röviden (1990);
5. Az ENSZ tevékenységének fókuszában (1989);
6. Egyezmény a gyermek jogairól;(UNICEF MNB kiadványa);
7. Fegyverkezés és leszerelés (1990);
8. 25 év az ENSZ-ben (1982);
9. Az ENSZ napjainkban (Kossuth kiadóval közösen) (1985);
10. Hazánk és az ENSZ (1985);
11. Az Egyesült Nemzetek egy jobb világért (1987);
12. Az emberi jogok ma Magyarországon (1989);
13. Koalíció az ENSZ támogatására (1989);
14. Dr. Antall József miniszterelnök beszéde az ENSZ Közgyűlés 46. Ülésszakán (1991);
15. Alapvető tények az Egyesült Nemzetekről (1991);
16. Egyezmény a nőkkel szemben alkalmazott hátrányos megkülönböztetések (diszkrimináció) minden formájának kiküszöböléséről; (Magyar Nők Szövetségével közösen) (1991);
17. Környezet és fejlesztés (1992);
18. A Magyar ENSZ Társaság alapszabálya (1989);
19. Az ENSZ és a demokrácia (1992);
20. Boutros Boutros-Ghali: Békeprogram (1992);
21. ENSZ-Akadémia – 1993;
22. A riói konferencia és a teendők utána (1993);
23. Az 50 éves ENSZ, A világszervezet jelentős eredményei 50 pontban (1995);
24. Boutros Boutros-Ghali: Fejlesztési program (1995);
25. Tisovszky János: Az ENSZ és a békefenntartás (1997);
26. Kép és valóság, Kérdések és válaszok az ENSZ-ről (1997);
27. Az ENSZ-család és Magyarország (ENSZ-akadémia, 1997);
28. A Magyar ENSZ Társaság alapszabálya (1998);
29. Alapvető tények az ENSZ-ről (2000).
30. Kofi A. Annan, az ENSZ főtitkára: 'Mi a népek' –az ENSZ szerepe a 21. században (2000)
31. ENSZ Millenniumi Nyilatkozat (2000)
32. Az ENSZ és a NATO (2002)
33. Az ENSZ és az EU együttműködése (2003)
34. Nemzetközi fejlesztési együttműködés a XXI. században (2005, HUNIDA kht-val közösen)

Megjegyzés: a még raktáron lévő kiadványok térítésmentesen beszerezhetők a Magyar ENSZ Társaságtól (1062, Budapest, Andrásy út 124. Telefon: 331-2124, Fax: 472-0840, E-mail: menst@menst.hu, Honlap: www.menst.hu)

THE ROLE OF THE HUNGARIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE NON-PROFIT COMPANY (HUN-IDA)

Ibolya BÁRÁNY, Managing Director

The UN Academy conference series, including the one on Africa was co-organized by the Hungarian International Development Assistance non-profit company, thereafter HUN-IDA.

Being a relatively young and small non-governmental agency, we felt privileged to take such a substantial role in helping realize the UN Academy events. By doing so, we strived for taking another significant step towards achieving our principal objective of:

“Intensifying and making more visible Hungary’s development cooperation efforts, with the highest level of ethics and professionalism.”

HUN-IDA was founded in 2001 with the objective of intensifying Hungary’s involvement in development cooperation programs. It grew out of the Organization for International Technical and Scientific Cooperation and Training Co. (TESCO Ltd.) with around 40 years of experience in technical and scientific co-operation with 57 countries of three continents.

Our activities became more visible in 2004, when we gained the Official Implementing Agency status from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the country’s bilateral development assistance programs. HUN-IDA also obtained the Mandated Twinning Partner Status for European Union projects; the official Adult (Vocational) Education License and a quality assurance certificate (ISO 9001: 2001) for Development Cooperation. We launched the Vietnam-Hungary Transition Knowledge Center project and the Hungarian Development Experts’ program, including a sub-program for young professionals. We got involved in promoting Global Development Education and implemented various public awareness raising programs. Among our partners, we have been working with the European Commission, UNDP, CIDA, the World Bank, GTZ, various bilateral development agencies and 19 beneficiary country governments.

As you can see, we are a relatively new Hungarian organization in development cooperation, though with roots back to past decades and some ambitious plans for the future. We truly hope to leave our mark in Hungary’s development cooperation history, especially as regards its initial phase of transforming into a real donor. The UN Academy events represented just one opportunity for HUN-IDA for doing so.

I hope you will find the information presented in this Report as useful as

proud we were with the overall accomplishment of these 14+1 conference events, which had been reflected in the positive feedbacks and comments received from the participants, the lecturers, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.